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Introduction: Civil society, Participation, and Democratization 
The notion that civil society is fundamental for a thriving democracy was reintroduced to 
sociology and political science in the late 1970s, following the work of such Central European 
dissidents as Leszek Kolakowski, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, the Czech Charter‘77 
movement or the members of the Hungarian Democratic Opposition   (Arato, 1981, 1992). As 
their ideas of possible democratization and resistance to the socialist state were heard and 
generalized by researchers worldwide, and the expectations toward civil society were enormous 
at the time of the Velvet Revolution (Baker, 2003). 
In this dissertation, I examine the extent civil society was able to fulfill these expectations in 
Hungary. Obviously, I do not intend to reheat unrealistic expectations towards civil society, or 
to present civil society as a mysterious cure for all the problems of contemporary Hungarian 
democracy. Instead, based on the literature on civil society published around the transition, I 
will carefully explore the main expectations towards civil society, take the results as 
hypotheses, and translate them into an empirical examination.  
These expectations, or hypotheses, at large, are that civil society, understood as a sphere of 
voluntary associations, performs a twofold role in the process of creating the new democracy. 
First, that this associational sphere expands itself and the pool of citizens engaging in exercising 
their civil and political rights. Second, that participation in voluntary associations fosters the 
individual engagement in political participation and political activities described by using the 
language of civil and political rights.  
Since Hungarian civil society is generally regarded as weak (Gerő - Kopper, 2013; Howard, 
2003; Kuti, 2016, 2017; Szalai et al., 2017), the necessity of such an evaluation requires further 
justification. The interesting fact about this alleged ‘weakness’ of Hungarian civil society is 
that the statement was first made right after the Velvet Revolution (see for example Arato, 1992; 
Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993; Kaldor, 1991; Ost, 1993) and since then it has been emphasized in 
almost every account.  
This rash and rigid claim makes it clear that after the Velvet Revolution the high hopes towards 
civil society were followed by quick disillusionment. Nevertheless, its empirical ground 
changed. In the early nineties, authors emphasized more the demobilization of society and its 
democratic deficit (Arato, 1992), while the rise of populism and non-democratic movements 
(Pakulski, 1995; Tismaneanu, 1993) strengthened the view that civil society was unable to 
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deliver. Later, the main empirical ground this evaluation was its comparison to the strength of 
Western European civil societies, mainly measured by the number of participants in 
associations, protests and other events (Ekiert - Kubik, 2014; Foa - Ekiert, 2017). 1 
Although the comparison obviously stands, this verdict might be a bit suspicious. Firstly, 
because the development of a democracy is a process, not a one-time act of establishing 
democratic institutions. The role of civil society would be the stabilization of this process by 
creating a new type of political culture and through the increasing participation, creating a 
balance between different subsystems of society. This obviously takes more than just a few 
years. Besides, there is a flaw in the argument, as Foa and Ekiert (2017) point out, proposing a 
strong civil society in the late eighties and a weak one just years after the regime change. 
Furthermore, according to Cohen and Arato (1992), civil society itself should develop parallel 
to democratic institutions.   
A further contradiction fuels this suspicion. Despite the importance attributed to civil society 
in building a democracy, and its alleged weakness, the state of Hungarian democracy was often 
referred to as satisfactory and stable (Ágh, 2014; Bernhard, 1993; Bogaards, 2018; Ekiert - 
Kubik, 1998; Foa - Ekiert, 2017). If civil society is indeed important in building a democracy, 
then how it is possible that civil society is weak, but democratic institutions are stable? The 
developments of Hungarian democracy since 2010 show that these institutions were less stable 
and more fragile than perceived earlier. Thus, if institutions were also fragile, then it is still 
worth examining how civil society performed throughout the period preceding the demolition 
of democratic institutions after 2010.    
The main reasons which led to the almost immediate blaming of civil society for its weaknesses 
probably lie in the various uses of the concept. Most importantly, two very distinct purposes of 
its use should be distinguished. First, it was normatively or analytically used for the aims of 
social sciences, mainly for political sociology. Second, it was used to describe a political 
strategy by oppositional movements and political actors (Baker, 2003; Gellner, 1994; 
Seligman, 1995). 
The strategic use of ‘civil society’ marks an important difference between the usage of the 
concept in the previous 300 or more years and after its reinvention in the 1970s. After Adam 
Michnik launched the project of New Evolutionism, or Havel and Konrád published their idea 
                                                                
1 As examples of articles, research reports applying this strategy, see:  Hajdu (2012); Howard (2003); E. Sik and 
Giczi (2009); Wallace et al. (2012). 
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of antipolitics, the theory of civil society was intended to be applied. Furthermore, dissidents 
and oppositional movements proposed a strategy based on civil society under non-democratic 
circumstances. Thus, their intention was not only to explore how civic engagement contributes 
to a vital democracy, but to figure out how to develop a new democracy based on civil 
society and against the socialist state. This was a real-life test of a theory, which naturally 
led to debates in the social sciences and contributed to the increasing expectations towards civil 
society as a sphere or subsystem.  
The strategy of civil society is a long-term, bottom-up strategy. Under authoritarian rule, when 
violent revolution is not an option, as in pre-1989 Central and Eastern Europe there is no other 
possibility than to engage in such a long-term strategy. However, the transition provided an 
unforeseen possibility, which found the opposition unprepared. In this unforeseen situation, 
when new politicians had to handle constitutional changes and the struggles of normal politics 
at the same time, the circumstances are not in favor of the bottom-up strategy of civil society. 
As a consequence, even the most committed protagonists of the political strategy based on civil 
society abandoned their previous strategy (Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993). Instead, actors were 
engaged in top-down institution building, and focused on regulations, creating a new economic 
and political framework, hoping that these new frameworks would transform the polity and 
political culture (Ekiert - Kubik, 2014).2    
Thus, civil society as a political strategy failed after the Velvet Revolution and since the 
boundaries between the two types of usage were blurry, this might lead to the perception 
that civil society itself has failed. It is likely that this is the view that prevented most political 
sociologists from a careful evaluation of the role civil society has played in the democratization 
(or the lack of democratization) in Central and Eastern Europe, leading to the idea that civil 
society is no longer a useful category. 
However, even if the political strategy has failed, examining the processes based on the 
analytical and normative concepts of civil society is still relevant in understanding the past 
decades of democratization. This work should focus on the process of democratization, rather 
than the legal acts of creating institutions. Therefore, I am going to examine processes, rather 
than the state of civil society in a given year or engage in cross-country comparisons. This 
                                                                
2 For further details on this process, see Chapter I.2. 
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means that the impact of civil society should be examined longitudinally, and the comparison 
should be made with its own state in different periods of the post-transition era.3  
The empirical examination should be based on the carefully explored expectations towards 
civil society. These expectations, however, might be highly dependent on the very definition of 
civil society. Therefore, the first step to arrive at the two hypotheses formulated above was to 
explore the various meanings of civil society in relation to the Hungarian developments around 
the transition.   
It is well known, that the term ‘civil society’ has many meanings. There are eminent authors 
who have successfully unpacked the concept’s centuries-old history, including Adam Seligman 
(1995), Andrew Arato, Jean L. Cohen (1992)  or Jeffrey Alexander (1998), or proposed a 
categorization of the various usages of the concept. These attempts, however, offer mainly 
general, context-free categorizations (Edwards, 2009; Perez-Diaz, 1998).  
It is much less common for authors to review the usage of civil society in relation to the Velvet 
Revolution or a specific country like Hungary. It seems, however, crucial to identify the various 
meanings of the concept to identify the main expectations. Since civil society is a normative 
concept in most cases, and it is certainly normative in the environment of the socialist 
state, its usage always refers to the impact civil society should achieve: sometimes as a 
function, sometimes as a goal, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly. Furthermore, either 
openly or as a latent assumption, authors engaging in civil society theories propose certain 
mechanisms to reach these results.  
Based on reviewing the literature between 1985 and 1995, I have identified five main models.4 
The first understands civil society as a social order and focuses on the structural characteristics 
of society. Besides the proponents of this idea, as Ernest Gellner, this is the group of authors 
where the fiercest critics of the usefulness of the concept are found, such as Adam Seligman or 
Krishan Kumar. The second and third group of authors use dualistic models, where civil 
society consists of everything outside the state: not only voluntary associations, or the public 
sphere but enterprises, family and friends as well. One of them proposes a general model, 
mainly based on John Keane’s and Ralf Dahrendorf’s work, while the other is applied to 
                                                                
3 Interestingly, for western societies, this type of analysis stands without a problem. For example, Putnam et al. 
(1993) examines the long-term processes of Italy and Putnam (1995b) the USA without any reference to other 
countries. In the Hungarian context, mainly trends in the number of non-profit organizations is published regularly 
(Balogh et al., 2003).   
4 See Chapter I.2. 
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Hungarian and Central and Eastern European countries under socialism. This second view is 
often referred to as the second society (see Hankiss, 1988) and in relation with the concept of 
antipolitics proposed by György Konrád or Václav Havel. 
The two remaining views present civil society as a more demarcated social sphere. The grand 
theory of Arato and Cohen (1992), or Márkus’ (1992) concept offer a view where civil society 
is the intermediary sphere between the state or economy and the informal, private sphere. This 
view often serves as a ground for authors presenting civil society as a network of voluntary 
associations. Finally, the most practical, analytic view presents civil society as the opposition 
under socialism.  
As it turns out, after reviewing their differences, the various views have important 
commonalities. First of all, they all expect civil society to contribute something to the freedom 
of citizens. Freedom, on the one hand, is understood and described by individual freedom rights, 
using the language of human rights (Judt, 1988) and on the other in practical terms, thus as the 
actual realization of these rights by citizens. Thus, they share their main expectation, the 
increasing realization of the civil and political rights on the individual level.  
A further commonality is that, although they define it very differently, voluntary associations 
are always at the core of this civil society. Furthermore, associations are not only important 
as actors, or a terrain for mobilization, but that they take the main part in the democratic 
socialization of people who engage in civil society. The various groups of authors might offer 
different definitions for associations, but as the main understanding I see them as organizations 
joined or established voluntarily, mainly by individuals, for the sake of a public aim, or for the 
sake of the aims of a given community (Braun, 2014; Freise - Hallmann, 2014).  
The main difference between the five groups of theories originates from the ways they see the 
differentiation between the state and civil society. As a result, they propose different 
mechanisms leading to the development of the associational sphere. For example, authors 
defining civil society as a social order emphasize centuries-long historical processes, while 
proponents of the second society emphasize the role of structural inconsistencies in the process 
of awakening, where inconsistencies and structural conflicts lead to the articulation of interests, 
and associations will be gathered to represent these interests.5  
Therefore, in the background of the two hypotheses, there is a unified model of 
democratization. This model has three elements: 1) the desired outcome, the growth in the 
                                                                
5 See Chapter I.2. 
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application and practice of civil and political rights by citizens. Although many of these rights 
appear, rights securing the organization of the associational sphere, such as freedom of 
association, or the rights providing the foundations and guarantees of political participation, as 
freedom of expression or assembly and the right to take part in public affairs have an 
exceptional role. 2) civil society, as the sphere of voluntary associations, considered as a major 
actor in fostering the use of civil and political rights. The theories often refer to the 
Tocquevillian approach to voluntary associations. According to this, associations might foster 
participation and the realization of rights connected to it by distributing information, serving as 
a pool of building networks of mobilization, finding partners for collective actions, developing 
skills through face to face contacts, negotiating or organizing6. 3) the various mechanisms 
leading to the development of the associational sphere.  
The first and second elements of the model serve as the guiding hypotheses for the empirical 
examination carried out in this dissertation. The empirical test of the third element, although 
such mechanisms are identified in Chapter I.2, would exceed the boundaries of this work.  
The disillusionment in civil society and the debate about the usefulness of the term had a further 
consequence. In the scholarly debates, at least in Hungary, ‘civil society’ has been replaced by 
economic theories of the non-profit sector, which pushes me to explain why despite its problems 
I use the concept of civil society to examine the impact of voluntary associations.  
On the one hand, the dominance of non-profit theories is due to the decision researchers at the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office took in the early nineties that they would join the promising 
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project of the John Hopkins University and apply the non-profit 
definition of Lester M. Salamon and Helmut Anheier7 to the sphere of associational and 
voluntary organizations. On the other hand, non-profit theories focus on explaining how non-
profit organizations work under democratic circumstances, while civil society theories always 
emphasize the fight for such a democratic environment. Thus, when I focus on democratization, 
civil society fits better as a conceptual framework.  
To examine the two hypotheses, I needed to conduct two different analyses. The first was to 
identify the changes in the level of the practice concerning civil and political rights between 
1990 and 2010. Measuring the tendencies in exercising rights is quite problematic, since the 
existing methods, applied by such world-wide reports as Freedom in the World, presents 
                                                                
6 Cf. Dekker (2014); Edwards (2009); Tocqueville (2006). 
7 For example, see Salamon (1994); Salamon and Anheier (1997, 2006) 
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Hungary, surprisingly, as an established democracy8, which guarantees civil and political rights 
on a high level already in the early nineties, and the evaluation does not change throughout the 
examined period. Therefore, based on these measurements, it is not possible to follow the 
changes in the realization of civil and political rights, especially the four rights listed above.  
Since it is hard to accept that there was no progress or setback in the state of rights between 
1990 and 2010, I need to identify the main causes of the shortcomings of the existing methods 
of measurement and to develop a new approach that can capture the changes. The reasons for 
their shortcoming, i.e. that they unable to capture changes, are connected to the aforementioned 
contradiction between the weakness of civil society and the stability of democratic institutions. 
Civil society and human rights theories approach democratization from different angles. 
Human rights theories assume that the flourishing of exercising human rights is dependent on 
the environment that we create; they consider the state as the most important factor in this 
environment. Thus, if the state performs well, people are supposed to start embracing and 
exercising their rights. Consequently, to capture the state of human rights, it is supposed to 
be best to examine the state, its regulation, and policies. For civil society theories, however, 
the democratic quality of these institutions is caused by structural factors, their historical, 
cultural and social embeddedness, which is expressed through civil society. Accordingly, the 
praxis of rights might be less dependent on the state and is mainly influenced by other factors. 
This leads to the very different approaches of the two: while civil society theories emphasize 
the bottom-up nature of building a democracy, human rights theories assume the top-
down process of democratization.  
This yields an action-based approach of measurement worked out in Chapter II.1. This type 
of measurement relies on different types of data, most importantly on large-scale, 
representative, individual level surveys. The last two chapters are designed to examine the 
hypotheses proposed in chapter I.2, however with a different design. Chapter II.2 is not only a 
long-term evaluation of exercising rights but investigates how the general, constitutional 
framework, certain policies supporting participation, political opportunity structures or political 
turbulences influence the individual level engagement to exercising the four fundamental rights 
listed above. Since there is no specific data constructed for my purposes, I need to apply various 
surveys to build the timelines of exercising rights, confront them with the literature on such 
activities and sometimes apply supplementary data on the organizational or on the event level 
provided by the authorities.  The last chapter (II.3) before the Conclusion turns to the role of 
                                                                
8 Most of the Central-European, post-communist countries appear similarly as established democracy.  
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associations and examines the extent associations influence political participation. In this 
chapter, I use the three waves of the European Values Study (1991, 1999 and 2008)9 to examine 
this question.  
The chapters of the dissertation use various methodologies to unpack the proposed questions. I 
have always tried to choose the methodology most suitable for answering these questions, rather 
than relying on my preferences or earlier practices. Thus, the first part of the dissertation, 
dealing with the meaning of civil society, the failure of civil society as a political strategy and 
the usefulness of the term mostly builds on the available literature. The results of this analysis 
serve as the grounds for the further empirical analysis presented in the second part of the 
dissertation. 
This empirical analysis, although civil society consists of organizations, is based on surveys 
conducted on the individual level. The reason for applying this strategy is that the available 
data on civil society organizations on the organizational level is mainly gathered for the aims 
of the non-profit research, leaving out non-formal associations and including non-voluntary 
nonprofit organizations. The scope of information collected is also limited to “organizational 
demographics”, which does not enable us to examine the realization of civil and political rights.  
The individual-level data is able to provide the possibility to examine the fulfillment of rights, 
however, offers little information about the types of associations or voluntary organizations 
respondents are involved in. Still, it offers a better chance to examine the relationship between 
associational involvement and the realization or practice of rights. Naturally, when it fits the 
aims of the analysis, I use other sources as well, for example, the figures of registering 
associations, or the yearly number of assemblies.  
The reason that my analysis does not go beyond 2010 is that a new era started in 
Hungarian politics in 2010. There are harsh debates, domestic and international, scholarly and 
public, about what is happening in Hungary, but there is agreement that the situation is new.  
Most of the commentators identify the decline of democracy and the creation of a new 
authoritarian or illiberal government and a limited democracy. Over the last eight years, 
criticism has become louder and might lead to sanctions from the European Union. In the annual 
Freedom in the World Report of Freedom House, Hungary receives worse and worse scores 
each year.10 In 2018, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the 
                                                                
9  (EVS, 2011) 




European Parliament issued a report to the EP, in which they formulate serious concerns with 
the state of Hungarian democracy, identifying several aspects where rule of law and 
fundamental rights are in real danger.11 Besides political and policy claims, the scholarly 
literature is filled with similar concerns, claiming that Hungary has turned away from the path 
of building democracy (Ágh, 2014; Kornai, 2015), labeling the recent developments as  
selective democracy (Varga - Freyberg-Inan, 2012) a neo-prebendal state (Csillag - Szelényi, 
2015) or defective democracy (Bogaards, 2018). 
Interestingly, this is also a time when debates about civil society have become prevalent in 
public discourses. The attacks on civil society organizations since 2014, a new law labelling 
civil society organizations accepting funds from abroad ”as foreign-funded organizations”, the 
campaign against the Open Society Foundation and its founder George Soros, and human rights 
organizations have brought back the issue into the public discourse (Gerő - Kerényi, 2017; 
Susánszky et al., 2017; Szalai et al., 2017; Torma, 2016) 
Although it is very tempting to include the post-2010 period into the analysis, I have good 
reasons for leaving it out. First, it would go beyond the scope of a dissertation and twenty years 
is enough to cover. Secondly, by examining the 1990-2010 period this contradiction could be 
exploited and used to contribute to our understanding of the preconditions of the development 
of the last years, in short, why Hungarian democracy is so vulnerable.  
The structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is built of more or less independent chapters. Each chapter has its own 
theoretical or introductory part, its own statement or hypotheses to examine. Although I sought 
to write most of the chapters so that they could be understandable on their own, they share their 
terminology and their main problematique revolves around the main question of the dissertation 
and the chapters build on each other’s results, as the cross-references will show.   
The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the period of the “Velvet 
Revolution”. After a short outline of the context of the revival of civil society (Chapter I.1), 
chapter II.2 fulfills three tasks. First, it explores the different usages of the concept around the 
                                                                
11 Rule of law in Hungary: Parliament should ask Council to act, say committee MEPs. Press Release by the 
European Parliament. Ref.: 20180625IPR06503.  
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180625IPR06503/rule-of-law-in-hungary-parliament-
should-ask-council-to-act-say-committee-meps. last accessed: 10/20/2018.  
Since then, the report was passed by the European Union and the procedure of Article 7 of the Treaty on european 
Union was initiated.  
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transition by reviewing and analyzing the scholarly literature in English and Hungarian 
connected to Hungarian civil society. Second, it defines the model I will use by highlighting 
their common features of. Third, by accessing the hidden assumptions built in civil society 
theories, it explains why the political strategy of civil society has failed since the transition. The 
third chapter provides reasons for the further use of the concept of civil society, even if its place 
has been occupied by non-profit theories, via highlighting their different origins and the 
theoretical consequences of this fact.   
Part II turns to the measurement and evaluation of the trends in exercising political rights 
between 1990 and 2010. Chapter II.1 examines why the existing methods of measurement are 
not satisfactory for my purpose and introduces the action-based measurement of exercising four 
fundamental rights.  The four rights are the freedom of association, the right to peaceful 
assembly, freedom of expression and the right to take part in public issues.  
Chapter II.2 evaluates the tendencies of exercising these rights between 1990 and 2010, based 
on information provided by nationally representative surveys, data gathered by authorities and 
by previous research. In this chapter, I also try to identify the influence of institutional factors: 
the general framework, policies introduced by the different governments, the political 
opportunity structures, and political turbulences. While the general framework was stable, 
several policies supporting civil society and participation were introduced in the second half of 
the 1990s and in the first half of the 2000s. Supporting policies were introduced under left-wing 
governments, which might indicate that the rule of these governments meant more open 
political opportunity structures.  I consider as political turbulences mainly the transition and the 
political crisis in 2006. To explore the possible impact of institutional settings, I identify three 
policy and five electoral periods and the time points of turbulences, examining whether the 
longitudinal data, where it is available, shows any changes in relation with the periods or time 
points.    
Part II.3 returns to the second element of the expectations towards civil society: the role of 
associations in fostering political participation. This is the chapter where the expectations and 
the international literature on the mechanisms will be confronted. Based on the previous 
research, two types of political participation, electoral and extra-parliamentary participation, 
are distinguished. The main assumption, namely that associational participation has a 
correlation with these two types of participation, is further sophisticated, by identifying 
additional types of associations: political, non-political interest and religious associations. The 
correlations between associational and political participation are examined through regression 
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Part I. Hopes and Disillusionment: Civil 
Society and the Revolution in 1989   
19 
 
I.1. The Socio-political Context of the Rebirth of Civil Society in 
Hungary  
Probably most of the readers are well aware of the socio-political and economic context, which 
characterized the period when the concept of civil society had re-emerged. Thus, the following 
pages serve only as a reminder to draw an outline of what happened and when prior to the 
transition. I will shortly discuss the Hungarian version of socialism, some of the factors led to 
its fall and the actors, who played important role in the transition. During this short chapter, 
however, I will start to introduce some of the terms, as the ‘second economy’, ‘second society’ 
or the ‘democratic opposition’, which will be referred to in the next chapter.  
I.1.1. The fall of socialism and the socio-political consequences of the transition 
A. The socialist system in Hungary 
The Hungarian version of socialism, although it was undoubtedly a socialist system, and shared 
the main attributes of socialism with its Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak counterparts, showed 
significant differences from the other members of the Soviet-bloc. However, its distinctive 
characteristics appeared primarily after the 1956 revolution. According to Kornai, (1992) the 
main distinctive characteristic of a socialist system is the bureaucratic coordination, which is 
originated in the Party’s dominant role in the political structure and controlling of property. 
Thus, the main characteristics of a socialist system can be summarized as (Kornai, 2007:305-
306):  
1. The dominant role of public property. Private property has only a complementary role 
if any.  
2. The coordination of socio-economic activities is based on central-bureaucratic 
coordination. Market-based coordination has only a subordinated, complementary role 
if any.   
3. Political power is monopolized by the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, which is 
opposing the idea of capitalism.   
Csanádi and Lörincz (1992) specify further how the influence of the Party over economic 
processes and the property permeates the decision-making system, creating parallel and cross-
cutting decision-making structures, causing uncertainty and the primacy of political interests 
over economic rationality.  
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Hankiss (1989a) defines the socialist system in its relation to the European ideal-type of 
modernization: Thus, a socialist-system, although it is an effort of modernization itself, it is 
seen as an anti-modernization attempt, by Hankiss, since it is characterized by the lack of 
chance to fulfill modern freedoms, as freedom connected to rationality, humanism and 
European liberties.  
Although the features defined by Kornai and Hankiss, listed above, defined the whole period 
between 1948 and 1989, there were certain differences in the various periods of Hungarian 
socialism. The main distinction between these periods is often made in the mid-1960s.12 The 
period prior to the mid-1960s was characterized by an orthodox and totalitarian rule, by 
aggressive and often violent nationalization, the formation of cooperatives and atomization of 
the society. Between 1956 and 1963, the methods of developing a socialist society became more 
sophisticated and less aggressive, but more effective (Rainer, 2004). This is the stage of the 
demobilization of the society (Hankiss, 1989a), a period under which the socialist system was 
fabricated, democratic institutions were demolished, and existing identities were destroyed. ( 
Based on the experience that led to the Revolution in 1956, Kádár slowly started to develop a 
more balanced type of socialism. The differences of the pre- and post-1956 (or 1963, 
respectively) periods are well represented by the mottos of the Rákosi and Kádár era. The period 
among 1948 and 1956 can be described by the motto: ‘he, who is not with us, is against us’ 
indicating a continuous “war” against society, while Kádár has changed this motto to ‘he, who 
is not against us, is with us.’ 13 Clearly, it is a motto that refers to the willingness of 
reconciliation with the Hungarian society (Rainer, 2001). 
In this second period, labeled as liberalization by Hankiss (1989a) the distinctive characteristics 
of the Hungarian version of socialism were its relatively liberal and reform-oriented nature, 
compared to other socialist countries, which was expressed in the constant commuting between 
reforms and turnbacks or at least by the continuous talk about reforms (Rainer, 2007; Miklós 
Szabó, 1989). 
In this period, the society and the elite lived together more or less peacefully. The government 
provided the society with a better standard of living than the other socialist countries, the 
possibility of the slow accumulation of wealth and with a kind of consumer society. In return, 
                                                                
12 The staging, however is not clear. While the post-1956 period (1ö56-1988) is often labeled as Kadarism, based 
on the rule of János Kádár, (Rainer, 2010), while the aims and characteristics, of the system suggests a staging 
similar to Hankiss’ version (Rainer, 2004).  
13 Kádár first used this phrase in December 1961, (Rainer, 2001) 
21 
 
the average members of the society accepted the rule of the Party and did not interfere with 
politics. (Hankiss, 1989a) since the regime was unable to convince the people to engage in the 
official ideology, this “deal” between the regime and the society aimed to provide legitimacy 
of the system based on satisfying the material needs and slowly raising the living standards. 
(Tökés, 1979)  
This is the period, however, which concluded in the dissolution of the system. The causes were 
the growing indebtedness of the state and the failure of keeping the deal on the side of the state, 
the growth of the second economy and second society and naturally the changing international 
circumstances.  
B. Processes demolishing the socialist system 
It is hard to point out when the fall of socialism has started. Some processes, which might play 
a role along the way, started already in the sixties. Kornai (1998) points out that with regards to 
the coordination mechanisms of the economic system, certain transformations were initiated 
already in 1968, with the introduction of the “New Economic Mechanism”. This reform allowed 
some autonomy to the state-owned companies and increased the role of market-based 
coordination. Although the reform was withdrawn in 1973, it increased the importance of 
autonomous economic initiatives and slowly changed the social structure and the economy under 
the surface.  
The second economy and the second society 
In the economic sphere, Gábor and Galasi (1981) detected the development of the second 
economy, a set of economic activities which in sum, utilize the labor outside the official 
economic sector of the socialist system. These activities contributed to the stabilization of the 
socialist economy in the 1960s. The second economy at first was mainly constituted by small 
household farms, then small enterprises of an informal private sector.  
Such private informal economic activities were restricted in the fifties and early sixties and 
became “legal” when the New Economic Mechanism brought a more supportive direction of 
politics in this sense. The first and second economy was interdependent, the first often provided 
resources and raw material for the activities of the second, while through the possibility of 
accumulating some wealth and supplementing the family’s income the second stabilized the 
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first.14 However, as an unintended consequence, the strategy of letting the second economy 
prevail, led to the further paralyzation of the first economy,  
“where everybody from managers to unskilled workers looked to tricks, lobbying, 
bargaining and loopholes rather than improving efficiency or quality, where all sorts of 
personal networks and informal organizations run the economy, (Sik 1992:170)  
Sik (1992) argues further: these practices led to a dense, informal network which effectively 
helped the families to survive or accumulate wealth step by step. Eventually, these practices 
and networks affected everyone’s lives, became stable and contributed to the transition by 
transforming itself - partially - into the informal economy. They became a lasting strategy to 
cope with economic hardships.   
Kis (1989) in the same time claims that the growth of the second economy, although it gave 
some autonomy to people, also caused self-exploitation. According to Kis, the destructive 
effects of the self-exploitation made clear that the double life, work in the first and then the 
second economy at the same time, cannot be maintained on a long term. 
Second Society 
Hankiss (1988) extends the idea of the second economy into the notion of a second society. He 
claims that second society, a “latent, second sphere of socio-economic existence” (Hankiss, 
1988:1) started to grow in the late 1950s.  Second society consists of not only economic 
activities but a second public sphere, a second cultural sphere, and even a hidden, second 
consciousness. Civil society and the oppositional movements also fall into the category of this 
second society and they strongly connect to the second public sphere and preserving of 
“original” values.   (Hankiss, 1988, 1989a) 
Both notions the second economy and the second society represent the duplication of structures. 
People often managed to live a double life, one in the official economy and public sphere and 
one in their private life and the second society. The reason, that the regime allowed and 
sometimes encouraged this duplication of life, was its need for a silent legitimation, which came 
in the aforementioned “deal” between the elite and the society. The people do not question the 
rule of the Party and mainly stay out of public issues, and in exchange the Party creates an 
                                                                
14 The state’s attempt was even to connect the two in a way which would subordinate the second economy to the 
official one, thus keeps it under control and avoid its unwanted expansion. The tools of doing this are twofold: 
first, regulations describing activities allowed in the second economy, the maximum size of enterprises and 
production, and taxation. Second, the state tries to make the second economy dependent on the first one as the 




environment in which the living standard is relatively high, compared to other socialist 
countries, and informal activities are allowed in order to a slow accumulation of personal wealth 
and increasing this standard of living. (Miklós Szabó, 1989)  
This lead to the duplication (or multiplication) of the mechanisms, which rendered the social 
stratification as well. Besides the positions occupied in the first economy, the second, informal 
spheres increasingly influenced the structure of the Hungarian society. Authors refer to this 
phenomenon as double stratification or double structures. (Gagyi - Éber, 2015)  
The increasing importance of the second spheres was accompanied by decreasing economic 
growth and economic stagnation in the eighties. The two factors together started to undermine 
the legitimacy of the ruling elite. (Szelenyi - Szelenyi, 1994). The economic stagnation was 
manifested in the fall of the ratios of GDP growth (which fell from 4 to 1.5 percent in 1979) or 
in the growing indebtedness of the state. Evidently, the slow growth caused hardships in the 
struggle to keep the living standard on a relatively high level and enforcing full employment.  
The important role of the stagnation in the collapse of the system is unquestioned. However, 
different explanations of this stagnation are available. Some of them emphasize internal reasons 
as the structure of labor force (Csanády, 2009) or a governance crisis (Hankiss, 1989a), while 
others focus on the oil crisis of the late seventies or the slow collapse of the two-block world 
system, the consequences of the arms race and so on (Bozóki, 2002). 
Csanády (2009) offers a macroeconomic explanation for this stagnation and the collapse of the 
system, based on the theoretical approach of Ferenc Jánossy. Jánossy examined the long-term 
processes of GDP growth of the twentieth century in different countries, from Germany to 
Japan. Jánossy found that each nation’s growth of GDP is tied to a distinct, linear trend, which 
shows surprising stability. Even a crisis or a large-scale reform hardly modify this path.15 The 
reason for this stability – according to Jánossy - lies in the structure of labor force. The growth 
first is fueled by simply the flow of labor from agriculture to industry. However, after a while, 
the sources of this flow are drained. From this point, the growth could continue only on the 
basis of productivity, which requires a labor force and institutions suitable to production 
governed by the principle of effectiveness. Csanády argues that the problems of the socialist 
system were twofold: 1) the first phase of growth has stopped too early (in the middle 1970s). 
Although a significant proportion of labor force remained working in the agriculture, it could 
                                                                
15 Naturally, a crisis causes a sharp decline in the GDP. However, after a short reproduction period, characterized 
by a much steeper growth-rate than usual, the level of GDP finds its way back to the trend line. This point is 
followed by the decline of growth, usually. (Csanády, 2009) 
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not have been redirected to the industry since it was not fit for performing in the industry. 2) 
The structure of production in the Kadar era was not able to perform effectively, thus the second 
phase could not be launched.  
(Hankiss (1988, 1989a) identifies the starting point of political processes that led straight to the 
fall of communism in 1978, just a year before a second economic reform was initiated. The 
failure of the renewed reform attempts and the ongoing economic downfall are a sign of 
governance crisis for Hankiss. This crisis slowly undermined the Kadarite reconciliation, the 
growth of living standard could be maintained on the price of foreign indebtedness. The Party 
slowly lost its control over the resources, the public sphere and its legitimacy weakened. 
Through these processes, the economic and political crisis cumulated in the rise of opposition 
movements and later in the velvet revolution itself.   
I.1.2. The opposition and the Negotiated Revolution16 
It is beyond doubts that the fall of socialism is caused by external and internal factors. External 
factors are the changing global economy, the developments of international relations, such as 
signing the Helsinki Accords in 1975, and that eventually the Soviet Union lost the arms race 
in the 1980s, therefore introduced Perestroika. (Bozóki, 2002; Franzinetti, 2008) Internal 
factors are the changing power relations, the growing dissatisfaction with the regime, all of 
which became visible in the late seventies and increasingly apparent in the eighties (Szelenyi - 
Szelenyi, 1994). There is less consensus on the importance of the reform-communist and the 
opposition. I do not want to evaluate, to what extent the large-scale economic and social 
processes and the reformists and oppositional actors contributed to the regime change. I think, 
however, that the role of these actors in exploiting and channeling social change and turning 
into a non-violent transformation of the system is important. Since these actors did not consist 
of a unified reform or opposition force, it is necessary to account the most important ones, who 
played a role in channeling these structural changes into the systemic transformation.   
First of all, the Hungarian Worker’s Socialist Party consisted of different fractions. The reform-
attempts and their withdrawal marked the current situation of the power struggles between the 
Party’s orthodox and reformist fractions. Thus in 1968, 1978 and in the second half of the 
                                                                
16 The term, ’negotiated revolution’ is used to describe the non-violent nature of the Hungarian transition and to 
emphasize the role of roundtable discussions by Bruszt (1990) and Tökés (1996)  
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eighties reformist fractions had a better position, while between reforms the orthodox fractions 
could secure their leading roles (Kornai, 1992).17 
After the revolution in 1956, and before the late seventies there was no sizeable and visible 
opposition, but small groups of critics were formulated in opposition to the Party or the official 
ideology. The source of these critics, as they often connected to the reform waves, was coming 
from state or Party-institutions and from the Marxist intellectuals.  
Although the criticism of the command-economy and discussion of economic reforms started 
already in the 1950s inside the party18, the first publicly released criticism concerned not only 
with economic planning but with the organization of society and the socialist ideology, 
appeared in the mid-late 1960s, parallel the preparations for New Economic Mechanism were 
prepared. Besides the more market-oriented coordination of the production and distribution of 
goods, sociologists and philosophers formulated their ideas which were, with the withdrawal of 
reform activities, treated as an attack on the system. Among these, the most notable was the 
renewed attempts of research in social stratification. 
In the late sixties Zsuzsa Ferge, András Hegedűs, Iván Szelényi and György Konnrád, in the 
early seventies Tamás Kolosi initiated their research on inequalities and social stratification. 
(Ferge, 1968; Szelenyi, 1969)  Without dwelling into the details, Ferge, Hegedűs, or Kolosi 
challenged the socialist picture of society, highlighting that there are still inequalities in 
Hungary. (Gagyi - Éber, 2015) Besides them, István Kemény just started his research revealing 
the marginalized position of the Roma (Miklós Szabó, 1989). In philosophy, Lukács’s followers 
tried to revitalize Marxism by engaging with its humanist-critical version (Kammas, 2007).  
In 1973, with the withdrawal of the reform, these attempts were put on hold. Szelényi and 
Konrád finished their seminal work, the ‘Intellectuals on the road to class power”, in 197419, 
for which Konrád was banned from work and went into internal dissidence, Szelényi left the 
country. Kolosi was, according to Gagyi and Éber (2015:601) “persuaded to refrain from his 
critical class analysis”. Philosophers of the forming Budapest School were forced into 
dissidence.  
                                                                
17 The different phases of reforms and the dependence on the leadership is reviewed and well documented by 
Berend (1990)  
18 Some modifications to the centrally controlled command economy was introduced between 1953 and 1955, 
however they were seen as strictly economic. See Berend (1990)  
19 (György Konrád - Szelenyi, 1979) 
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Although the first wave of critics in the 1960s were later considered as dangerous, their 
approach or at least their argumentation was to take seriously and restore the Marxist roots of 
socialism and try to find solutions to the existing problems from inside. This point of view is 
gradually changed and by late eighties, intellectuals and reform economists proposed 
alternative models, based on market economy and political pluralism. (Bozóki, 1999) 
Probably the first turning point for most of the critical intellectuals, who first wanted a reform 
for the regime, was the brutal oppression of the Prague Spring. This could be the point when 
they realized that the Soviet Empire would suppress any peaceful initiative as well, and the 
reform from inside is not possible (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002; Kammas, 2007). 
Then the withdrawal of reforms strengthened their alienation from the system and an opposition 
started to develop. This developing Hungarian opposition consisted of relatively separated 
groups of intellectuals, who applied different strategies, based on their background and their 
position within the system. However, besides using their roles as experts to criticize the system, 
their repertoire increasingly included other forms of protest, such as petitions, creating samizdat 
publications, establishing informal organizations, and in the late eighties, organizing 
demonstrations as well.  
The first semi-public forms of opposition were underground, new-wave cultural events and to 
write, publish and multiply samizdat publications20. The first of its kind was published in 1972, 
collecting the underground writings of the sixties (Haraszti, 2000). At that time, the main forum 
of the underground publication was Magyar Füzetek, edited and published in France by Péter 
Kende. Writers had to smuggle out their articles from the country while others had to smuggle 
the printed publications in (Bajomi-Lázár, 2005; Haraszti, 2000).  
The mid-seventies brought a change in many Central and Eastern European Countries. In 1975 
the Helsinki Accords were signed and this brought human rights into the discourse as a 
reference point for the opposition (Judt, 1988).  A group of Czech and Slovak intellectuals 
crafted a Charter to protest against the violation of human rights, theoretically guaranteed on 
the basis of the Helsinki Accords. The Charter received a harsh response from the 
Czechoslovakian government, which triggered a collective action from Hungarian intellectuals 
as well. They started to circulate an open letter of solidarity and to collect signatures. (Bozóki, 
1999; Judt, 1988) 
                                                                




After Charter’77, oppositional activity became more frequent and more organized.21 Opposition 
groups started underground periodicals. By the late eighties, there were 30 of them. Although 
these were produced in a small number, the Radio Free Europe, a radio broadcasting from 
abroad aiming to provide independent news coverage in countries under repression, reviewed 
them systematically (Bajomi-Lázár, 2005).22  
The increasing ‘second public sphere’ already meant the establishment of small informal 
organizations providing the ground for these periodicals. The informal networks of the 
intellectuals provided the distribution system for the samizdat, which probably also helped to 
maintain and strengthen this network.  
Together with the growing dissatisfaction and the system’s decreasing capability to keep the 
opposition under control, more and more groups, from different intellectual traditions and 
background activated themselves. Basically, there were two main fractions of oppositional 
movements. As Bozóki and Karácsony (2002) described, they chose different strategies. The 
democratic opposition took a leftist and liberal stance and chose human rights as their 
ideological background. Their strategy was the open objection of the system. This broad group 
consisted of mainly urban intellectuals from the Capital, had members actively participating in 
oppositional activities since the sixties, and engaged intensively in creating and distributing the 
samizdat literature. In the 1980s the democratic opposition started to form organizations 
providing social care for the poor, hidden seminars, as the flying university. Independently, but 
connected to the democratic opposition, the environmental and the peace movement were born. 
(Mikecz, 2012) 
Also, close to the democratic opposition, whose members were mostly in their late 30s and 
forties, the younger generation started to form their organization. Colleges of Advanced studies, 
as the Rajk and Bibó Colleges were the bases of their network which later formalized as the 
Party of Young Democrats (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002). 
The Populists, who emphasized the legacy of the populist writers of the 1930s chose a 
somewhat different strategy. Instead of publishing samizdat they tried to establish their own 
periodical officially. Just after the regime refused to give permission, they participated in the 
conference in Monor, the first all-opposition meeting. Two years later they organized their own 
conference in Lakitelek, to where they did not invite the representatives of the democratic 
                                                                
21 Napló (between 1977 and 1981), Hírmondó, Beszélő (1982-) or Demokrata and many others.  
22 The proportion of the adult population managed to listen to Radio Free Europe had been 19 percent already in 
1981 and it increased to 27 percent to 1987. (Hann 1989 cited by Bajomi-Lázár, 2005) 
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opposition but they invited the leading figure of the reform wing of the Party, Imre Pozsgay. At 
Lakitelek they announced the foundation of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which became 
a leading organization in the process of the transition. The Forum kept contact with Pozsgay 
and the reform-communists in the following years23 (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002). 
In 1986 and 1987, two significant reform-programs were published: The Turnabout and Reform 
by the so-called reform economists and the Social Contract by the editors of Beszélő. The first 
focused on the necessary economic reforms, however, mentioned the restructuration of property 
and provision of rights as well. The second emphasized the changes in regulation, how the 
political system, decision making should be reformed. Both programs accepted the one-party 
system and the leading role of the communist party (Kis et al., 1987). 
However, the activity of both the democratic opposition and the populist movement increased, 
and the reform-economists were allowed to publish more openly, the distinctive characteristics 
of the Hungarian opposition at the time, compared to the Polish one is their relative isolation 
from the masses. The demonstrations they held up until 1988 received only a small popular 
support.  The demonstrations they organized mobilized only a couple hundred of people at the 
maximum.  
Their mobilization capacity has changed in 1988 when two mass demonstrations were held: the 
commemoration of 15th of March attracted thousands, and in June a march against destroying 
villages in Romania also mobilized tens of thousands. After that, it was less surprising that the 
commemoration of 15th of March and the reburial of Nagy Imre on the 16th of June in 1989 
attracted even more, 150 or 200 thousand people. It is important to emphasize that both the 
democratic opposition and the populist movement participated in the organization of these 
events.24 
Inspired by the success of the demonstration on the 15th of March, 1989, the Independent 
Lawyer’s Initiative called for an Oppositional Roundtable to discuss a unified strategy against 
the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. To participate in the Roundtable a wide range of 
oppositional forces was invited. The most important actors were the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats. While the former was the representative of the 
                                                                
23 One of the leading organizers of the so-called populist movement at the time, Zoltán Bíró was working in the 
administration. He maintained a close relationship with Pozsgay, since he was one of the closest colleague of him 
as a minister of Cultural Affairs between 1975 and 1983. (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002)   
24 Although the number of participants is not that well documented, the scope of mobilization can be easily defined 
based on the recordings of events by Fekete Doboz (Black Box) Foundation, committed to the objective reporting 
to the events prior 1989. (Révész, 2007) For the review of changes in mobilization see (Elbert - Jávor, 1990)  
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populist movement, taking a more or less right-wing stance emphasizing the need for a unique 
Hungarian way, the latter considered itself as the successor of the democratic opposition.25  
Besides the two major parties, historical parties also joined the Roundtable. These were re-
established in the late eighties, with the participation of those elders, who originally were 
members of these prior 1948. However, their record of opposition activities was not as 
impressive as the other two groups’, they were seen as a linkage between the democratic 
traditions of the 1945-1948 period and the transition.26. Civil organizations, as the Federation 
of Young Democrats (Fidesz), The Democratic League of Trade Unions and The Bajcsy-
Zsilinszky Friendship Society participated as a third type of actors. (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002) 
The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and its satellite organization, the National People’s 
Front joined the negotiations in June 1989 and the Roundtable transformed itself into The 
National Roundtable. The negotiations aimed to work out the timeline and the legislative 
background of the transition. The negotiations ended on the 18th September and however, an 
agreement was reached between most of the parties, the Free Democrats and the Young 
Democrats did not sign it for various reasons. Probably the most important reason was the 
disagreement on the time and method of the election of the president. (Bozóki - Karácsony, 
2002) 
On the 23rd of October, the III. Republic was announced and in April 1990 the first free and fair 
elections were held. Prior the elections, several fundamental laws, as the Constitution, the Act 
on the freedom of association and peaceful assembly were accepted by the Parliament to ground 
the peaceful and legal transition of power to the newly elected parties.  
Among the Successors of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party the Hungarian Socialist Party, 
led by the second line reformist leaders of the former state party entered the Parliament with a 
10.9 percent result. The Hungarian Democratic Forum won the elections (24.7%), The Alliance 
of Free Democrats (21.4%) occupied the second role.  Besides, the Independent Smallholder’s 
Party (11.7%), the Alliance of the Young Democrats (8.95 %) and the Christian Democrats 
                                                                
25 Prior to SZDSZ, the Network of Free Initiatives was founded. The Network was intended to be civil society 
organizations, but as the events speeded up, they turned it into a party named as the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(Bozóki, 1993). 
26 The re-established groups were the historical parties, as the Christian Democrats, the Independent Smallholders 




entered the Parliament (6.5%).27 Thus, the government was formed by the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum, in coalition with the Independent Smallholder’s Party and the Christian 
Democrats. 
As I have mentioned, the different branches of the opposition had different ideological 
background. However, the idea of civil society is often seen as a common ground for the pre-
1989 opposition (Lomax, 1997), it is clear that at least the emphasis on it was different by the 
various groups. In according to Bozóki and Karácsony (2002) and Bozóki (1999), the populist 
movement and the historical parties were committed to a minimalist project of democracy and 
to a market-oriented economic system and they were also suspicious towards the western-
oriented ideas of civil society and western institutions. Thus, when one examine the concept 
and performance of civil society, he or she mostly examine the strategies prior the transition, 
and the ideological background of the democratic opposition and groups connected to it, such 
as the students in Colleges of Advanced Studies or the newly formed trade unions, which 
engaged to the ideas of human rights, western-oriented reform, and widening citizen’s 
participation much more.   
  
                                                                
27  Az 1990 Évi. Országyűlési választások. 2. Forduló (1990.04.08.) (The results of the Parliamentary Elections in 




I.2. Models of Civil Society Around the Transition in 1989-1990  
In the late eighties and early nineties, the term, ‘civil society’ was among the most popular 
expressions in describing, explaining or understanding the transition. The “rebirth”, 
“reinvention” or “revival” of the concept of civil society first started in Central and Eastern 
Europe and in Latin-America followed by Western Europe and North-America (Gellner, 1991a; 
Kaldor, 2003; Ost, 1993; Seligman, 1992a, 1995). Although the process of rebirth and the 
concept’s diffusion itself could deserve a separate chapter, I will trace back neither the historical 
origins of the term nor the roots of its revival.28  Instead, I am interested in, if it was once 
“revived” or “reconstructed”, how international and domestic academics’ understanding 
evolved in relation to the Hungarian regime change and what role they attributed to civil society 
in the building and in the functioning of the future democracy.  
Since the concept is used to explain or predict the possibilities and mechanisms of 
democratization, its reconstruction has crucial consequences for the models, proposed by the 
authors, as those contain the assumptions about the process on how democratization should 
happen.  
By ‘models’, or ‘understanding’ I refer to a loose way of defining the concept. Considering that 
civil society is mainly about the relationship between the citizen and the state (and their 
intermediaries) the main task of concept definition is drawing the boundaries between the two. 
Thus, the main aspect of the examination the concept is about what constitutes civil society and 
where the border between civil society and the state lies. The reasoning backing up this 
distinction is often based on the roles or function the authors attribute to civil society.   
As I will show, the models explored here are too divergent to simply merge them into one 
consensual model of civil society.  However, exploring the main commonalities between the 
different models allows me to suggest a core set of actors and a core mechanism of 
democratization, mechanism and a core set of hypotheses of democratization. Their differences, 
nonetheless, contribute to our understanding of the loss of popularity of the civil society as a 
political project among the political elites after the transition.    
                                                                
28 This work has been done by seminal scholars such as Seligman (1995),  Cohen and Arato (1992), Keane 
(1988d) or Edwards (2009) just to name a few.  
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To explore the different models of civil society used around the transition, I reviewed the 
English and Hungarian academic texts applying the term, between 1985 and 199529. In the 
English case, I have used some well-known online journal databases and tried to explore the 
most important books about the concept. In the Hungarian case, I reviewed the most prominent 
Hungarian journals of the period.    
The chapter will be structured as follows. First, I will shortly introduce the most well-known 
typologies of civil society. Second, I will introduce the methodology and the corpus I used. 
Third, the models of civil society will be presented and fourth their commonalities and 
differences will be explored. At last, I will propose the hypotheses of democratization 
embedded in the models.  
I.2.1. Variations to civil society 
Since the concept has a long history and its meaning was the subject of fierce debates, many 
authors reflect on the different uses and meanings of the concept. Most of them start with a 
historical review of the concept beginning with Aristotle, Saint Augustine and going through 
Locke, Smith, and Hobbes or focusing on Tocqueville, Hegel, Marx or Gramsci (see Alexander, 
1998; Cohen - Arato, 1992; Keane, 1988d; Kumar, 1993; Seligman, 1995).  
However, since most of the texts are dealing with the possibilities of transition from socialism 
to democracy30, references to the history of the term are used to justify the author’s specific 
concepts and ideas of this transformation. By reconstructing their own versions of civil society, 
they try to answer questions such as: is the transition is possible at all; What is the role of the 
actors in this transition? What is the role of the state? How could the paradoxes of 
democratization be resolved? For me, thus, it is more important, how contemporary authors 
build their own concepts, than providing a particular pre-definition of the subject. Interestingly, 
such a review is rather uncommon and rarely focuses on Central and Eastern Europe.    
Historical references highly influence how the authors define the border between civil society 
and the state. As Perez-Diaz (1998) also notes, those, who tend to rely on the early protagonist 
of the concept (as Locke or Smith) gravitate towards to a generalized model of a democratic 
                                                                
29 When it was necessary for the understanding of the debate about civil society I included earlier writings as 
well, but the principle is to select articles and books from the years between 1985 and 1995.   




society (Gellner, 1994; Perez-Diaz, 1998), while Hegel is the road to a model in which civil 
society and the state are rendered into a dualistic model, where the differentiation can be 
described in terms as institutional-non-institutionalized, formal-informal, politics-economics, 
public-private (for example Keane, 1988a, 1988c, 1988d). Gramsci, Luhmann, and Habermas 
(with a little Parsons, of course) provide a ground for a more differentiated view of society, in 
which civil society, state and economy are separated (as Cohen - Arato, 1992).  
Perez-Diaz (Huszár, 2009; Perez-Diaz, 1998) differentiates between three main understandings 
of contemporary civil society: generalists, who tend to understand civil society as a unique 
social order, and an “ideal type of a society characterized by a set of socio-political institutions 
as the rule of law, limited and accountable public authority, economic markets, social pluralism 
and a public sphere” (Perez-Diaz, 1998:211), those, who apply the dualistic model, where every 
non-state sphere is part of civil society, and minimalists, who understand civil society as a non-
state, noneconomic sphere (mostly associations and the public sphere) of life.  
Similarly, Edwards (2009) identifies three categories: He labels the generalist approach as the 
‘good society’ model.  Edwards rather emphasizes values, such as tolerance, non-violence or 
cooperation as the fundamental characteristics of this good society, as opposed to the role of 
institutions. Instead of a ‘minimalist’ model, the model of ‘associational life’ is defined. 
According to this view, civil society consists of voluntary associations, which are non-state, 
non-market actors. Edwards criticizes this approach for the unrealistic expectations about the 
effect of associations on social integration and democracy. A third view presented by him is to 
understand civil society as the public sphere, with an important function to control those in 
power 
Sales (1991) also describes various models of the relationship between the private and public 
spheres: First, a dualistic model, in which the public and private spheres are the opposites of 
each other. In this model, civil society is equated with the private sphere. It includes everything 
that is non-state from families to economic organizations. Second, in a model where private and 
public mutually infiltrates each other, civil society serves as a mediating sphere basically 
consisting of the public sphere, including the press, clubs and any other organizations or 
activities respected as public space outside of the state. The third model considers civil society 
as the domain of public opinion formation. Although it is similar to the previous view, it is 
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connected to the contemporary form of the modern state and possible only in systems which 
recognizes the freedom of expression and association.31   
These reviews do not differentiate between Central and Eastern European and Western 
variations. Some of them touch upon the particular period of the Central-European transition. 
Sales (1991), for instance, uses the Eastern-European opposition as the primary example of the 
dualist model, but only a few authors, as Cohen and Arato (1992) or Baker (2003) try to identify 
the main, country- (or region-) specific discourses of civil society of the seventies and eighties. 
Even these authors do not discuss the reception of the ideas proposed, they rather use these 
particular versions of the notion as a ground for their own theory.  
In the Hungarian context, Glózer (2008) examined the discourses of civil society and the terms 
used to describe the sphere of voluntary organizations from 1990. She identified a shift in which 
the usage of the concept of civil society was abandoned and as service provision became a 
major activity of associations and foundations and as the professionalization of these 
organizations proceeded, the ‘nonprofit sector’ became the dominant frame used. 
Thus, a review of the models of civil society focusing on Hungary during the transition period 
is still missing. This is particularly interesting when it is taken into account that even the 
academic debates about civil society of the time were more than abstract debates. The period 
around 1990 was one when academic debates could influence politics and policies to a much 
greater extent than in other times. This is because these debates served as a think through of the 
tasks of the transition and since the academic and public - even political - circles were highly 
interconnected. Thus, although my review focuses mainly on academic sources, these concepts 
could be the distilled versions of more popular, intellectual understandings of civil society.   
The categorization will be similar to Perez-Diaz’s and Edward’s threefold system, however, as 
I will show, there are important differences between variations of the dualistic system 
constructing a general theory or relying more on a sociological analysis of the Central European 
societies. Moreover, the minimalist approach is motivated by the view that there is a “way out” 
from the situation defined by the political and historical legacy of the Central and European 
Region. 
                                                                
31 Sales concludes that based on these models, civil society should be defined as a diversified sphere of public 
opinion formation, which is also a sphere of integration and mediation between individuals and groups, the 
economy and the state and “where social identities and new lifestyles are formed” and “having fundamental ties 
with democratic systems as a condition for existence and development”  (Sales, 1991:309) 
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I.2.2. The corpus 
In conducting a systematic search for texts using the concept, I had to face two challenges: The 
first and easy way to construct a corpus for my research would have been to search among 
journal articles. Unfortunately, the debate is not limited to journal articles. Moreover, there are 
some authors (as John Keane), who primarily expressed their opinion in books. Second, I 
needed both Hungarian and English language sources. While English language articles are 
better “searchable” in large online databases, Hungarian sources are less available in such a 
collection.32    
Thus, I tried to find the relevant literature by using three starting points. Firstly, I went through 
the most well-known articles and books in the field33. Secondly, I searched for articles published 
between 1985 and 1995 in electronic scientific databases34 using the term “civil society” and 
one of the following key-words together: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Hungary, 
between 1985 and 1995. Thirdly, I collected the Hungarian articles dealing with the topic found 
in the journal, ‘Valóság’ from 1985 to 1990, in the Hungarian Review of Sociology and Political 
Science between 1990 and 199535 and I also included the articles of a short scientific debate in 
‘Magyar Tudomány’ in 1987.  
A. The collection of journal articles in English   
To find journal articles published in English, in international journals I searched four of the 
largest online databases:  JSTOR, EBSCO, SCOPUS and Web Of Science. I applied the search 
term ‘civil society’ together with the keywords Central Europe(an), Eastern Europe(an), and 
Hungary(ian), between 1985 and 1995.36  
                                                                
32 However, there is a Hungarian search engine, MATARKA, which contains bibliographic information about 
every article published in Hungarian journals.  
33 Those books, which are unavoidable after some desk research on the topic, as John Keane’s and Andrew Arato’s 
work.  
34 I conducted this search in the available databases, (JSTOR, Web of Science, Scopus, Science Direct and 
EBSCO), then I made a selection based on the abstracts, which resulted in 130 articles. Further selection based on 
content and availability issues reduced the number of the articles even more. There was also some overlap with 
articles identified previously. 
35 The first volume of the Hungarian Review of Political Science was published in 1992.  
36 In each case I used the abbreviated for of the terms: e.g ’Hungar’ instead of Hungary to include matching cases 
for Hungary and Hungarian as well.   
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Altogether I have found 2077 matches in the four databases. After clearing the duplicates37  
1426 articles remained as results. By filtering cross-database duplicates, this number decreased 
to 1413 cases (table 1). 
Table 1. Matching cases in the four online databases by search terms: total and 




Civil society + 
Central 
Europe(an) 













Ebsco 282 444 281 1007 699 
Jstor 137 577 217 931 627 
Scopus 35 40 15 90 60 
WOK 8 26 15 49 40 
Total 462 1087 528 2077 1426 
As a second step, I examined the relevance of the articles based on their abstract. In this round, 
I have excluded the articles which were not relevant (e.g. used the term in relation to military-
civil relations, or were written about other regions of the world, etc.).  
At last, I had 249 articles which had a definition of civil society in their abstract (or in the full 
text if it was available). Among the 209 mentioning Hungary, 175 were available in full text.  
I examined the text of these 175 articles. 76 of them explained or used the term in greater detail 
beyond only making a reference to the concept. further than mentioning as a single reference 
to the concept.  
B. The collection of journal articles in Hungarian 
The Hungarian sources were researched in a different way. In this case, I tried to find the major 
platforms of the debate (table 2). Prior to 1989, the major academic platform was Valóság, a 
journal in a semi-independent position. Social scientists were able to express their thoughts with 
fewer constraints in this journal as compared to other platforms. 
After 1990, Valóság has lost its significance, since each discipline founded its independent 
journal. Thus, for the 1990-1995 period, I searched for relevant articles in issues of the 
                                                                
37 Interestingly cross-database duplicates were rare (13 cases) the main problem was that the different search terms 
matched for the same cases.  
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Hungarian Sociological Review (Szociológiai Szemle) and the Political Science Review 
(Politikatudományi Szemle).38  
Table 2. Number of articles found in Hungarian journals 
Journal No. of relevant articles 
Valóság (1985-1990) 13 
Sociological Review (1991-1995) 12 
Political Science Review (1992-1995) 13 
Besides, I have included five articles (Ágh, 1987; Kiss, 1987; M. Szabó, 1987; T. Szabó, 1987; 
Urbán, 1987)  found in the Review of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Magyar Tudomány, 
which serves as an interdisciplinary journal to inform the different disciplines about what is 
going on in other fields.  
C. Handling different sources  
The academic and intellectual circles of Hungary and the Western world were interconnected 
even before the transition: Dissidents of the Soviet bloc worked and published in Western 
countries, scholars, future politicians, intellectuals visited Western Europe and the United 
States with scholarships. Also, in the early nineties, many western scholars spent considerable 
time in the Post-Soviet bloc. For this reason, the analysis is not divided into international and 
Hungarian, or Western and Eastern discourses.  
The following review cannot be fully exhaustive. It is probably not possible to mention all the 
authors who have published at least a single article on the topic, but I hopefully managed to 
find and review the most representative works. 
D. Dimensions of examining the discourse 
In this part of the analysis, I am trying to capture the expectations towards civil society. These 
expectations are, however, highly influenced by the actual model of civil society by the authors, 
in my opinion. As I already showed above, the late twentieth-century usage of civil society 
could be categorized by the place of the border between state and civil society. Therefore, at 
first, I will look at this differentiation by examining:  
• Who are the actors, constituting the civil society? Through exploring the elements of 
civil society, the analysis identifies, whether there is a differentiation between state and 
                                                                
38 Founded in 1992 
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civil society and what the term, civil society refers to. Are individuals, families, the 
economic organizations part of this sphere, or it refers to groups, organizations of a 
certain kind?  
• What is the basis of this differentiation? For example, are there certain principles, 
processes or mechanisms that render certain actors to an independent sphere, or is it just 
their relation to the institutionalized forms of power?   
• What are the functions attributed to civil society? 
After identifying groups of theories, I turn to their differences and commonalities in their 
definitions of civil society and expectations towards a ‘future’ or ‘imagined’ civil society. 
Through these, I will be able to identify how civil society should contribute to the process of 
democratization or what is the role civil society should fulfill in an established democracy.   
Based on the three dimensions, mentioned above, I defined three main categories of the usage 
of civil society. This main categorization is similar to what Perez-Diaz (1998) suggests. The 
first type understands civil society as a social order (I), The second category, the dualist model 
of the state versus civil society has two sub-categories: a universal model dualist model of state 
versus (civil) society and a dualist model under state socialism. The third category considers 
civil society as a more strictly defined sub-sphere of the society. This latter category can also 
be divided into two sub-categories: the non-economic, non-state sphere mediating between 
individuals and informal networks of the society as well as one referring to the opposition under 
state socialism.  
A particular task of discussing civil society in relation to Central and Eastern Europe (or 
Hungary in my case) is to explore the relationship between civil society and the socialist state. 
Authors do that either by or by defining civil society as a broader social realm, a second society 
independent from the state, which will be discussed under the dualistic approach, or by 
discussing the opposition’s role in civil society, which I will introduce under the third category 
of theories.   
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I.2.3. A typology of approaches to civil society in relation to the Hungarian 
transition 
A. Civil society defined as the Western society  
A minority of the authors define civil society as a certain social or political order. The 
difference between the two seems to be important since this is the terrain where the usefulness 
of the term is the most fiercely debated. For example, Seligman (1992a, 1995) and Kumar 
(1993, 1994), argue that ‘civil society’ has too many meanings and as such cannot be used as a 
clear analytical concept and more importantly, ‘civil society’ has no additional meaning to 
democracy, citizenship or constitutionalism.  
Seligman (1992a, 1995) claims that ‘civil society’ is popular only because ‘democracy’ has lost 
its meaning and mobilizing power since the socialist regimes acted in the name of democracy 
and named their systems as People’s Democracy. Civil society, however, is able to mobilize, 
because it is exhausted39.  
As an analytical concept, writes Seligman, civil society raises the same questions as the 
development of a bourgeois society. Thus, the differentiation between public and private,  
tensions between the state and its citizens and most importantly, the transformation of a group 
of individuals into a society of citizens and its integration all need to be addressed. The question 
is, how autonomous, rational individuals will constitute a community in which members will 
be able to trust each other and have rights at the same time. According to Seligman, in a ‘classic 
civil society’, rights are based on mutual trust (and obligations), thus both are embedded into 
the community. In the modern forms of civil society theory, rights are based on universal 
principles (e.g. human rights) which leads to an internal conflict between rights and solidarity. 
Civil society theory,40 in Seligman’s view, tries to overcome this conflict, however, with not 
much success. It only tries to redefine solidarity as part of the universal principles of rights and 
imagined communities based on these universal values, still the process of this transformation 
is not clear. Then, in dealing with this problematique it is better to turn to the concept of 
citizenship (Seligman, 1992b, 1995).41 
                                                                
39 Timothy Garton Ash partly shares his view. Ash notes that the ideas used by Havel, Michnik, Konrad or Lipski 
- notable Eastern European writers, political essayists of the time -  might not be relevant for western societies. 
“Attempts to interpret the activity of Western peace movements as part of the struggle for civil society, for 
example, are not very convincing” (Ash, 1989[1986]:212). 
40 Seligman mainly refers to Habermas, Arato and Cohen as a contemporary theory of civil society.  
41 Although from this article of Seligman it is not quite clear, why citizenship would be a better choice.  
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Both Seligman and Kumar (1992, 1993, 1994, 1996) point out the difference between “civil 
society” as a universal idea and civil society as the political project of the opposition under state 
socialism. Kumar argues that the opposition understood civil society as a sphere of independent 
institutions, for strategic reasons and because of the specific circumstances of the transition. 
When the transition occurred, this view has lost its significance and it turned out that in fact, 
the opposition meant constitutionalism, democracy or citizenship under the term of civil 
society: a way of managing the relationships of individuals and institutions in a “society of 
citizens” (Kumar, 1994:128).  
In sum, civil society could be characterized by the features of liberal democracy, which  
Seligman (1992a, 1995) identifies with the following characteristics, based on Dahl and 
Lijphart’s definitions: 
“1) the freedom to form and join organizations, 2) freedom of expression, 3) the right to 
vote, 4) eligibility for public office, 5) the right of political leaders to compete for support 
and votes, 6) alternative sources of information (what we would call a free press), 7) free 
and fair elections, 8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and 
other expressions of preference” (Seligman, 1992a:5)42  
In opposition to Seligman and Kumar, Ernest Gellner (1991a, 1991b, 1994), claims that the 
concept of civil society is not only useful but even more useful than the notion of ‘democracy’ 
in describing what has happened in Central and Eastern Europe. Gellner would regard 
Seligman’s definition as the institutional or procedural features of democracy. In his view, 
procedural democracy constitutes an insufficient, abstract and naive definition of democracy, 
since it assumes that the establishment of such institutions on its own is able to lead to a properly 
functioning democracy. This view presents democracy as a context-free concept, although, 
Gellner argues, it requires quite specific conditions to emerge. Merely the institutional 
definition of democracy cannot explain how a lasting democratic order is established. A lasting 
and proper democracy requires a civil society as a precondition.  
The concept of civil society, in opposition to the concept of ‘democracy’, includes the necessary 
preconditions for a democratic political order as well. Gellner argues that democratic 
procedures are proper to make “relatively minor choices within an overall settled structure”. 
(Gellner, 1994:185) The implementation of democratic principles, maintaining democratic 
institutions, however, is not a question of choice but it is based on such structural preconditions, 
as value systems and certain configurations of the social structure. These preconditions highly 
                                                                
42 Translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.  
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influence how the institutions function. The problem is, that they are a product of long-term 
historical processes and, as a consequence, they are culturally embedded and often non-
reflected. Therefore, it is impossible to make conscious decisions about the long-term 
maintenance of institutions, or the track they will follow. People might be able to decide about 
initiating a parliamentary system, but they cannot decide whether the new institutions will be 
used according to intentions since this depends on the already given social structure, culture, 
and values. 
To Gellner, the key concept, the aim of social change and development, is individual liberty 
and civil society is a social order which nurtures the modern notion of individual freedom. Civil 
society enables people to act independently not only from the state but also from strict kin-
networks and bounding social norms (rituals) (Gellner, 1991a, 1994). A civil society is distinct 
not only from authoritarian and totalitarian systems but also from societies where traditional 
communities prevent individuals from practicing modern liberties, most importantly civil 
liberties and political rights. 
“his [the citizen of a modern state] membership of the national state is not conditioned 
either by rites or by membership of ritually demanding sub-communities. His 
membership of associations within the state is optional, revocable, and does not 
determine his status. He can eat marry, dine, associate, work and pray (or not pray) as 
he thinks fit. None of its legally (or even socially) connected with his effective 
citizenship. (Gellner, 1991a:498)” 
Based on Gellner’s two works (1991a, 1994), the following seven main characteristics of civil 
society can be identified. 
1. Civil society is an industrialized, modern, complex society, with a high level of 
differentiation. Gellner does not present a detailed picture of its composition but he 
makes it evident that it has a state, a political, economic and some kind of societal 
(family or kinship networks, religion) sphere.  
2. The state and other spheres of the society are separated. Gellner is not totally coherent 
in his definition of civil society, sometimes his phrasing refers to civil society rather 
as a sphere, not as the whole of society: In one instance, he defines civil society as the 
sphere of “institutions and associations independent from the state” (Gellner, 
1991a:498), he states in his other piece that civil society is not subordinated to the state 
(1994). Nevertheless, it is clear that the community structure, the private sphere and 
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the economy are separated from the state. In a civil society, the state should not be able 
to dominate the other spheres. 
3. Political, ideological and social pluralism, in the sense that there are plural institutions, 
ideologies, and identities. Belonging to communities and associations is based on free 
choice. In civil society, there is no dominant ideology or religion. Not only because it 
would possibly harm liberty, but as Gellner notes, for doubt is essential for the civil 
society, since it enables self-reflectivity and defends everyday life from being 
sacralized.  
4. Centralized state power. Securing liberties requires a central state and its monopoly of 
violence. Political pluralism does not eliminate institutions linked to the nation-state.  
5. Civic spirit: Citizens have civic spirit, which is “..the presence and authority of a moral 
conscientiousness, which binds a man to his contractual and other obligation without 
needing to be underwritten by a torrid network of ritually reinforced social links” 
(Gellner, 1991a:501, italics in the original). Civic spirit associates with inner 
reinforcement of the abstract rules of law and trust in it.  
6. Pluralism and civic spirit have a center in the economy: first, economic success 
requires civic spirit, second, the economic sphere is the key (probably it provide 
resources and fosters modernization) to the freedom from the “the tyranny of cousins” 
(Gellner, 1991a:502) To achieve such a strength, economic decentralization shall 
prevail. 
7. Civil society requires constant economic growth so that social conflicts can be resolved 
moderately. At this point, Gellner binds civil society to capitalism or the market 
economy.  
Similarly to Gellner, Jenő Szűcs43 (Szűcs, 1988) also defines civil society as the western socio-
political order.44 The essay was written as a tribute and reaction to István Bibó’s work, who 
                                                                
43 Miklós Molnár (1996) also mentioned the notion of civil society as a social order. Molnar agrees with the idea 
that civil society is a “political culture…… the forms of the civilized public and private life” (1996:12) and the 
“fundaments of a specific civilization: of the European-North-American one.”(1996:13). On the other hand, to 
understand the role of civil society in the dissolution of the socialist regime, he sticks to a dualist approach in his 
work. For this reason, I will discuss his work among dualist theories.    
44 His essay was originally published in Hungarian in 1981 in Történelmi Szemle (Vázlat Európa három történelmi 
régiójáról, issue 3, p 313-359.) and in 1983 in English (The three historical regions of Europe: An outline. Acta 
Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 29(2/4), 131-184)  
I have included the essay in my analysis, since it was translated and republished in English in 1988 in Keane’s 
‘Civil society and the State’. 
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although did not use the term ‘civil society’ but defined the characteristics of the European 
society in a similar manner to Gellner (Bibó, 2004[1971-1972]). 
 Szűcs’s essay is an outline of the historical development of three regions (West, East, and 
Central) of Europe in the longue durée to explain how the twentieth century Europe was 
developed.  For Szűcs and Bibó, such as to Gellner, the stake of the European development or 
civil society is to bring about a system which nurtures individual liberties. 45 The main features 
of this civil or European society are: 
1. The division of state and society (in a different way or to a different extent in various 
historical periods, but the division exists as a principle);   
2. The relationship between individuals has a contractual nature, since the formation of 
feudalism.  
3. The important role of human dignity and the gradually universalized, contractual-
based liberties, that are strongly connected to the aforementioned contractual 
relationships. The breach of a (however abstract) contract humiliates the principle of 
human dignity and fundamental liberties. 
4. Democracy is not a structural element of a certain social order but “the objective 
technique of exercising freedom” (Szücs, 1983:131)46 a political order which might 
exist among different social circumstances.    
5. These societies are moving towards reducing fear, which supports the 
institutionalization of the “rule of liberty and fearless, calm reason” (Bibó, 2004[1971-
1972]:155) 
The theories of Gellner and Szűcs share two common characteristics: the first is individual 
freedom as a key notion, an objective of civil societies. The second is the source of this freedom: 
the structural balance between the different subsystems or spheres of the society. For Gellner, 
the balance has two foundations: 1) the differentiation between state and society, and 2) his 
view of human nature.  
                                                                
45 In according to Bibó, the western society should enforce social justice and equality as well. 
46 This phrase as I quote here appears only in the Hungarian version and in the English version, published in 1983, 
since it is part of the introduction explaining the paper’s connection to Bibó’s work and this part was left out from 
the 1988’s publication.   However the notion and a similar phrase appears in the version published in Keane’s book 
as well.  
44 
 
The structural balance is important because it is the guarantee for civil rights, individual 
freedom can flourish. For Gellner, (1994) balance means the lack of groups or actors who could 
rule over or dominate other groups. The source of this balance is the systematic differentiation 
between state and society, where society consists of the market and voluntary organizations, 
informal networks, family and so on. As he notes himself, from the point of view of civil society 
not only the division of politics and economy is important, but also the balance between the 
two. In this arena, he pictures the citizen as a rational, utilitarian individual. The utilitarian 
nature of individuals is the other source of the same structural balance.  
These utilitarian individuals aim to articulate and fulfill their selfish interests and attempt to 
rule over others. However, in a society where this is impossible, simply because none of the 
actors has the power to ascertain such a rule, they are well aware that others would act similarly. 
So, the only possibility to eliminate the constant threat to one’s interests posed by others is to 
establish a system in which everyone mutually recognizes the rights to articulate and achieve 
the interests of others with certain limitations in place. Therefore, civil society is civil not only 
because of the “civilized men”, or moral laws of human nature, but mainly because of its 
structural constellation, rooted in the utilitarian citizen’s nature and interests. Gellner identifies 
such a balance in the 17th-18th century Europe, where the ruling actors were not equipped with 
enough resources to exercise total control above the ruled, but the division of labor, the extent 
of economic growth, the strength of the new, Reformists religions leads to an ideological and 
political stalemate.47 Unfortunately, in a modern society, the state or the economy are both 
capable to endanger such a structural balance.  
For Szűcs, the source of the balance is clearly attributed to the weakness of the rulers in 
medieval Europe. In the Early Middle Ages, kings could not maintain their rules without the 
lords, and lords could not maintain their rule over their territory without offering something 
(defense and some basic rights, at least in principle) in return for the services of the peasants. 
This initial situation, where the actors had to rely on each other to some extent, became a 
structural characteristic by becoming a norm. Even with the growing centralization, this 
principle was central to the medieval European kingdoms and to the particular rights originated 
from these contracts between lords and king, cities and king or lords and servants became 
universal rights. The balance is based on these rights and on the norm, which constitutes the 
basic element of Western political culture (Szűcs, 1988).  
                                                                
 47 Cf. Gellner (1994:73-74) 
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B. Dualist approach I.: Civil society is everything but the state 
The second group of studies defines civil society as a sphere that consists of every or almost 
every aspect of life outside the state. Authors who apply this approach strongly emphasize civil 
organizations’ and groups’ autonomy from the state. Two novel advocates of this approach are 
John Keane (1988a, 1988c) and Ralf Dahrendorf (1990, 1991). Other authors referring to this 
generalized type of model are usually much less detailed about it (see Ding, 1994; Eyal - 
Townsley, 1995; Goldstein, 1995; Joppke, 1994; Kolankiewicz, 1994; Krygier, 1990; Lengyel, 
1987; Ronning, 1995; Schopflin, 1991; Stewart, 1990; Yanqi Tong, 1994; Y. Tong, 1995; 
White, 1993; Williams - Reuten, 1993). 
The main aspect behind the dualist approach is the classical dichotomy of the public and the 
private. The public is the state and private is everything else, the economy, the family or 
voluntary associations.  
“the  schema  'the  state  versus  civil   society'  is  used  to  refer to the  public  versus  
the  private,  the coercive  versus  the voluntary,  or the compulsory  versus  the 
autonomous.” (Ding, 1994:294-295) 
“The model of change seems to be that of eighteenth-century France. The hope is,  
presumably, that if a sphere can be created for the bourgeois entrepreneur, then 
ineluctably and behind the scenes, the social conditions will  arise in which Hungary's 
ancien regime will fall and the, previously half-fulfilled bourgeois in the Magyar 
population will realize its other, citizen  half.” (Stewart, 1990:157) 
As I already mentioned, the main philosophical reference for these authors is Hegel, however, 
most of them propose important differences to the Hegelian model. Hegel outlined a dualist 
model in which civil society is a subject of the state. In civil society, private interests prevail, 
however, the various interests might be at conflict. The state in the Hegelian model not only 
mediates between private interests but represents the public good, the interest of the public 
itself. (Keane, 1988d) To the authors reflecting on the revolutions of 1989, the dichotomy is 
important and the relationship between the two spheres is (or supposed to be) more equal and 
supplementary.  
Keane uses this dichotomy to prepare the ground for claiming a renewed social democracy, 
which would create a balance between the preservation of individual liberty and increased 
equality. The warranty of such a society is the proper differentiation between the state and the 




In this context, Keane defines civil society as:   
“aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-
state activities - economic and cultural production, household life and voluntary 
associations - and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising 
all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions.” (Keane, 1988c:14) 
In other textual references Keane enumerates other institutions as elements of civil society, the 
list seems inexhaustible. What is repeated constantly is the emphasis of their independence or 
autonomy from the state. They range from households to enterprises through voluntary 
associations.  
Keane always mentions groups or institutions as constituents of civil society, but never 
individuals.  Civil society should be plural, it opposes or controls state power, creates an identity 
(connected to being in opposition to the state), and some of its institutions, like political parties, 
should mediate between civil society and the state, thus sending, receiving, and recoding 
demands.  
His broad definition of the notion comes from the idea that civil society can be found in different 
forms, not necessarily in the form of voluntary associations. How can someone recognize civil 
society then? Through its opposition to the state, which is, according to Keane always the 
characteristic of a civil society, and through civic virtues, which would encompass “self-
interest, hard work, flexibility, self-reliance, freedom of choice, private property, the patriarchal 
family and distrust of state bureaucracy” (Keane, 1988c:6-7). 
The relationship between the state and the civil society should be co-dependent: Neither a 
totally free civil society nor the dominance of the state will produce growing freedom and 
equality. The fight between groups can degenerate civil society (the strong overcoming the 
weak) so the state should regulate this fight with a legal system and the articulation and 
protection of universal rights (Keane, 1988c). The interdependence of the two would lead to 
growing freedom, equality and participatory decision making. Still, there is no stable balance 
between the state and civil society. Keane notes that “there is a constant danger in democratic 
systems that party competition, freedom of association, rule of law and other democratic 
procedures will be used to defeat democracy.” (Keane, 1988b:181).  
Dahrendorf, based mostly on his “Reflections on the revolution, (Dahrendorf, 1990) draws a 
similar picture of civil society, however in a slightly different context. Although Dahrendorf 
does not oppose state intervention and redistribution and share the concerns over solidarity, he 
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considers increasing liberty as the primal aim civil society should achieve, through the 
establishment of an open society in the Popperian sense. Dahrendorf emphasizes that the open 
society has an untidy, chaotic order filled with uncertainty, but the answer to this uncertainty is 
not the establishment of monopolies of ideologies or groups, but to provide the possibility of 
trials and errors. Everyone can make mistakes and try again, but for this, the society shall 
preserve its openness.48   
Although Dahrendorf points to existing open societies as examples, (as Sweden, Germany, and 
Japan) his collection of characteristics is more of a Weberian ideal-type, representing a political 
system that might be also labeled as liberal democracy (based on the rule of law, separation of 
different powers, primacy of individual rights) or as a market economy with a state. In such a 
political system, the ruling elite changes peacefully. The state is strong enough to provide 
defense and safety in times of crisis, but its power is limited by decentralization. Most 
importantly for us, the open society’s social foundation, which is the key in anchoring and 
stabilizing its constitutional and economic characteristics is the civil society.  
Civil society should be a dense, multi-centered network made up of autonomous organizations 
such as media, local governments, small businesses, political parties, universities and 
independent churches or voluntary associations and situated between the state and individuals. 
This list of institutions suggests that autonomy is not exactly a matter of financing or ownership. 
Autonomy rather stems from the logic of operation, as civil society organizations are those 
“forms of organization which enable people to conduct their lives without being permanently 
exposed to government and notably to the central government” (Dahrendorf, 1991:23). That 
being said, civil society and the state could perform the task of liberating the individual only 
together.  
Members of civil societies are respectful towards each other and are “able and willing to go and 
do things themselves, if necessary by formin action groups with others, confident men, women, 
who are not frightened and have no reason to fear, citizens.” (Dahrendorf, 1990:105-106) 
Without civil society, and this is extremely important in the context of the transition, the other 
characteristics of the open society are weak and vulnerable. The source of the autonomy of civil 
                                                                




society institutions is its network which is robust enough not to collapse from the elimination 
of one important actor and to be also self-sustaining.49  
C. Dualist theories II: Civil society under state socialism 
A specific version of the dualist approach is used to describe a sphere independent from the 
state under state socialism. The totalitarian regime until 1956 (or 1963, arguably) tried to control 
every sphere of life: independent associations, networks, social circles could not be maintained. 
However, the shift in the paradigm of the Kádár Regime after 1963 allowed a limited autonomy 
for the private sphere and small-scale economic activities. (Hankiss, 1988, 1989a) The dualist 
approach to civil society is also used to describe this relatively autonomous and informal sphere. 
(Benda et al., 1988; Bernik, 1994; Hankiss, 1987, 1988, 1989b; Jewsiewicki et al., 1995; 
Molnár, 1993a, 1996) Besides civil society, they call it as an independent, alternative society 
or parallel polis (Benda et al., 1988), a second society (Hankiss, 1988), a self-regulating or self-
defense society (Ágh, 1987, 1989) depending on the different theoretical aspects emphasized. 
Hankiss’s (1988, 1989a) notion of the second society is somewhat a starting point for others to 
engage this specific version of the dualistic theory of civil society. He basically expands the 
notion of the well-known idea of the second economy to state that the second society is a sphere 
which is basically the mirror of the first, official society. While the first is centralized and 
organized by vertical relations, a top-down information flow, dominated by political intentions 
and ideology, the second society is decentralized, horizontal relations are more prevalent, the 
information flow is bottom-up and it applies the notion of interest representation, and the main 
activities are socio-economically oriented.  
The second society is a parallel society with all the sub-spheres a whole society has: a second 
economy, a second culture, a second public sphere, or a second social consciousness, and a 
second sphere of socio-political interactions.  (Hankiss, 1988, 1989a). 
Molnár (1993a, 1996)50 heavily relies on Hankiss’s work in building his own model of civil 
society. First, he reconstructs various meanings of the concept. 1) As a concrete phenomenon 
dividing politics and activities outside of politics. 2) As a tool of heuristic thinking about the 
relation between the state and society, in the last three centuries, which resulted in the very 
                                                                
49 In the social movement literature, Baldassari and Diani (2007) explains this relationship between the robustness 
and vulnerability of a network of social movements organizations and the topology of such a network.  
50 His book was published in French in 1990. The shortened and revised version was published in 1996 in Hungary, 
but Molnár and his French book entered into the debate in the early nineties as well. (See the discussion in the 
Politikatudományi Szemle (Molnár, 1993a, 1993b; Szelényi, 1993). 
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different meanings of civil society. 3) As a plan or model of the desired society and 4) finally 
as a “political culture…… the forms of the civilized public and private life” and the 
“fundaments of a specific civilization: of the European-North American one.”(Molnár, 
1996:12-13). Although Molnár suggests that each of the four approaches are relevant, he 
emphasizes three main aspects of the explanation of civil society, which makes clear that he 
applies a dualistic model:   
1) The importance of the social structure.  (The organization of the society) 
2) Family and private life as spheres that were able to resist the interference of politics.  
3) The history and the sphere of associations since the 17th to the 18th century. Molnár 
does not equate civil society with associations. He states that the network of 
autonomous associations is only a characteristic of a civil society,  
At one point Molnár equates civil society with the people51, and at the end of his book he gives 
a definition as follows: “Civil society cannot be reduced to the autonomous activity of the 
associations and movements – the term includes the formation of political culture, civilized 
manner, and behavior as well.” (Molnár, 1996:241)  
It would be simplistic to say that every author referring to the second society equates it with 
civil society. Molnár clearly uses the two concepts as synonyms. Hankiss divides the second 
society into different sub-realms52 and places civil society in the second sphere of socio-
political interaction (cf. Hankiss, 1988:28). The slow re-establishment of social networks, 
informal community associations, single issue movement and so on were considered as the 
main processes in this sphere of political interactions.  
Hankiss and Molnár use the term of autonomy to describe the relation between the first and 
second society. In defining autonomy, Hankiss applies the criteria of the second economy 
developed by Gábor R. (1983). In sum, an activity would be autonomous, if it is as little 
related to the first society as possible: it is not organized or controlled by the state; it is 
informal, avoids formal activities and forms of organization such as state ownership; it is not 
really visible and it rejects the official ideology. Of course, it is a relative autonomy. In an ideal 
alternative society, autonomy would be the main principle of the whole society, while activities 
                                                                
51 p.157. 
52 As the second consciousness or second culture. 
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under state socialism could be autonomous only in comparison to the activities of the first 
society. (Hankiss, 1988) 
Tőkés (1988) and Manchin (1988) ask the following question: what is the relation between the 
second economy and the second society. Tőkés suggests that the second economy is not only 
the sum of alternative economic activities, but it is a precondition of autonomous political 
activity, since “collective personnel autonomy was born when the individual’s right to private 
property acquired unconditional legal protection and became the material guarantee for the 
substantive exercise of the rights vested in all citizens.” (Tőkés 1988:42, emphases are in the 
original). Manchin (1988) falsified this hypothesis examining the empirical associations 
between economic carriers and civic culture: Basically, no relationship (or even a negative 
correlation) was found between civic values and being partly self-employed or having a 
complementary income from overtime work. 
Interestingly, as part of the second society approach, antipolitics, an approach emphasizing the 
distrust in politics and withdrawal from the public, instead of engaging it, also gained much 
attention. Antipolitics is less emphasized by empirical sociology and mostly connected to the 
work of Vaclav Havel and György Konrád, whose work is not the subject of the recent thesis 
in greater details, both of whom treated civil society or second society as a sphere of antipolitics. 
Antipolitics goes beyond simply being outside of the state’s terrain: it is a lack of trust towards 
state institutions, people withdrawing to the private sphere and continuing living as no 
oppression would prevail. For Konrád. this is a strictly individual strategy, however, Havel is 
less clear about that. Havel’s “living in truth” approach (Joppke, 1994:551), refers not only to 
the uncompromising way of life but to the civil society’s capacity to preserve the real substance 
of the nation or community. The official public sphere is based on a lie, thus this truth cannot 
be expressed, it has to be preserved buried into the private realms. (Joppke, 1994)  
“Living in truth” or double consciousness has two different understandings: Hankiss (1988) and 
Ash (1989[1986]) describe a phenomenon when people develop a (false) mind or mask for their 
public and a (true) mind for their private lives. Hankiss writes that this type of second 
consciousness is observed mainly during the totalitarian period, while others (as Ash or Scheye) 
see it as a constant characteristic of living under socialism. Scheye, (1991) as a psychologist 
emphasized the positive role of this type of split in one’s self: it has an important role in 
preserving the integration of the personality. 
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Hankiss describes a second type of understanding of this double consciousness. It can be also 
characterized as a sign of a value-set, believed to be lost, such as religious values, humanism 
or a pluralistic set of political ideologies, which started to appear again in the late Kadarite 
period (Hankiss, 1988). For Hankiss, this type of consciousness contributes to the fall of 
socialism. Although it is similar to the former variation of antipolitics, since it transcends to the 
strict sense of individualism, it is less understood as ‘letting out the true nation’. For Sawatsky 
(1991)  the liberation of the truth is a characteristic of the intellectuals, while  “The ordinary 
people,   who in the  end made the revolution happen, needed to discover that truth and commit 
themselves to it” (Sawatsky, 1991:726)  
D.  Civil society as a mediating sphere  
The next group of literature had probably the most significant influence on the international 
research on civil society. It presents civil society as a non-state realm which is also independent 
or separated from the other realms, such as the economy or the private sphere (family friends). 
The body of works cited here can be divided into two parts. First, there are authors trying to 
formulate a systemic view of civil society as a mediating sphere between individuals, or 
informal spheres of life and the state. Among these, the grand theory of Andrew Arato and Jean 
L. Cohen (Arato, 1990, 1992, 1999; Cohen - Arato, 1984) is undoubtedly the most well 
formulated and serves as the main reference point. (A. Gergely, 1992; Bryant, 1993, 1994; 
Gubán - Weiss, 1987; Márkus, 1992) However, there are also studies using the concept 
independently or at least without reference to the former theory. (Molnár, 1993b; Pehe, 1995; 
Szelényi, 1993)  
Second, authors use the ‘mediating sphere’ concept in a more practical manner as well, refer to 
the organizations of civil society as an independent sphere of organizations and networks. 
(Bajomi, 1994; Koslowski, 1992; Quigley, 1993; Sandi, 1992; Máté Szabó, 1993, 1994, 1995b). 
First, I will introduce the systemic theory of Cohen and Arato, second the connected theoretical 
approaches and third, the ‘practical’ usage of the mediating sphere.  
This approach marked with the name of Andrew Arato and Jean L. Cohen heavily relies on the 
systemic-theory of Jürgen Habermas. The main idea of  Habermas (1987) is a differentiation 
between the System and the Lifeworld, based on their logic of operation. In short, the System 
includes the state and the economy, while informal spheres outside of the System are considered 
as the Lifeworld. While the System is responsible for administration, large-scale management, 
the necessary production of goods, the Lifeworld has three main functions: the reproduction of 
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personality through socialization, the reproduction of culture, and the husbandry of the 
necessary knowledge for the operation of the System (language, unknown background 
knowledge etc.). Through these processes of reproduction, the Lifeworld also provides the 
essential ground for the operation of the System as well (common knowledge, healthy 
personality etc.). The main difference between the two spheres is their different logic of 
operation: the System’s main governing principle is goal rationality, since it has to carry out 
policies, projects, and administration effectively, while the Lifeworld is the terrain of 
communicative rationality, in which the main drive for action is basically the need for mutual 
understanding. The main point of Habermas’ argument is, that in modern societies, the System 
colonizes the Lifeworld. Colonization means, in short, that the state and the economy is 
transforming the communicative actions of the Lifeworld into actions oriented by their goal-
rational logic (e.g. through elections: the choice between parties is not based on the interests 
articulated in debates that fulfill the conditions for communicative rationality, but by creating 
enemies out of the other parties, presenting elections as matters of life and death.) As a 
consequence, the collectively shared interpretations and meanings of the surrounding world and 
events could be lost along with the freedom of the actors. The reproductive functions of the 
Lifeworld are threatened and the roots of the System itself are in danger.  
Cohen and Arato supplement Habermas’ theory with two elements: First, they introduce the 
political and the civil society, two interrelated associational spheres, placed between the 
System and the Lifeworld. Second, they argue, that not only colonization can take place, 
but the democratization of the System is also possible. Civil society can induce 
communicative rationality in the operation of the state and the economy. To explain what civil 
society is, in this context, I will elaborate on the notion of civil and political society and their 
relation.  
The main organizational forms of both civil society and political society are associations, thus 
both of them are associational spheres. These associations could be formal or informal 
associations, e.g. voluntary associations for civil society and political parties for the political 
society. Political society often originates in civil society, as it was the case during Central 
European transitions. However, they have important differences, most importantly they are 
integrated through different logic of operation.  
Civil society is, in principle, coordinated by the logic of communicative action which 
“involves a linguistically mediated, inter-subjective process through which actors establish 
their interpersonal relations, question and reinterpret norms, and coordinate their interaction 
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by negotiating definitions of the situation and coming to an agreement” (Cohen - Arato, 
1992:435).  
In practical terms, this means that the aims of the actors in civil society are based more on 
values than on rational effectiveness. Although they also apply rationality in their everyday 
work and they have organizational aims and strategies, accordingly, the aim of fulfilling and 
representing given values should overwrite other criteria of organizational (e.g. financial) 
efficiency.  
Political actors, however, need to prioritize between various values and interests, since 
their main criteria of success is to win the elections and gain the support of the citizens. 
Thus, their organizational effectiveness will overrule the values and interests they represent if 
needed. Therefore, the political society is governed by goal-rationality and, as such, it 
represents the System, while civil society is tied to the Lifeworld.  
It is important to note, although civil society overlaps with the Lifeworld and political society 
with the System, they are also differentiated from them. The institutions of civil society are 
fundamentally different from the very informal and unconscious institutions of the Lifeworld 
while the organizations of the political society bear only legislative authority if elected, 
otherwise, they should be separated from the state.   
The common origins and interrelation of political and civil society, the complex mechanisms, 
rules, and processes enhancing mediation between them provide them with a possibility to 
understand each other, thus to mediate between the System and the Lifeworld, and as I 
mentioned earlier, in both directions. 
To understand why Arato and Cohen call for civil society, I need to elaborate the need for a 
rationalized lifeworld, its connection to democracy and the inevitable role of civil society plays 
in establishing a democratic order. The Lifeworld does not necessarily support modernity and 
democracy in itself. To serve as a ground for democracy, the Lifeworld needs to be modernized 
and rationalized. Rationalization means that traditional norms of the Lifeworld could be 
replaced by “communicatively achieved ones” (Cohen - Arato, 1992:456) which are, similarly 
to the ones Gellner proposed, based on civil rights.53 However, the Lifeworld modernized only 
by the System presents a problem, because the communicative rationality is lost, which would 
result in a new type of non-communicative set of norms.  Civil society is able to prevent such 
a systemic penetration of the Lifeworld by the System and it can constantly introduce new 
                                                                
53 Cohen and Arato calls it as right of the intimate or private (Cf. Cohen - Arato, 1992:455). 
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channels and methods of communication via its institutionalized forms coordinated by 
communicative rationality. (Cohen - Arato, 1992) 
So as to prevent the ‘loss of freedom’, civil society needs to develop its own institutions, which 
is a time-consuming process. In the context of the transition, this means that the strategy of civil 
society clearly opposes the logic of revolution. Revolutions might be based on associational 
forms of collective action, but they are intended to be fast, they are often violent and attack 
persons instead of structures. Revolutions are also often followed by the demobilization of the 
masses. The institutionalization of civil society requires time and the rights of communication 
to be guaranteed, thus, the limitation of the newly emerging political power.  
This idea of civil society is clearly based on the strategy of New Evolutionism, however, Cohen 
and Arato try to extend the strategy to established democracies as well. Their main point is, that 
democratization means essentially the decolonization of the Lifeworld, which not only prevents 
the “loss of freedom” it is also able to restore it and democratize the System.  Based on this 
extension, the theory can be generalized, and presented as a systemic social process. 
However, democratization cannot lead to the destruction of the System and to the hegemony of 
the communicative logic. In Cohen and Arato’s view, this would lead to the destruction of 
differentiation, which is the basis of modernity (and freedom). Thus, civil society requires the 
existence of the political society, the state, and the economy. The former guarantees the rights 
for the operation of civil society while the latter provides the basis of production.  
Márkus (1992) develops a very similar theory: Civil society is a non-economic and non-state 
sphere, differentiated from the private sphere as well. Civil society is able to operate only in a  
society protected by the state, where the state guarantees the fundamental rights of individuals 
and collective actors.  
The difference is, introduced by Márkus is that needs fuel the whole concept. While rights could 
be universalized, needs are necessarily plural and particular. The definition and the decision 
which need should be fulfilled is a result and subject of political competition. Thus, the sphere 
of civil society in a liberal democracy  
“primarily appears as an institutionalized sphere for the competition between different 
social groups, which represent their own particular interests, separately and isolated from 
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each other, against the state.  They try to pressure the state to prefer the interests they 
represent.” (Márkus, 1992:46).54  
The function of civil society is to channel these interests into the state. The competition of the 
different civil society actors in representing their particular needs might give birth to or raises 
universalized interests as well.  
Molnár, who proposes a model which fits into the dualistic argument under socialism, in a 
response (Molnár 1993) to critics moves towards the intermediary sphere  
‘which is neither smaller, nor less than the sphere of politics, or the guarded private 
sphere. It exactly has the additional value which is “cannot be caught with the tools of 
class analysis but cannot be reduced to the legal categories of citizenship or the 
philosophic category of human rights.”’ (Molnár 1993:109).  
However, it is not clear what would differentiate this sphere from other spheres, more 
importantly from the economy. For example, Szelényi (1993) points out that Molnár, suggests 
that the development of civil society could be understood as the diffusion of private economic 
activities.   
For Márkus, or Cohen and Arato, civil society is a sphere of intermediary organizations, 
networks, and the non-political (or cultural) public sphere. Family and friends are clearly 
excluded from civil society as institutionalized political actors (as parties) as well. Arato and 
Cohen, however, distinguish between civil society based on formal, more stable associations 
and social movements. Social movements are much more fluid and dynamic. They add new 
ideas and values to the discourse.  In spite of might be more successful in challenging the 
System, their achievements cannot be institutionalized without the associational sphere of civil 
society  (Arato, 1992).  
The theory of Cohen and Arato provides a theoretical ground for other authors, who defined 
civil society as a mediating sphere for more practical purposes. They use it to analyze specific 
phenomena or processes of the development of the sphere of voluntary associations or the 
political sphere. For example, Szabó (1995b) examines how the political and civil society have 
been differentiated after 1989, through research on protest activities. In his article, he points out 
that protest activity became more formalized in the first election-cycle of the Parliamentary 
system, and was the main terrain of civic actors (including trade unions and parties outside of 
                                                                
54 I translated the term ’érdekcsoport’ as ’social group’, despite it could be translated as interest group as well. 
However, based on the context I think that the meaning of ’interest group’ is too narrow, since it might refer to 
well-organized lobby groups only.  
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the Parliament), while political parties elected into the Parliament became almost totally 
inactive in this field.  
Szabó (1993, 1994) in his other articles rather uses the concept of social movements or the 
movement sector, which consists of civil society organizations, authoritarian movements and 
even political parties. The movement sector might be understood as the overlapping terrain of 
civil and political society, but55his typology is rather based on the level of institutionalization 
of collective actions. Thus, Szabó distinguishes between less formalized and structured mass 
action, and the more structured, more stable forms of collective action. This latter pool of 
organization might include subcultural spheres, political parties and civil organizational 
networks.   
Related to the concept of the intermediary sphere, without much reflection on their own 
concepts and led by their narrow focus on a given set of organizations, many articles use the 
concept of civil society emphasizing the importance of voluntary associations.   For example 
as Quigley describes civil society as “Institutions characteristic of civil society include a free 
press, independent legislatures and judiciaries, trade unions, chambers of commerce, and 
voluntary associations. (Quigley, 1993:4)”, or Sandi does as  
”... private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct 
control of the state”  and “Such decentralized structures, of a network type, can offer the 
framework for individuals to manifest themselves, to participate”. (Sandi, 1992:111)) 
When authors referring to civil society as an intermediary sphere, identify the actors and 
institutions of civil society, they emphasize the associational nature of these actors the most. 
The actors of civil society include certain types of organizations, as human rights organizations 
or groups, civil society organizations, NGOs, cultural organizations, etc. They often include the 
groups of opposition, trade unions, and the Church, especially in relation to Poland. To explain 
why associations are important, they usually refer to Alexis de Tocqueville’s theses about the 
importance of associations. According to that, in associations people will learn to deal with 
public issues and they develop respect and tolerance towards others. Altogether associations 
enhance communication among the members of the society and they serve as a cross-cutting 
bridge between social groups. Through the representation of interests and negotiating between 
associations they will also create the public sphere.  
                                                                
55 Although Szabó does not refer to civil and political society in these articles.  
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E. Civil society as the opposition 
The last group of authors uses the term with a focus on the opposition under state socialism. 
They often mention specific actors, organizations or refer to civil society as a network of 
organizations. The approach is similar to the approach of the intermediary sphere in the sense 
that these organizations and networks are seen as non-state, non-economic actors and are 
differentiated from the family and individuals. It is also similar to the dualistic approach since 
they appear as a homogenous sphere opposing the state. (Ash, 1989a, 1989b; Bruszt, 1990; 
Bruszt - Stark, 1991; Kolankiewicz, 1994; McCormick - Kelly, 1994; Yanqi Tong, 1994; 
Weigle - Butterfield, 1992)56 
The most important characteristic of civil society, pointed out by these authors, is its autonomy 
or independence from the state. Interestingly, despite the emphasis put on it, independence is 
rarely explained and as a feature is taken for granted.  
“the independent self-organization of society, the constituent parts of which voluntarily 
engage in public activity to pursue individual, group, or national interests within the 
context of a legally defined state-society relationship” (Weigle - Butterfield, 1992:3) 
The authors do not go beyond the declaration of independence and as a consequence, their 
definitions often become tautological. They mostly use the concept to picture the dichotomy of 
state and civil society without analyzing it. Those, who try to explain it somehow, mainly 
understand it as being outside of the state and the official public sphere57. There are a few 
exceptions, mostly Hungarian authors, or those who had spent some time in Hungary. They do 
not question the autonomy of the opposition – which means acting outside of the state or void 
of state control – but analyze if there is a strict dichotomy between the two parties, in terms of 
their relation. For example, Ash describes the opposition’s outside nature on the one hand – as 
the opposition tries to act by neglecting the state’s attempts to control or intimidate them – and 
an important difference between the Polish and Hungarian opposition on the other hand: the 
border between the Party and the opposition is much less clear in the Hungarian case than in 
the Polish one (Ash, 1989a). The difference is also emphasized by Bruszt and Stark (1991), 
who also stress the importance of the relations between the reform wing of the Party and the 
                                                                
56 Kolankiewicz distinguishes between civil society of state socialism, which he equates with the opposition, and 
civil society of a democratic state. In the latter case, he uses a simple dualistic model, similar to Keane’s. 
57 “with the concept of 'civil society' under state socialism, we refer to the self-organization of society in spheres 
relatively autonomous from the state” (Bruszt - Stark, 1991:202). “building civil society in these conditions meant 
organizing society for self-management in any sphere of social life where the state was either not paying attention 
or was willing to tolerate autonomy.” (McCormick - Kelly, 1994:810) 
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opposition in the Hungarian case: the Hungarian opposition is louder, but weaker than its Polish 
counterpart, in terms of social support and embeddedness. Interestingly this weakness leads to 
the possibility of being a partner to the ruling party at the end of the eighties since the reform 
wing of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party believed that its power could be stabilized 
through elections. Bruszt (1990)  argues, that one of the internal conditions of the fall of 
communism in Hungary was the alliance between the opposition and the reform wing of the 
Party, and there were attempts to reach a compromise between the two parties. Although the 
strategies of the Party to defeat the opposition did not work, as the elections in 1990 showed,  
in some way the possibility of connections or the alliance with the reform wing helped to avoid 
polarization and contributed to the non-violent nature of the Hungarian transition. (Arato, 1992; 
Cohen - Arato, 1992; Yanqi Tong, 1994)58  
Besides the relationship between the opposition and the Party, the opposition's social 
embeddedness is also problematized, however to a smaller extent. First as noted, the Hungarian 
opposition is seen as weakly connected to larger social groups. Kolankiewicz (1994) however 
argues that the opposition is a) part of the elites, at least in a sociological sense. b) “oppositional 
activity was equally a blend of second economy and second society.” (1994:149). This view 
contradicts the general view on the relatively low level of social embeddedness of oppositional 
organizations. Although it does not challenge the view that established, institutionalized 
channels are needed to include the particular interests of the different strata to these debates.  
Only Ash (1989b) differentiates59 between the narrow opposition, or politically involved 
groups, and the wider range of association, others mainly write about the political opposition 
or define civil society as a whole. For Ash, the non-political civil society is only semi-
independent and its growth is dependent on the strategy of the political opposition.  
A less problematic, widely accepted feature of the opposition is its highly pluralistic and 
fragmented nature. It consists of different groups sometimes fighting, competing with each 
other. A quote from Ash’s description of the Hungarian and Polish opposition illustrates well 
this plurality.   
“In both Poland and Hungary, groups or grouplets whose identities or programs arise 
from specific postwar realities, overlap or combine with groups raising almost every 
flag, slogan, aspiration, or prejudice of the pre-war political spectrum (except 
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communism): populism, reform economists, radical sociologists, smallholders, 
Lutherans, Catholic ‘base groups‘ evangelical sects, democratic opposition, democratic 
youth, democratic academics, solidarity, Fighting Solidarity, national democrats, liberal 
democrats, liberal Catholics and conservative Catholics, Christian socialists, Jews, anti-
Semites, advocates of worker’s self-government, apostles of free enterprise, syndicalists 
and monetarists, self-styled ‘crazy-liberal’, ‘neorealists’, ‘neopositivists’” (Ash, 
1989b:267) 
Another widely acknowledged feature is the Hungarian opposition’s self-limiting nature. Self-
limitation means that the privileged role of the party is not challenged and in relation to that, 
non-violence. Self-limitation is not only frequently mentioned in the academic literature, but it 
is also expressed by the actors in the Hungarian opposition as well. The most obvious example 
is the program titled ‘Social Contract’ released in 1987 by Beszélő, which declared the 
privileged position of the Party and offered to be a partner in implementing the necessary 
reforms (Kis et al., 1987). 
I.2.4. Expectations and the road to freedom 
Despite the diversity of the approaches presented above, they evidently share a main 
problematique: the transition from socialism to democracy. By reviewing the aims attributed to 
and expectations towards civil society I might point out the main similarity in their argument: 
Democratization requires participation in the end. Although this seems to be an evident 
statement, it has important consequences.  
A) Participation requires fundamental rights, in principle and in practice; 
B) The question, how civil society contributes to democratization gains central 
importance.  
While statement (A) is shared by most of the theories and authors cited here, the answer to the 
question (B) is influenced by the model of civil society proposed. Therefore, I will shortly 
discuss the typical aims and expectations raised by the corpus, then I will turn to the assumed 
mechanisms of democratization.  
A. Aims and Expectations.  
Democratization has two layers: Establishing democratic institutions and the 
democratization of the society. Most of the authors understand it as the contribution of civil 
society to the establishment of rule of law or legal institutions. 
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Among legal institutions, especially fundamental rights are emphasized. Mainly freedom of 
expression and freedoms guaranteeing self-organization are mentioned, however other rights, 
less connected to the political sphere (e.g. freedom of movement) also appear.  
The reference to fundamental rights is also used to connect the institutional aspects to the 
transformation of the society. Freedom rights should be legally institutionalized by the state and 
understood and realized by the citizens at the same time.60 As such, they lead to the self-
organization of society. It is not clear, whether civil society constitutes a means or an end of 
this process, but democratization is mostly understood as the capability of self-governance. The 
desired scale of self-governance is not clear, however, it always includes self-expression, self-
organization of associations or other organizations, and influencing decision making.  
Self-organization is connected to the goal of a limited state, balanced by an autonomous sphere 
of social activity.  The two are connected. If the limited state is the new democratic state, then 
civil society should perform its control function. If the state is still an authoritarian one, civil 
society is eroding its authority by establishing a parallel society which undermines the 
legitimacy of power.  
Besides nurturing individual freedoms, equality or solidarity is also present among the goals of 
civil society, albeit to various extent. Mainly Keane (1988a, 1988c) emphasizes equality and 
the importance of the balance between equality and freedom. He identifies three major threats 
of achieving such a balance: 1) The contradiction: on the one hand, modern mass societies need 
a state responsible for legitimate regulation, managing infrastructure, etc. on the other hand a 
state with the necessary strength these tasks require can threaten citizens’ liberties and their 
autonomous self-organizing capacities.61 2) The fight for liberty and equality at the same time. 
The two are often mixed up and people tend to replace the fight for liberty with the struggles 
for equality, which leads to demands of increasing state intervention (e.g. services) in social 
life and the unintended narrowing of liberty. 3) Most of the theories ignore the heterogeneity of 
civil society and its changing relation to the state, as they stress conflict or harmony between 
the two (Keane, 1988a). 
Keane’s fears could be understood better from his attack on neo-conservative thinking and, at 
the same time on, in his own terms, state-administered socialism. Neo-conservatism in order to 
save classical libertarian values, such as mutual reliance and freedom of choice, would place 
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61 Gellner also worries about the strength of the state, however he adds that either the state or the economy could 
threaten citizens’ freedoms (cf. Gellner, 1994).   
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civil society above the state, which in principle would mean the restriction of state offered 
services and would allow the principles of the free market to prevail in most areas of life. Yet, 
conservatives perceive civil society as the source of disorder, which requires national traditions 
and centralized power as means of containment. Therefore, they would increase state power in 
the end.62In turn, state-administered socialism subordinates freedom to the principle of equality. 
In this case, the growing number of services provided by the state indicates the growing 
intervention into private life.  
The solution Keane (1988c) offers has two elements. 1) Societies have to apply a pluralist and 
complex notion of liberty and equality, which allows citizens to define how they understand 
these notions. 2) An institutional setting is needed which distributes decision making power 
among different institutions of the state and civil society. These institutions then perform two 
functions: they dismantle or block monopolies and distribute different goods (and access to 
liberty) in different ways according to the complex definitions of equality and liberty, which 
lead, through the growing number of choices to the increased possibility of participation.  
Between institutions and the society, the aim of a free public sphere appears. It is either the 
alternative public sphere of samizdat publications or its extended form for authors who are 
addressing civil society under socialism and the velvet revolution. Among democratic 
circumstances, it might mean the better visibility of groups, organizations, and interests. It 
might be also understood as the institutionalized public sphere but in a generally limited scope. 
Only a few authors address the question of the mass media. The “public sphere” is rather 
referred to in a Tocquevillian sense, that is a space created by associations, organizations and 
interest groups to express their opinions. (see Benda et al., 1988; Bernhard, 1993; Dipalma, 
1991) 
The aim, which connects all of the aims mentioned above is to increase political participation 
and collective action. Evidently, participation is the key in creating the autonomous sphere of 
social activities through establishing associations and in expressing opinions in the public 
sphere. Participation will provide the pluralism of interests, opinions and organizations. 
Participation is defined in terms of freedom rights, but not only theoretically. It is expected that 
citizens understand the concept of freedom rights and they emotionally engage with them. As a 
result, participation would increase. Freedom rights are also the key to counterbalance 
atomization. The strong engagement entailing individual rights and the communitarian ideals 
                                                                
62 Which did indeed lead to the use of increased power in favor of the privileged groups and to the freedom of the 
few (my conclusion). 
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of civil society are connected through political freedoms. These are meant to be exercised with 
others, thus, by engaging them, post-communist societies will be able to overcome atomization 
and to create the desired autonomous, strong sphere of independent activities.  
When legal and institutional institutions are mentioned, authors emphasize the importance of 
the realization of the possibilities provided by these legal institutions.  
“Every act of defiance helps us to build the framework of democratic socialism, which 
should not be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure but a real day-to-day 
community of free people.” (Kennedy, 1992:38) 
In sum, there is a great emphasis on the foundation and practice of civil and political liberties: 
the picturing of the citizen who is able to exercise liberties is a common feature of the articles 
and books belonging to the corpus above. The picture of such a citizen or community of citizens 
is always accompanied by the assumption or desire for developing a civic virtue. As Cohen and 
Arato (1992) point out, this civic virtue has much to do with the self-limiting approach of the 
opposition and is a crucial element in forming this expectation of increasing participation.  
Similarly to the importance of freedom rights plurality of civil society or the sphere of 
independent groups is beyond any doubt. The descriptions of the opposition introduced above,  
by Bruszt and Stark (1991), Ash (1989b) or Hankiss (1988), the emerging social movements 
and associations mentioned by Molnár (1996) and the expectations that different social groups 
would find their voice through civil society point in this direction. But more importantly, 
plurality is proposed as a structural feature of civil society by Dahrendorf (1990), Arato (1992) 
or even by Gellner (1994). Structural means the lack of dominance of any type of activity, aim, 
identity or ideology between the independent and informal groups of the civil society. In 
addition, Dahrendorf and Keane63 refer to the messiness of such a system, filled with 
uncertainty but still encouraging participation, which is possible only if neither the state nor 
any other groups manage to suppress the citizens.    
Although plurality is emphasized, a quite homogenous civic virtue is proposed or accepted by 
most of the authors. The primacy of civil and political liberties and expectations towards the 
growing level of participation as the foundation of the future requires a certain value-set, all 
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forward and improve ourselves and the conditions in which men and women live on this planet, we have got to 
accept the untidy, antagonistic, uncomfortable, but proud and encouraging concept of open horizons.”  
(Dahrendorf, 1990:28) In Keane’s work it could be derived from the constant need for defining the boundaries 
between the state and the civil society the constant struggle for freedom and equality in the same and because the 
struggle for equality and redistribution cause results which will not be self-sustaining. (Keane, 1988c) 
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collected under the five models of civil society mentioned above. The value set consist of values 
such as willingness to do actions, reducing fear (of the state or negative consequences of action), 
self-reliance, respect toward each other, being committed to non-violence, be able and willing 
to articulate and vindicate self-interest, hard work, flexibility. The values of the ability to 
tolerate others and being patient, non-violent and self-confident, are emphasized by authors 
who stress the uncertainties caused by the continuously and dynamically changing 
environment.   
B. Assumed mechanisms of democratization 
After pointing out the expectations towards a rising trend in participation, the question arises, 
about how civil society is going to achieve the desired goals. There are four answers to this 
question, and the exact answer is based on the model of civil society the authors use. Thus, in 
the following part, I will introduce four mechanisms of democratization and argue that they are 
proposed as a logical consequence of the given models of civil society.  
Institutions vs. society: Democratization is basically impossible.  
It seems that there are two main opposing views explored with regard to the ‘civil society as a 
social order’ approach: First, according to the top-down approach proposed by Seligman or 
Kumar, civil society is defined by democratic legal and political institutions. Once these are 
established, democracy is forming an order. The other view considers civil society as a specific 
kind of structural setting and value system. For Gellner and Szűcs, a structural balance should 
emerge first, in which the different actors are not able to rule over each other. This situation 
leads to the emergence of rights as a specific political culture. Institutions in this view are 
preconditioned by the structure and the value system maintaining this structure.  
Thus, it seems, that Szűcs’s and Gellner’s message for the Central-European transition is that 
even if a society decides to move towards democracy, even if the majority supports the 
transition, or takes part in the decision-making process somehow, it is not a question of a 
conscious decision to what extent this democracy will work, but it is mostly based on structural 
preconditions shaped by long-term historical processes.   
According to this argument, a civil society could be formed among very specific circumstances 
and its formation requires a centuries-long (or even longer) period starting in the Early Modern 
Period (or even earlier). Not only the time frame of such a transformation is not acceptable for 
a program aiming at the transition. The specific structural conditions, which results in the 
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specific political culture allowing individual liberties grow, are long gone in the 20th century. 
The state and economy are too strong, a different type of political culture is already set. Gellner 
refers to this explicitly:  
“The first thing to note, is that the natural selection mechanism, which worked in favour 
in its [the civil society’s]  favour, so dramatically and conclusively in the past, need no 
longer work for it, or at least not for it alone” (Gellner, 1994:197)  
In evaluating the future chances of civil society, Gellner expects the guarantees to be established 
by the world powers, who are engaged in this type of society and he does not believe in the 
possibilities of a further, organic democratization.    
Although Dahrendorf defines civil society in a dualistic model, and his standpoint is often 
misunderstood as optimistic, a closer examination of his book reveals that the strong emphasis 
on the open society leads to a pessimistic conclusion, similar to Gellner’s. The optimism 
attributed to Dahrendorf is based on a famous quote implying that the constitutional change can 
be done in six months, economic change in six years and the social transformation, the new 
political culture will develop in sixty years. Unfortunately, some important elements of the 
quote are often left out:  
“The formal process of constitutional reform takes at least six months; a general sense 
that things are moving up as a result of economic reform is unlikely to spread before 
six years have passed; the third condition to the road to freedom is to provide social 
foundations which transform the constitution and the economy from fair-weather into 
all-weather institutions which can withstand the storms generated within and without, 
and sixty years are barely enough to lay these foundations.” (Dahrendorf, 1990:99-
100,  my highlights) 
A false version of the quote is often used to support the thesis that the development of 
democratic culture needs only time (or generational change) to evolve under democratic 
institutions. Dahrendorf, instead, uses this phrase to illustrate that the development of civil 
society is key to a successful transformation and, how fragile the chances are for a civil society 
to be developing on its own. The problem proposed by Dahrendorf is that the constitutional 
and normal layers of politics are mingled in the Velvet Revolution. While constitutional 
politics should engage to the “framework of the social order and institutional forms” 
(Dahrendorf, 1990:34), normal politics should be driven “by interests and other preferences 
within this framework” (Dahrendorf, 1990:34). During the Velvet Revolution, the two 
happened parallel. While realpolitik requires the mobilization of citizens loyal to a party, 
constitutional politics requires debates based on deliberation. When the balance between the 
two is distorted there are greater chances in spreading a  
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“combination of a nostalgic ideology of community which draws harsh boundaries 
between those who belong and those who do not, with a new political monopoly of a 
man or a ‘movement’ and a strong emphasis on organisation and mobilisation rather than 
freedom of choice” (Dahrendorf, 1990:104)  
In sum, if one takes the approach of Gellner, Szűcs, or Dahrendorf, the hypothesis is, that the 
transformation would require too much time, too specific conditions, so the chances of success 
are close to none.  
Tensions in the social structure 
The second mechanism is proposed by the authors of the dualistic approaches. The main 
argument is that there are tensions in the structure caused by the fragmentation of its different 
aspects. These tensions will lead to conflicts in which people will recognize their interests and 
learn ways to participate. This inevitably leads to the recognition of democratic action.  
The tension could be rooted in the cleavages in the social structure.  
1. Where there is no real chance to discuss different social and political conflicts, peace 
is only provided by economic growth or the perception of economic growth. With the 
changes in the perception, latent conflicts become manifest. In the eighties, the debt-
driven economic growth turned into stagnation and decline, the improvement in the 
quality of life has stopped, thus the conflicts became sharpened. (Dahrendorf, 1990) 
These conflicts will lead to the awakening of the articulation of interests and 
decreasing legitimacy of the system. Although Dahrendorf has seen it as the causes for 
the fall of the system, the economic hardships after the Revolution might cause similar 
effects: sharpening social conflicts and disappointment in the newly formed political 
system. (Ferge, 1994, 2000)   
2. The different, emerging problems in the late seventies and eighties caused distortion 
in the power and economic structure of the system. On the one hand, officials started 
to follow their own interests and built clientelistic networks. On the other hand, this 
caused dissatisfaction. Besides the system had to allow the operation of the second 
economy increasingly to cover its failure to provide the necessary economic stability. 
This slowly leads to the self-organization of the society (Molnár, 1996). 
3. The withdrawal to the private sphere is also a source of tension, so when the power of 
the state started to erode, it also led to the manifestation of suppressed values, as 
nationalism civic values and so on (Hankiss, 1989a; Scheye, 1991). 
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Although the tension might have various sources, it would lead to the recognition and 
articulation of interest, which will lead to the emancipation of the “masses”.   
The second economy as a practice field 
The basic assumption is that the increasing, independent economic activity support the 
formation of civic engagement because it requires making decisions, developing managing 
skills and the financial independence serves as a ground for political independence as well. Ágh 
(1987, 1989) argues, that the growing individualism in the economy leads to political 
individualism. Individualism is understood as articulation and advocacy of individual interests. 
Economic activity causes the accumulation of wealth. Individuals, who would not like to lose 
the fruit of their work will require guarantees to be able to continue their activity and have a 
stable economic activity. So, they will form associations to represent more efficiently their 
interests.  
Tőkés suggests that the second economy is not only the sum of alternative economic activities, 
but it is a precondition of autonomous political activity, or to the entire second society, since 
“collective personnel autonomy was born when the individual’s right to private property 
acquired unconditional legal protection and became  the material guarantee for the substantive 
exercise of the rights vested in all citizens.” (Tőkés, 1988:42, emphasis is in the original) 
original).  
Although the validity of this thesis is at least challenged by Manchin’s empirical results (1988) 
it might be possible in theory, the economy gains a role Gellner (1994) attributes to it as the 
ground for civic virtues, after the Velvet Revolution.   
 “New evolutionism” 
For the majority of the authors, civil society consists of groups, organizations and communities. 
These groups mediate between the society and the state and play a crucial role in the 
development of the necessary skills and values needed for the successful building of a 
democracy. This is mentioned by a wide range of authors and is emphasized by Bibó, Gellner, 
and Dahrendorf as well (even if they understood civil society differently), however, it was 
elaborated more precisely by Cohen and Arato (1992). The systemic link between the state and 
the society or individuals is provided by the autonomous groups, interest organizations, 
voluntary associations, the media, etc. This mediating role of civil society is possible only if it 
is well embedded in the less formal spheres of the lifeworld. If this is the case, civil society 
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integrates the Lifeworld as well, and by socialization it fosters participation in decision-
making. In this regard, mediation and integration are mutually strengthening each other.   
Mediation is connected to the mass basis of these organizations. The mass basis is a 
precondition of the successful interest representation, while successful mediation provides a 
necessary motivation to believe in the process, thus to maintain and increase participation in 
civil organizations. Consequently, “New Evolutionism” counts on the constant struggle for 
engaging citizens increasingly. Civil society organizations work parallel to widen their social 
basis, thus to spread democratic values and to democratize the system. The two are 
interconnected democratization provides legitimacy to their engagement to the given value set 
and to their methods of organizing.  
The main hypothesis of democratization, in this case, is thus connected to the Cohen-Arato 
theory. Basically, they build on New Evolutionism: civil society first develop as a parallel 
society, which occupies more and more space including more and more people and activities. 
The parallel society serves both as a sphere of socialization and a growing control over 
the governments which is pressured to apply more democratic procedures. According to 
Cohen and Arato, this process should continue among the democratic institutions after the 
Revolution. Therefore, civil society remains a sphere which is not only defending the Lifeworld 
from the System, it also mediates democratic procedures applicable in the system:  control via 
the public sphere, opinion formation, building a value system and social dialogue as well.  
Although other authors would not build such a theory, their focus on the actors or groups of 
actors also implies that actors have a role in democratization: they are able to control the 
government, mobilize people, develop skills and suggest democratic procedures.  
I.2.5. The model of democratization and the role of civil society 
Above I defined the main expectations (aims) towards civil society and the four processes 
through which civil society might contribute to the achievements of the goals. Based on these 
expectations and processes, I propose a model of democratization, a mechanism, which define 
the role of civil society in the process.  
The first element of the mechanism is its outcome: the increasing number of people practicing 
their freedom rights. The second element is civil society, which serves as the main agent in 
fostering individuals’ engagement with their rights, and, at last, a mechanism, which leads to 
the birth of the associational sphere. 
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The first element is the least problematic, since increasing freedom in terms of exercising 
individual freedoms of fundamental rights, as a result of the activities of civil society is the 
most common expectation formulated by the authors.   
The two other elements of the model require more explanation. Among the four processes of 
democratization, New Evolutionism has an important role. First of all, it is shared by many 
authors, regardless the exact model of civil society they propose. The role of association-like 
organizations is often emphasized and it is expected that these organizations might serve as 
socializing and mobilizing agents for ordinary citizens. This is the Tocquevillian core of most 
of the theories (even Gellner and Szűcs refer to such agents and mechanisms occasionally), 
where voluntarily joined associations, either with private or public aims support the 
development of skills, networks, values required by democratic politics.64   
Processes “b)” and “c)” are connected to the growing tensions of the social structure and to the 
second economy are mechanism preceding the formation of associations. These theories 
assume that these tensions, inconsistencies, cleavages and new activities will lead to the 
awakening of interest articulation and to the formation of associations. After this happened, 
associations will do the rest of work what they would do in a democracy. According to this 
idea, the mobilizing and socializing effect of associations lie in their universalistic 
characteristics. Thus, once associations are born, their universal characteristics inevitably lead 
to the enhancement of the practice of freedom rights.  
Democratization process “a)” in this regard formulates similar Tocquevillian expectations, but 
states that the preceding mechanisms and conditions are not suitable for the development of 
such a sphere of voluntary associations since the institutional structure and political culture is 
not favorable for its development.65  
The model of democratization is summarized in Figure 1. The preceding processes, through 
tensions and emerging alternative activities, lead to the formation of the associational sphere, 
which serves as socializing agents and an arena of mobilization. The participation in 
associations leads to the increasing chances for individuals to practice individual freedoms, 
especially connected to the politics, interest representations and so on, while the associational 
                                                                
64 The Tocquevillian theory is elaborated in details in Chapter II.3. 
65 Although I could conclude that there is no civil society and even it has, it do not have the expected impact on 
the practice of rights.  
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sphere is able not only to teach and collect those, who would already acquire these skills or 
ready to participate but also to expand itself, thus to include more and more citizens.   
Figure 1. The process of democratization 
 
Based on the model presented in Figure 1, an empirical examination might have three different 
focuses: First, to explore, which mechanisms lead to the formation of associations. Second, to 
what extent the engagement to associations increase the probability of the realization of civil 
and political rights, most importantly those, which are connected to political participation. The 
third focus might be the extent associations are able to increase the proportion of people 
exercising their rights.  
In the remaining part of the dissertation, I will engage the last two questions: the trends in 
exercising rights and the association’s impact on participation. However, before turning to 
these questions, I shortly explain the failure of civil society as a political project and challenge 




I.2.6. The failure of civil society as a political project 
Probably most of the reviews discussing the revival of civil society, especially those which 
focus on the opposition, would start with introducing Michnik’s New Evolution, the political 
strategy which based on the disappointment of previous failed attempts of changing the 
political system. These previous attempts, as the Poznan Uprising in 1956, the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956 or the Prague Spring in 1968 ended with their violent oppression by using 
military force and leading to deaths. Michnik wanted to avoid the same fate, so he announced 
a strategy, which had two main principles: 
• Self-limitation: “The leading role of the party in the state sphere would not be 
challenged” (Cohen - Arato, 1992:32), and non-violence (Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993)  
• Its subject is not the state. In Cohen’s and Arato’s words, this means that the: “agent 
or the subject of the transformation must be an independent or rather a self-organizing 
society aiming not at social revolution but at structural reform achieved as a result of 
organized pressure from below” (Cohen - Arato, 1992:32) 
As a result, this strategy would build a parallel society, independent from the state, avoiding 
and blocking state interventions, building parallel educational and cultural institutions, and as 
such, placing itself in more or less total opposition to the socialist state. The power of the 
parallel society would be its high capability for mobilization and activity in the civic sense, 
shredding constantly the area in which the state rules. (Cohen - Arato, 1992)  
This strategy was introduced in Hungary in the eighties as well. (Hankiss, 1988), however with 
important modifications. The first, self-limiting characteristic of the strategy was implemented 
by the Hungarian opposition. The application of its second characteristic, the total opposition 
of the state is much less clear in the Hungarian case. As I mentioned, Ash (1989b), and Bruszt 
(1990) pointed out that the Hungarian opposition, in comparison with the Polish Solidarity, was 
much weaker in terms of its social embeddedness. This weakness was perceived exactly in its 
lack of capability to reach out to non-intellectual groups, being incapable of mobilizing them. 
Molnár (1996) rightly pointed out, that self-organization was an activity of the intellectuals, as 
the workers and trade unions were not part of these self-organizing efforts. Apart from several 
politicized movements, such as the environmental, or right-protectionists movement, or social 
scientists working with the Roma and the poor, the non-political associations cannot be seen as 
part of this sphere, since there were doubts about their independence (Ash, 1989b).  
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Despite the knowledge about the lack of the opposition’s social embeddedness, it was often 
referred to as part of the larger, second society. The main features connecting the opposition 
and the second society were their informality and their autonomy or independence from the 
state. However the meaning of autonomy was not really reflected and its usage mixed up two 
distinct meanings, which might be best described by the Hirschmannian terms of ‘exit and 
voice’ (Hirschman, 1970). The opposition, although it tries to act autonomously from state 
control, clearly aims at least to influence state policies and public discourses. The so-called 
second society, on the other hand, tries to avoid any contact with the official world, it just 
wanted to be left alone.  
This dual picture of autonomy was present even in the intellectual scene: Despite, the 
democratic opposition was clearly trying to claim more possibilities of participation, György 
Konrád, one of the most well-known writers, expressed the idea of antipolitics, the idea of being 
left alone. Although he sees the networks of self-organized groups, communication, solidarity 
as part of his concept, antipolitics, is basically about non-action and being political only by 
monitoring the state and rejecting its ideology or actions. Konrád was as much a propagator of 
individual, universalistic human rights as others of the democratic opposition, but he describes 
antipolitics as:  
“The antipolitician tries to escape from the authority of organizations, he suspends its 
communal obligations, he has no other mandate, just what he gave to himself” (György 
Konrád, 1989[1986]:157).  
Bruszt, in his research in 1985 examined the citizen’s opinion about democracy. He found that 
for the majority of citizens democracy means equality. Besides, one-third of the respondents 
answered that democracy is the possibility of participation in politics, while another one-third 
said it is a situation when the state doesn’t intervene into the citizen’s life (Bruszt - Fehér, 1988). 
By supplementing these findings with Manchin’s Manchin (1988)  about the non-existent 
correlation among economic strategies involving complementary income-sources to values of 
political autonomy, it seems evident that the second society, the spheres of economic and 
private activities and the area of politically involved organizations had different strategies 
toward the state. The task would have been not only to increase the embeddedness of the 
political opposition but to mobilize the second society, it seems, against its intentions.  
Therefore, as a result, although there was a second society in Hungary at the time,66 the 
opposition could not relate to it as Solidarity did in Poland. The criteria of the parallel society, 
                                                                
66 On the second society see chapter I.1. 
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which is step by step democratized by the ‘second civil and political society’, could not be 
fulfilled, which had serious consequences for the transition and for the new political system 
after 1989.  
One of these consequences is highlighted by Molnár (1996), who argues, that the approach of 
civil society he applies for the period prior to 1989, cannot be applied after 1989 or in a 
democratic political order. The main argument is, reflected well by most of the other authors 
as well, that under democracy, civil society and the state (or politics) are complementary to 
each other since they have their own functions. The existence of the democratic order relies on 
their mutual, conflictual but also complementary relation. This notion is well described above 
in relation to the work of Keane, Arato and Gellner. The second society, although it contributed 
to the dissolution of the authoritarian rule, could not contribute to a democratic system, at least 
not in the participatory sense proposed by the New Evolutionist approach. The same applies to 
civil society in the narrower sense, for another reason: Many examples show that the opposition 
was not only the “civil society of the authoritarian state”. This would be the case if they would 
have not only accepted the rule of the Party but the principles of the political system. As Konrád 
describes:  
“We have to test the flexibility of those elements of the system which have not been 
declared axiomatic. We ought to regard the Communist Party as a party that just won 51 
percent of the vote in parliamentary elections.” (George Konrád, 1984:79) 
or three pages later: 
“The greatest act on behalf of freedom is to behave toward everyone as though we were 
free men – even toward whom we fear.” (George Konrád, 1984:82)67 
The main point is that the second society wants to be left alone, but the opposition proposes a 
system working according to different principles and as such would not only control or correct 
the government but would replace it with itself. Thus, the civil society of the socialist system is 
the seed of the political society of the new one and will become the political society later, when 
it is possible.  
So, how shall one overcome this problem? A common answer is to ignore the problem and use 
the term similarly in both cases (for example Dahrendorf, 1990, 1991; Keane, 1988a, 1988c; 
                                                                
67 For these two quotes I used an earlier translation of the book by Richard E. Allen: Konrád, G. (1984). 
Antipolitics: An essay. (R. E. Allen, Trans.): A Helen and Kourt Wolff Book, Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, 




Weigle - Butterfield, 1992). Another answer is to escape from it, like Molnár (1996), who states 
that he is only talking about the socialist times. Cohen and Arato (1992) try a third way by 
putting the emphasis both on the civil and political society. Although they do not write about 
this explicitly, in my opinion, the emphasis put on political society as a sphere separate from 
the state and on the civil society as well was necessary to describe the shift from opposition to 
becoming the political society of the socialist regime (around 1988-89 with the Roundtable 
Negotiations, forming parties etc.) and then to the political society of the new regime.   
“In the 1980s this project [New Evolutionism] was, amazingly enough, not only not 
abandoned but extended to two other countries: Hungary and the Soviet Union. Two 
reasons, aside from that of the inherent normative validity of the basic ideas, were 
responsible. One was geopolitical: Important shifts had occurred in the international 
economic and political environments in which the project had originally led to 
stalemate. The other was theoretical, involving an expansion of the original framework 
by introducing the category of political society.” (Cohen - Arato, 1992:60) 
The reason for the emergence of this new political society is a common perception that reforms 
must touch not only the economy but other spheres of life as well, which required partners on 
behalf of the society (Bruszt, 1990).  Still, the collapse of the socialist regime was not foreseen, 
and with the rapid changes, the opposition (every group) was challenged by the problematic 
choice of maintaining a civic movement or forming a political party. The choice was also 
pressing, since those who would choose to remain faithful to the civil society project would 
quickly find themselves on the margins. Sooner or later, most of the major groups decided to 
enter party politics, becoming the main actors of the political society. (Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993) 
To be precise, as Máté Szabó (1995b) suggests, this sphere slowly differentiated into civil and 
political society. Although, the new parties tried to act against this differentiation with their 
extensive campaigns of the first popular election and trying to maintain the movement and the 
party at the same time (Arato, 1993; Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993), the new political organizations 
lost their direct connection (which was also not very strong originally)  with the people. Civil 
society was also somewhat weakened as its most experienced actors left for politics (Arato, 
1999). Unfortunately, I do not have concrete evidence on how much of the former opposition 
left and stayed in civil society, but among the different elite-segments (economic, cultural, 
political) the political needed the greatest recruitment: the former political and state leaders 
naturally became persona non grata in politics (however one of the successors of the Party was 
able to achieve an eight percent share of the vote at the first elections) and tried to secure their 
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position in the economy, while the cultural elite remained almost unaffected by the transition 
(Kristóf, 2014).  
A third piece of the puzzle is still missing: Hankiss (1988) shows the process of atomization, 
and suggest that it was partly successful: mostly the closed circles of friendship and the family, 
the closest and most trusted networks, resisted the process which led to the situation best 
characterized by familism (Dupcsik - Tóth, 2008), where trust is only directed towards these 
closest circles, while no outsider can be trusted. Molnár (1996) emphasizes that workers 
remained the most contained group; they remained separated from the new organizations of the 
intellectuals. The circumstances of the atomized society, where the necessary networks and 
trust for interest articulation did not exist, paired with the highly legislative approach of the 
opposition, which assumed that the establishment of formal institutions of social debate and the 
public sphere will automatically help these groups to find their voice.  
Also, as I mentioned, the assumption that the new association will be based on common 
interests tied to social status (through occupation, profession, educational level, locality, etc.) 
seems quite unquestioned.  
In sum, the four pieces of the puzzle: 1) The two different criteria of autonomy (being left alone 
and independent participation) of the second society and the opposition, 2) the lack of 
connections between the opposition and other social groups and 3) the opposition becoming the 
new political society, and the 4) assumption that social groups will find their voice, once the 
democratic institutions are e introduced.  
All this led to a blind spot of the opposition and intellectuals in their expectations.  No one (or 
at least not the political elite) exactly had a plan on how to build the civil society of the new 
political order in terms of fostering (creating the structures, allocating the money), independent 
organizations and autonomous political and social participation. Since interest-articulation was 
expected to pop up with the establishment of (more or less) uncontrolled communication 
channels, and associations were expected to form based on these interests, no one had in-depth 
policy-plans about how to introduce the teachings of democratic behavior into public life and 
into the educational system.68  
                                                                
68 Democratic political socialization remained weak in the Hungarian education after the transition, on each level 
of the education. Many research points out, that political socialization is a marginal issue in the Hungarian 
education and it maintains the apolitical attitudes of the Youth while avoids to strengthen civic values. (Bognár - 
Szabó, 2017; Csákó, 2004, 2009; A. Szabó, 2018; A. Szabó - Bauer, 2009; A. Szabó - Oross, 2012; I. Szabó, 2009)  
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I.2.7. Summary  
In this chapter, by examining the different understanding of civil society, I explored the 
expectations towards civil society in the period around the transition. Based on the Hungarian 
and English language academic literature between 1985 and 1995, I identified five models of 
civil society. 1) Civil society as a social order identifies civil society as the Western society and 
focuses on the structural settings of a whole society. 2) A dualistic model, which redefines the 
Hegelian distinction of the state and civil society. This approach understood civil society as a 
sphere, including everything outside the state. 3)  A dualistic model under state socialism, which 
equates civil society mainly with the second, non-official society. While the activities of the 
second society are considered as independent from the first, the two spheres are heavily 
interdependent. 4) Civil society as a mediating sphere, in which civil society is understood as a 
nonstate, non-economic sphere of organizations (and movements), which is mediating between 
the state and the society and provides important functions of social integration. 5) The civil 
society as the opposition under socialism refers to the networks and organizations of the 
dissident groups prior to 1989.  
Despite the five models define civil society differently, they share their main expectations. Most 
importantly, they form expectations and aims connected to the democratization of the society 
and the public sphere through the support of democratic institutions. The language of human 
rights undoubtedly penetrates the whole literature. Human rights and mainly civil and political 
rights serve as a tool to tie the needs for democratic institutions, participation, social self-
organization and the public sphere together. The notion of these rights makes possible the 
communitarian, associational characteristic of civil society and its activities on the basis of 
individual rights.  
To fulfill the expectations, several mechanisms are proposed by this literature. These 
mechanisms are highly influenced by the given model of civil society. While authors identify 
civil society as a social order, they are necessarily pessimistic about the chances of 
democratization. The particular models propose different ways to change the power structures 
and political culture of the society. The dualistic approaches mainly emphasize the role of 
growing tensions in the society. These tensions could be economic or based on the suppressed 
values, the important thing is, that they lead to the recognition and articulation of interests 
because conflicts become manifest. This is an unconscious way of democratization, while the 
‘mediating sphere’ and ‘opposition’ approach emphasizes the more classic, Tocquevillian 
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effects of civil organizations reformulated by Adam Michnik’s New Evolutionism. According 
to this approach, civil society organizations serve as a main network for the diffusion of 
democratic values and skills necessary to operate among democratic conditions. The 
autonomous sphere of civil society mediates between the state and society by proposing 
democratic mechanisms and suggesting that the people are able to influence the state’s 
operation.  
Based on the expectations and mechanisms of democratization I proposed a unified model of 
democratization, in which civil society is understood as a sphere of voluntary associations, 
serves as a pool of socializing and mobilizing agents. In this model, associational participation 
would increase the chances of practicing civil and political rights, and the associational sphere 
would be capable of extending the social groups able to engage in such activities.  
However, the processes of democratization might be the hypotheses for further examination, 
they are also assumptions of different political strategies of democratization. The strategies 
being parallel, the interplay between them and the expected nature of the collapse of the regime 
leads to a blind spot, which might explain, why the strategy of civil society was abandoned after 
the transition. All this might be summarized as follows: 
1. Using the notion of autonomy in two different ways but treating them as a similar 
phenomenon: Under the label ’civil society is everything but the state’ or the so-called 
dualistic approach, there are two approaches used mainly to describe the situation of 
civil society under the socialist regime. One of them uses the term second society, or 
civil society to label the whole society which tries to avoid the state’s control from the 
second economy to the people withdrawing into the safe nets of their families and close 
friends. The other approach labels the opposition, independent political and cultural 
groups as civil society. They are both seen as a composition of autonomous actors, 
however, the criteria for their autonomy is different.  The members of second society 
wanted to be left alone by the state. They did not want to participate in political 
processes. The opposition, however, aimed at political participation and the active 
exercise of freedom rights.  
2. Forgetting the lack of embeddedness of the groups of opposition, and expecting the 
second societies democratization, which would mean to foster its participation, despite 
its different criteria of autonomy  
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3. The assumption, that voluntary associations has to and will be based on common 
interests. Furthermore, the common interest is based on a shared social status, therefore 
it is always bound to distinct social groups.   
4. The necessary focus on legal institutions: The programs and reforms of the opposition 
focused on the establishment of the legal framework, which is necessary, but not 
sufficient for establishing a new democracy. 
5. The rapid and unexpected changes which put the forces supporting the “civil society 
project” into a situation where they had to choose between marginalization or building 
professional political organizations based on the principles of effective operation.  
If the project of civil society has failed, the question then arises: Should I stick to the concept? 
Many scholars decided to move on and use the concept of nonprofit theory (Glózer, 2008). 
As a closing chapter to Part I, I am going to explain, why it is better to use the concept of 
civil society than non-profit theories when someone intends to understand the role of the 




I.3. The Usefulness of the Concept of ‘Civil Society’ in 
Understanding Democratization  
Having defined civil society in the previous chapter, I also showed what has led to the failure 
of civil society as a political strategy. Parallel to its ‘political failure’ it lost its dominance in 
describing the sphere of independent, voluntary associations. Instead, non-profit theories 
became popular worldwide and in Hungary as well. Therefore, it is important to clarify, why I 
still want to use this as the main concept in my analysis, whilst drawing less on other significant 
directions of scholarship, such as non-profit theories or social movement studies. Although 
these concepts are often used as synonyms with civil society69, they are targeting somewhat 
different forms and volumes of organizations. Further, they grew out from different theoretical 
traditions. As I will argue, the separate traditions of their origins and the context of these 
origins influence the questions researchers ask, and the answers they find through their hidden 
assumptions.  
As Glózer (2008) and Kuti (1998) convincingly point out until the mid-1990s ‘non-profit 
sector’ or ‘non-profit theories’ became the dominant framework of examining associations and 
similar entities. Sometimes the notions of ‘third’ and ‘voluntary’ sector also appeared, but only 
as synonyms to the non-profit sector.70 
                                                                
69 This is especially prevalent in the Hungarian case for reasons discussed later. This practice of usage is apparent 
in the short introduction of the Civil Review (Civil Szemle), a Hungarian journal about the non-profit sector and 
civil society. In the short text about the aims and scope of the Journal uses ‘non-profit Sector’ and ‘civil sphere’, 
‘civil society’ as interchangeable terms: The Civil Review is a theoretical journal: it is a periodical, which aims 
the introduction of the civil sphere, social cooperation and non-profit organizations. …. Beyond tracking the 
development of the domestic civil sphere, it is open internationally and it describes the processes of the European 
region…. The Journal discusses all the aspects of civil/non-profit sector and civil society…. it shall contribute to 
the development and institutionalization of civil/non-profit sector as independent area of social sciences. 
http://www.civilszemle.hu/hu/folyoirat last reached 2018.06.27. (the translation is mine) 
Compared to the ‘Aims and Scope’ of Voluntas, Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly or Journal of Civil 
Society the rather chaotic use of terminology is quite evident.  
70 Although I am not discussing the most recent developments in this regard, it is clear that the term ‘civil 
society’ gained more popularity recently, both in international and domestic research, even among the former 
proponents of non-profit research (Anheier, 2017; Antal, 2016; Kuti, 2017; Vándor et al., 2017). The main 
reason for that is change of the political structure. As the level of democracy is connected to the question of civil 
society, I believe that this chapter will also contribute to the explanations of the recent shift in the terminology of 
scholarly debates and the public discourse.  
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Besides ‘non-profit theories’, ‘social movement studies’ could be a contender to the civil 
society approach. However, during the 1990s and 2000s ‘non-profit’ is a far more popular term, 
than ‘social movements’.71  
A simple literature query among the titles72 available in Hungarian at the Metropolitan Szabó 
Ervin Library73 between 1985 and 201474 illustrates the prevalence of the three concepts: The 
‘non-profit sector’, ‘civil society’ and ‘social movement’. Civil society and related search terms 
gain most hits, followed by ‘non-profit sector’. ‘Social movement’ is lagging far behind (table 
3.). 
Table 3. Hungarian titles available 1985-201475Metropolitan Szabó Ervin Library 
Concept appearing in the title N 
civil society 659 
non-profit sector 235 
social movement 84 
Thus, in the following pages, I will explain, how the non-profit and the late twentieth-century 
civil society theories are different by their origin, how this difference affects the implicit 
questions they ask, and to some extent, how this affects empirical research. The last point is a 
crucial question since in many countries – among them in Hungary – non-profit research fuels 
the collection of large-scale, quantitative data. Due to the lack of other organizational level data, 
these datasets are often used for the purposes of research on civil society. As a consequence, 
the differences between nonprofit ad civil society research appear as a data-collection problem. 
                                                                
71 However, I have to note that research on social movements started to become fashionable in Hungary recently. 
In the nineties, early 2000-s there was only one notable scholar nurturing this line of research, Máté Szabó. In the 
last years however, new volumes are published on the topic (Máté Szabó - Mikecz, 2014; Van Til - Krasztev, 
2013). 
72 I also searched among ‘subject words’. However, as I checked the results, I found out that in phrases every word 
is searched independently. Thus, the results for subject word ‘civil society’ would contain any title that has the 
subject of civil or civil+ something and society or society+ something. To search just among the titles might neglect 
some books and articles, but works much better as an illustration of the range of uses of the concept.  
73 The Metropolitan Szabó Ervin Library is one of the main libraries of Hungary and its main focus is to collect 
the literature of the social sciences, especially sociology.  
74 I decided to end the period for searching the titles in 2014, since in 2014 the government launched an attck on 
civil society organizations, in relation with the Norwegian Fund. From this year, similar discursive and 
legislative attempts to discredit certain organizations were repeated by the government and by pro-government 
media outlets. (Kuti, 2016, 2017; Torma, 2016)  
75 Search terms: social movement: Social movement (társadalmi mozgalom), social movements (társadalmi 
mozgalmak);  civil society: civil society (civil társadalom), civil sector (civil szektor), civil sphere (civil szféra), 
civil organization (civil szervezet), civil organisations (civil szervezetek); non-profit sector: non-profit sphere 
(non-profit szféra), non-profit sector, (non-profit szektor) non-profit organization (non-profit szervezet), non-profit 




As I will show, this is not a sufficient argument and it is important to point out that data 
collection is also driven by implicit presumptions of the nonprofit theories.  Thus, based on the 
Hungarian case, I will argue, non-profit data can only be used with caution, and controlled and 
supplemented by other sources.  
There are some limitations to the discussion of scholarship worth to mention. First, I will treat 
groups of theories as single frameworks, which is a necessary simplification to focus on the 
fundamental difference between the two directions of research. Second, since I introduced civil 
society earlier I will mainly focus on some early work of the non-profit sector from the seventies 
and from the second wave of non-profit research has been done during the nineties.  
I.3.1. The origins of non-profit and civil society theories  
The reinvention of civil society and the birth of non-profit theories happened in parallel in the 
seventies. The first in Poland, whereas the second in the United States. As I see it, both branches 
of theory circulate around the questions of the relationship among the state and its citizens. 
However, in details, they are asking very different questions and start answering these questions 
on a very different ground.  
The central question of civil society theorists is how the human and political rights universe can 
be introduced into the relationship of the state and its citizens, thus how limiting the state’s 
power and empowering the citizens is possible. Conversely, non-profit theory asks a different 
question, namely, how the public good is produced and what is the role of non-profit 
organizations in this production. The first question is more political, the second is more 
economic, which leads to some fundamental differences in the basic assumptions about their 
answers and explanations. To understand why they start with differing questions, it is necessary 
to introduce the different contexts of their birth. 
The context 
There are significant differences between the United States and Central-Eastern Europe in the 
seventies, and this section highlights two of the most important aspects. 
Civil society was born in a context when citizens did not have the choice – or even the illusion 
– to control a major part of their public lives in Central-Eastern Europe. Although it would be 
a mistake to picture socialism as a total lack of individual freedom, it’s principles of operation 
were clearly against exercising civil and political rights.   
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Non-profit theory was born in a context where the principle of providing basic rights was not 
in question. The initial work of Weisbrod (1975), one of the founders of non-profit studies in 
the USA, clearly stated that his work tries to answer the question of public-good production 
where public, private/for-profit and non-profit sectors are in operation. Weisbrod intended to 
develop the theory of this third, understudied voluntary sector which would explain the 
existence of the legal non-profit, voluntary organizations. These organizations were already, 
legally working, without any kind of constraint on self-organization, which Central-Eastern 
Europe experiences. Furthermore, in Weisbrod’s theory there were clear references to ‘voter 
demands’, and ‘consumer-voter demands’ as a tool of expressing satisfaction with the state’s 
or other provider’s performance. In the socialist one-party state and its shortage economy, these 
tools were evidently missing.  
The main questions and answers  
The main explanations of the origin and operation of the non-profit organizations, such as the 
theory of the public goods, the failure of the state (Salamon, 1991; Weisbrod, 1975), the 
contract failure, or the idea of consumer-control mechanisms (Hansman, 1987; James, 1990), 
are clearly economic in nature. 
It is important to note, that these non-profit theories are mostly about service-providers and 
consumers in the field of education, healthcare, or other similar fields. The problem of public-
good production is twofold: first, why do these consumers turn to non-profit organizations 
instead of the state or for-profit firms? Second, why do non-profit organizations appear among 
service providers (and why do some people tend to participate in these organizations or support 
them)?  
In their answers, these early theories assume that somewhere in the process of producing a 
public good there is a failure, which makes it hard for the consumer to:  
a) satisfy their needs, since there is not enough in terms of quantity or quality of these 
goods; 
b) make the best decision on the possible forms of supplementing the required, but not 
available public good.  
Thus, the consumers of any public good would be ‘homo oeconomicus’, who turns to the public 
good provider with which they can reach the optimal (or the best available) option. Thus, the 
consumer is trying to maximize her utility functions by a rational choice.  
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Since the easiest and often the cheapest way to acquire these services is through state-owned 
institutions, the homo oeconomicus needs extra motivations or selective incentives to turn 
to any other provider then the state. Explaining participation or action in relation with non-
profit organizations thus requires a motivational, if not a demand-supply approach.  
This is the point, where the two theoretical traditions diverge in my opinion. Civil society theory 
in the late twentieth century incorporates the human rights approach. Even if this human rights 
approach is fostered by the international circumstances, and even if the language of human 
rights served as a means for the opposition,76 (see Michnik, 1999)as a consequence of its 
application, its main assumption, namely perceiving these rights as inherent to the human 
nature, built in the discourse about civil society. In this discourse the fulfilment of human rights 
belongs to the human nature, therefore one has to explain first why someone does not practice 
their rights. Only subsequently arises the question of the means (public, private, formal, 
informal) through which she fulfils the needs motivating the practice of these rights. This 
leads to the critical nature of civil society, despite the non-normative nature of non-profit 
theories.  
Coordination of the relationship among the state and the citizen 
There is a further consequence of this difference, introduced above, regarding the relationship 
among the state and the citizen. This relationship is based on different types of coordination: 
Within civil society theories, this coordination is based on legal rules, regarding what the state 
can and cannot do, and how much it is allowed to interfere with the individual’s life. The most 
important point is to keep the boundaries and prevent the citizens from any harm in their rights.  
To non-profit theory, this coordination is based on demand and supply77, which assumes that 
citizens have the possibility to express their demands either in a political way (votes), or via 
consumer choice. The first requires democracy, the second necessitates the market.78 Both 
democracy and the market require legal boundaries regulating the relationship between the state 
and the citizen. Thus, the questions of civil society theory target the very conditions assumed 
                                                                
76 Michnik Michnik (1999) refers to the impact of the Helsinki Accords from 1975 on the situation of oppositional 
initiatives. As signatories of the Helsinki Accord, countries of the Warsaw Pact formally accepted to incorporate 
human rights in their legal system. This served as a reference for the opposition.   
77 Which is the extension of the classic liberal approach of coordination actions, the invisible hand, to non-market 
realms.  
78 I am not suggesting that market processes are entirely missing from socialism - Bródy (1983) highlights that 
cycles of supply and demand worked in the planned economies as well, only instead of consumers the state officials 
provided the demand side. These demands were partly based on the confidential reports of public opinion 
researchers, which are now available at the Open Society Archive.   
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as given by non-profit theory. Furthermore, non-profit theory inquires how public goods are 
produced among the already given circumstances of democracy and market-oriented economy.  
I.3.2. Empirical consequences 
It would be a mistake to identify every non-profit research with such a narrowly defined 
economic theory. The attempts to measure the size and significance of the non-profit sector 
cross-nationally in the 1990s are more focused on the activities of the organizations, their 
organizational behavior, as well as their incomes and expenditures, and do not necessarily refer 
closely to the theories of the seventies and eighties. (see for example Salamon - Anheier, 1997, 
1999) In the nineties, political and cultural factors also appear among explanations of the size, 
strength and vitality of the non-profit sector (Salamon - Anheier, 2006).  
The legacy of economic theories: The non-profit organization 
The 1990s is also the decade of clarification, working out a widely accepted definition of the 
non-profit organization by Salamon and Anheier (Salamon, 1994; Salamon - Anheier, 1997, 
2006)79. Although explanations started to diverge from economic theories, the definition itself 
carries the legacy of these theories. The sector then is defined as the totality of these 
organizations.  
Thus, the unit of the non-profit sector is:  
a) an organization: It has a sustained, systematic operation, an organizational structure 
and it is institutionalized to a certain extent. There are some ambiguities with regards 
the formal or informal nature of this organization. While Salamon et al. (Salamon et 
al., 2003) state that the organization-like operation and not its legal personality is 
important, the Hungarian approach tends to be more formalistic and usually requires a 
legal personality (Kuti, 1998). 
b) not distributing profit: Generally, the income-sources of these organizations are not 
commercial ones. Financing is based on membership fees, donations, and support from 
the government (local or national), through various financing mechanisms. But non-
commercial activity is not a distinctive characteristic of non-profit organizations. 
Furthermore, they can operate on the same ground as for-profit organizations, 
                                                                
79 As an illustration of the prevalence of the definition, see: (Bocz, 2009; Kuti, 1998; Salamon, 1994; Salamon et 




competing for the same pool of clients, providing similar services (Galaskiewicz - 
Bielefeld, 1998). What is distinctive in this case is the – mostly legal – restriction on 
distributing profit among members. Thus, the profit – if there is profit – always 
contributes to the mission of the organization.  
c) self-governing: Every definition emphasizes the self-governing nature of these 
organizations. They have the competence to make decisions, to start and to cease 
actions, alliances etc.  
d) private or independent from the state: Salamon et al. Salamon et al. (2003)(2003) 
emphasize the private nature of these organizations, while Kuti (1998) only the 
institutional separation from state institutions. This separation does not prevent them 
from contributing to the public good or to the tasks the state has.80   
e) voluntary: with regard to its membership or participation in its activities.  
Further criteria features less strongly: Kuti (1998) refers to the non-political (not involved in 
party politics) and non-religious (the exclusion of churches) nature of non-profit organizations. 
Salamon and Anheier list these features among the main elements of the definition in their book 
in 1996 (Salamon - Anheier, 1996), but they do not in their study a year later (Salamon - 
Anheier, 1997). This latter, broader-definition is recalled by Salamon and Anheier in 2006 as 
well (Salamon - Anheier, 2006). 
Kuti (1998) mentions two further characteristics of non-profit organizations. First, their  
necessary contribution to the interests of the wider public or to the public good, second, the 
organization’s activity has a support from the citizens. This support might be expressed through 
volunteer work and civic initiatives.81 
To understand how the definition is constructed, we shall remember the initial questions of 
Weisbrod indicating that the curious thing about non-profit organizations is that they are not 
the result of any state pressure of economic constraints, and cannot be explained evidently by 
self-interest, which would be profit making. The implicit assumption of this view is that people 
tend to participate in public affairs only if they have a special interest in it or if they are pressed 
to do this.  
                                                                
80 This seems to be a small difference, however, eventually this is the bases of including public charities and 
public beneficiary organizations, both founded by the Parliament, local governments or other governmental 
institution in the domain of non-profit sector in the Hungarian case.   
81 Interestingly, more than a decade later in the new Law of Civil Organisation this last element gained an 
important role, as a basis of holding a public benefit status.   
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This view has its empirical consequences. Evidently, the examined organizations cannot be 
profit-oriented and researchers have to explore the specific interests – called motivations in 
empirical research on volunteering – which inspire the operation of these organizations despite 
their unlikely existence. The self-governing characteristic is a consequence of the non-state, 
non-compulsory, non-profit feature of these organizations.  
The social theory and the unit of analysis 
Kuti in 1998 stated that ‘non-profit’ in the Hungarian case became a well-established and 
institutionalized term as the label of the ‘world of associations and foundations’, over other 
terms, such as ‘civil society’. Indeed, it became one of the most important notions in studying 
these organizations. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) accepted it as a basis for 
shaping the yearly data collection about non-profit organizations,82 having a great impact on 
research.  
However, as Table 3 suggests, the discussion goes on. The majority of the 659 hits of ‘civil 
society’ have been produced after 199783. However, among the search phrases related to ‘civil’ 
the distribution is different: while 59% and 60% of hits for the phrases ‘civil society’ and ‘civil 
sphere’ appear after 1997, nine out of ten titles containing ‘civil sector’ or ‘civil 
organization(s)’ were written after this year. Thus, based on the titles, an assumption can be 
made that the literature on civil society shifted from a social-theoretical scope to the 
organizational level. A similar shift occurs with ‘non-profit sector’ as well. While only 51 
percent of titles containing ‘non-profit sector’ has been authored since 1997, 80 percent of titles 
including the term ‘non-profit organization(s)’is written after 1997.   
This shift is associated with the convergence of the two bodies of research and probably fostered 
the confusion of terminology. Further, this change seems to reflect international trends. 
Interestingly, after the theoretical and conceptual efforts to clarify the non-profit concept in the 
1990s, in the 2000s non-profit researchers started to use the notion of civil society again. The 
                                                                
82 Balogh et al. mention three approaches: they name the applied one as statistical definition, but the criteria of 
being non-profit organisations are the same as mentioned above. The other two is the legal (every non-public 
organisations which are not profit-oriented) and a national-economic one (those non-profit organizations by the 
statistical definition, which helps the population primarily and do not have income collecting activity.) (Balogh et 
al., 2003) 
83 In 1997 a new regulation on the public benefit status of nonprofit organization was established and the tax-
designation system was introduced. Kuti Éva published her influental book summarizing nonprofit research in 
Hungary in 1998. Thus, 1997 seems to be a good point of demarcation.  
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‘Global Civil Society’84 yearbook series and some edited books on civil society discussing the 
behavior of non-profit organizations mark this process (Zimmer et al., 2004). It seems that civil 
society serves as a referential social theory, where the unit of analysis is henceforward the non-
profit organization.85  
The non-profit definition given above has its weaknesses and problems as well as its strengths. 
These are well elaborated in Salamon’s work (1992). My main concerns here are not the 
problems of either concept, but that the ‘referential theory’ and the theory on which the 
selection of the unit of analysis is built have different inherent assumptions.  
I.3.3. Non-profit data and civil society research: The Hungarian practice 
The HCSO offers a vast data source and thus an easy-to-use framework for empirical research. 
However, the operationalization of foundations and associations being based on non-profit 
theory definitions is of concern. The attractiveness of available data often tempts researchers: 
while talking about civil society, they use non-profit data and (organizational) theory, without 
further reflection.  
To be precise, there is one type of reflection, which generally emerges from the analytical issues 
faced: the data collected on the basis of non-profit theory (and the legal definition of non-profit 
organizations) has a different organizational scope than those of civil society.  
In the Hungarian case, where the main source of non-profit research is the HCSO-s Non-profit 
Register, this is a twofold problem: first, data collection covers not only private but some 
publicly owned or governed non-profit organizations;86 for instance, within the category of 
associations, ‘public beneficiary companies’ whereas within the category of foundations ‘public 
benefit foundations’ are considered as governmental non-profit organizations, since they are 
mostly founded and financed by governmental institutions (Kákai, 2005). Public law 
                                                                
84 The yearbooks of the Global Civil Society Programme, published between 2001 and 2012. For further details: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/conflict-and-civil-society/past-programmes/global-civil-society-
yearbook last accessed: 25/10/2018. 
85 In some cases non-profit organizations are referred to as civil society organization (CSO), but the definition is 
exactly the same. As an example, compare Salamon and Anheier (1997:31-32) and Salamon et. al. (2003:7-8) 
86 The main source of non-profit research is the database of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office on non-profit 
organisations (Non-profit Register) collecting data about voluntary associations86 and foundations.86 The Non-
profit Register codes associational organisations according to their specific form: voluntary association, trade 
union, professional-employer’s advocacy organisation, professional organisation, public law associations and 




associations (e.g. chambers, the Hungarian Academy of Science) are also problematic. They 
are legal associations, but they have as strong competencies as authorities have. Besides, they 
are neither under the control of the government nor their members (Kuti, 1998). Most 
importantly the legal background of their foundation requires an act of the lawmakers, which 
means that every public body is named in specific legislation. Their organizational culture and 
behavior are often similar to authorities.  
A general strategy to tackle this problem is to exclude these organizations from the analysis if 
it is possible. Based on this strategy, there were several, more systematic attempts to clarify the 
relationship between civil and non-profit organizations. The Hungarian Central  
Statistical Office started referring to private foundations and associations as ‘Classical civil 
organizations’ (Balogh et al., 2003). Using a different approach, Bíró (2002) introduced the 
term ‘civil-nonprofits’ to separate civil organizations from the publicly owned-governed non-
profits. Thus, in this case, non-profit organization is a broader category, which contains the 
smaller sub-section of civil organizations.  
The second problem occurring during the data collection is the problem of gathering 
information from non-institutionalized organizations. These can be communities, social 
movements, informal alliances of organizations, and so on. Both the ‘civil-nonprofit’ and 
‘classical civil’ approach admit their limitation in this sense, thus they cannot report anything 
about these informal entities.  
Thus, this data-based, formal approach offers a simple solution: non-profit organizations and 
civil organizations are different, but overlapping categories (Figure 2). For civil society 
researchers, this approach offers conveniently available, large-scale data for a “small” price: 
sacrificing information about informal organizations.  
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Figure 2. The overlap between non-profit and civil organizations 
 
The further, non-reflected price is that this approach cannot handle the issue of civil society 
theories incorporating some profit-oriented organizations. This differentiation among profit and 
non-profit organizations is explicitly denied by dualistic theories of civil society, and implicitly 
in the three-sector approaches which often treat actors of the public sphere (e.g. media 
organizations) as part of civil society. The role of political parties and trade unions is also 
problematic when interpreting data through that approach.  
In my opinion, using such data is advantageous only if the researcher uses it together with 
information about different forms of participation in different types of organizations and on 
different fields of activity.87 Organizational level data about the material and human resources 
of nonprofit organizations might be treated as an organizational pool for human resources and 
associational and political participation. This supplementary information then allows us to 
examine the outcome of organizational participation: whether a given type of organization 
contributes to the functions of civil society or not. This is the strategy I apply in this study 
as well: the emphasis in the analysis will be on the individual level data from various 
surveys, but sometimes I utilize the information about non-profit organizations as well, 
and interpret the non-profit data from the aspects of civil society research.  
  
                                                                





















The terms ‘non-profit sector’ and ‘civil society’ are often used as synonyms. This unreflective 
usage of the two concepts is problematic, even when they are used in a supplementary way: 
civil society as a social theory, to which non-profit organization is the unit of analysis. The two 
rely on different theoretical core and have different assumptions and questions. Non-profit 
theory asks the questions: why someone acts for the public good, or why someone does 
volunteering. This requires a rational choice, motivation, or selective incentives. ‘Civil society’ 
in principle cannot understand these questions since its inquiry focuses on how to introduce 
human rights into the relationship of the state and its citizen. The main assumption here is that 
human rights somehow inherently belong to the individual. Thus, participation in the public 
sphere and governing her own life are part of the nature of the citizen.88 Selective incentives in 
this approach are not required to foster participation. However, they can be a tool to block 
participation, especially when they are coming from the state or the economy.  
Civil society examines problems to which non-profit research is blind. The models, non-profit 
economic theories propose, require democracy and market-oriented economy. Civil society 
theories target the development of democracy (and sometimes the market) which is the 
framework for non-profit theories. Probably this is the explanation of the adaptation of the non-
profit framework by the Hungarian researchers in the early nineties. The problem of democracy 
seemed to be solved, at least at the institutional level. The failures of democratization might 
have directed the attention of non-profit researchers to the notion of civil society again in the 
2000s.  
However, the new interest of non-profit researchers in civil society and the convergence of the 
two research traditions might foster the confusion in terminology and in empirical research as 
well. The Hungarian Statistical Office offers a great data source on non-profit organizations, 
which is constantly used for research on civil society as well. Problems arise from the divergent 
theoretical core, often seen as issues of data collection. These questions are treated as ‘solved’ 
by paying a seemingly small price: the data offered by non-profit research is seen as information 
about an organized civil society which cannot reach informal actors of civil society. However, 
                                                                
88 Even Gellner (1994), who pictures the citizen as close to the ‘homo oeconomicus’, treat public participation as 
a “normal part” of life, which results from the fact that everyone tries to follow their own interests, however in a 
peaceful way. This might be a discrepancy in my argument, but Gellner treat civil society as a whole, not separated 
into the three realm. Following someone’s interest in a peaceful way is the action of the civil society even (or for 
him especially) in the economic sphere as much as in the non-economic realms.  
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this approach not only abandons informal actors but treats civil society organizations as non-
profit and excludes parties and other formally political actors by default. 
Thus, non-profit data can be used with caution and mainly as supplementary information about 
the organizational pool of organized civil society. The main empirical focus should be on data 










II.1. Measuring Civil and Political Rights: the Action-Based 
Approach 
In the previous chapters, I have argued that the main expectation towards civil society is to have 
a strong, positive impact on the level of individual freedom in a society, including the increase 
in democratic participation. Before turning to the evaluation of this expectation, it needs to be 
introduced how such an expectation, the level of exercising rights and freedoms, can be 
measured.   
Since scholars of civil society understand freedom and participation in terms of human rights, 
I will also conceptualize freedom itself, using the theory and concepts of human rights. From 
the point of view of civil society, civil and political rights are of the utmost importance, thus I 
will primarily focus on four of them, all directly connected to participation: freedom of 
association, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and the right to participate 
in public affairs. 
At first, it might appear that measuring the state of these freedoms in a society is a simple task, 
since numerous tools of measurement are already available. Various NGOs, international 
agencies, social scientists developed indexes to evaluate the state of human rights. 
Unfortunately, these metrics suffer from various problems which make it difficult to apply them 
for my purposes. Most notably, they are unable to follow the changes in the realization of human 
rights including the developments or setbacks, unless they are marked by a significant change 
in the regulation. Consequently, they have been presenting Hungary (and other transition 
countries) as a stable and free democracy already since 1990.89 
Their main shortcoming is originated in human rights theories’ feature, that they treat the need 
for freedom as an inherent characteristic of the human nature, thereby suggesting if factors 
restricting this need are removed, freedoms will flourish. Human rights theories consider the 
state the most important factor in providing the environment for influencing the fulfillment of 
human rights, through legislation and policies.  
                                                                
89 I am well aware of the recent, worsening evaluation of the Hungarian democracy by the Freedom House or the 
Bertelsmann Institute. (For more details, visit the Freedom of the World report on Hungary: 
(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/hungary or the  Bertelsmann Institute’s country reports:  
https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/ both URLs was last accessed: 11/11/2018. 
However, these evaluations, as I will argue, rely on the legislation and state-policies or actions of the government 
and authorities. Consequently, the changes will reflect on the changes in the main institutional and legal 
framework.   
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Consequently, if the state is the most important factor responsible for providing a nurturing 
environment in terms of the need for freedom, the measurement should focus on state policies 
and legislation only. This is exactly what most of the existing measurement tools offer, despite 
the research on political participation evidently pointing out that other socio-economic and 
cultural factors are as much important as the state’s behavior in explaining participation. Thus, 
if participation is perceived as the praxis of certain rights, considering the role of non-state 
factors becomes unavoidable.  
Furthermore, such measurements present the countries of the first world90 as a homogeneous, 
free and democratic group for the 1990-2010 period. Despite the rosy view provided by these 
indexes, scholars are well aware of many substantial differences between countries and 
particular time periods, especially considering the fulfillment of human rights91.  When one 
examine to what extent people act upon their civil and political rights, a very different picture 
is found in each country, even in those with a very similar institutional design. Therefore, their 
differences cannot be explained on the basis of existing human rights measurements. Thus, I 
will argue, in order to get a more accurate picture, existing measurement tools relying on 
evaluating state policies, legislation or governance should be supplemented by a measurement 
based on the action of the people.  
To arrive at such a conclusion in the first half of this chapter, I revise the mainstream approach 
to human rights, highlighting the role it attributes to the state and its relation to the inherent 
nature of human dignity. Through the critical evaluation of these assumptions, I will argue for 
the need of an action based approach of measurement. To support this claim, I will review 
the main tools of human rights measurements and I will illustrate the problem by examining the 
Freedom House’s Freedom of the World reports and the Cingranelli-Richards index. In the end, 
I will introduce an approach on how to measure the four political rights mentioned above based 
on representative surveys on the actions of the people.  
                                                                
90 e.g. North American countries and those now forming the European Union. 
91 For example, Tökés (1979) explores the differences in the understanding of human rights between Central and 
Eastern Europe and Western countries. Moravcsik (2000) discusses how human rights regimes develop in different 




II.1.1. Human rights and the role of the state 
The use of the term ‘Human Rights’ has several sources, all referring to different groups of 
rights. There is a consensus on the three most important sources or documents which constitute 
the International Bill of Rights: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two 
covenants92 defining more precisely the ‘civil and political’ and ‘social, economic and cultural’ 
rights. (Conte - Burchill, 2009). Some authors refer to cultural rights as a distinct group of rights 
whereas Frezzo Frezzo (2011) indicates that a new “generation” of rights, namely 
environmental rights are in the making. For me, mostly civil and political rights are important, 
although to a small extent I will refer to their relationship with other groups of rights. Hence, it 
is important to note that, in this study, I use the term ‘human rights’ to refer any group of rights, 
while I will use the term ‘civil and political liberties or rights’ when I refer to the exact rights I 
am examining (table 4). 
Table 4. The main groups of human rights  
Civil and political rights* Social, economic and cultural rights 
right to life,  
freedom from torture and slavery,  
freedom of the person, 
the right to a fair trial,  
the right to private life,  
freedom of thought,   
freedom of conscience,  
freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech, assembly, association,  
right to marry, to found a family,  
right to vote, 
right to personal property 
 
the right to food, shelter, housing,  
the right to employment*, 
the right to adequate education 
right to adequate healthcare, 
right to adequate housing,  
right to decent work, 
right to social security** 
*(Foster, 2011:14) and **(Fukuda-Parr et al., 2008:5-6)  
It is almost a common knowledge that civil and political rights are seen as negative rights. 
‘Positive’ and ‘negative’ refer to the type of action imposed on the actor (mostly the state) who 
should guarantee the given rights. When a right is considered as ‘negative’, the state should not 
                                                                




intervene (withholding itself from restricting the right), while being ‘positive’ means that the 
realization of the right requires intervention by the state. 
The negative nature of human rights is emphasized by Foster (2011) in his definition of liberty: 
“The term ‘liberty’ used in its general sense refers to basic principles of autonomy and freedom. 
One is free to do what one chooses and the right to individual autonomy protects us from state 
interference as to what we do, with whom we associate and what choices we make with respect 
to our lives.” (Foster, 2011:269 italics are mine).  
Traditionally, civil and political rights are considered as negative, while social, cultural rights 
are treated as positive rights. The assumption behind the negative-positive approach was that 
the protection of social and economic rights require the intervention of the state (Ssenyonjo, 
2010). To put it simply, the level of inequality would not decrease without the state providing 
sufficient education, social care or welfare measures. Medical care would not be available for 
everyone if the state would not build and maintain hospitals. Although, this argument seems 
plausible, human rights theorists lately challenged this view.  
Some theorists point out human right theories have changed in this regard and recognize that 
guaranteeing a right always requires some kind of intervention (Bódig, 2015; Fagan, 2009). For 
example, the necessary safety of individuals provided in everyday life requires the operation of 
the police. Individual safety is considered as a civil right, thus, this example clearly shows the 
view considering only social and economic rights as positive, since they require “action” from 
the state (and the allocation of resources), while considering civil and political rights being the 
opposite is false.  
However, the nature of intervention could be positive or negative. Thus, it is possible, that the 
(negative) action of the state aims to limit the state’s possibly for intervention into someone’s 
life, while it means some active (positive) help in other cases. (Bódig, 2015; Landman, 2006) 
Although the recognition that civil and political rights need intervention from the state is an 
important point in my research, it still leaves another aspect unexplored. Regardless of the type 
of intervention being positive or negative, civil and political liberties are still seen as 
“institutional mechanisms for securing a certain set of conditions” (Fagan, 2009:102)93. Thus, 
the fulfillment of rights still depends on institutional mechanisms, and on the main institution(al 
setting), or on actors whose civil and political rights require action on the side of the state.  
                                                                
93 Institutional is understood as the establishment of the necessary conditions by regulation. 
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This view is driven by three assumptions: First, human dignity is inherent to human nature; 
second, the state is the most important actor creating the environment for rights in practice; and 
third, there is a unidirectional causation between institutional design and practicing rights. All 
of these assumptions are highly questionable.  By challenging them, I will try to establish the 
ground for an approach of measurement emphasizing the action of the citizens.  
II.1.2. The inherent nature of rights and the institutional design.  
The inherent nature of human rights and the importance of institutional design is strongly 
connected. The basic assumption is that the needs providing the ground for human rights are 
inherent to human nature. In this regard, in a (socio-)psychological terminology, human rights 
theories are motivation theories. The main implication of motivation theory is that human 
behavior is driven by certain biological or psychological needs. (Ryan - Deci, 2000). Abraham 
Maslow, an early and well-known protagonist of motivation theory, identifies motivations 
along the goals of the individuals. These goals (like acquiring safety) are connected to certain 
levels of physiological and psychical needs: when needs are satisfied on a certain level, new 
goals can emerge on a new level. (Maslow, 1943). Self-determination theory, a more recent 
version of motivation theory, also emphasizes that certain needs, like the need for competence, 
relatedness and autonomy, are connected to human nature but “will flourish if circumstances 
permit.” (Ryan - Deci, 2000:69) 
The logic of human rights theories seems similar. People have their basic needs implying the 
need for human dignity (Fagan, 2009), freedom of expression, and so on, while rights 
guaranteed by the state are the main tools for providing the environment in which these basic 
needs can be fulfilled.94 When the circumstances are good, freedom will flourish. When the 
environment is not so favorable, people will not be able to exercise their rights.   
                                                                
94 Not so surprisingly human rights theory and motivation theories are connected: I might cite Maslow as an early 
example: in the 1940s he identifies the guaranteed freedoms as a pre-condition of the basic need-satisfaction:  
“There are certain conditions which are immediate prerequisites for the basic need satisfactions. Danger 
to these is reacted to almost as if it were a direct danger to the basic needs themselves. Such conditions as 
freedom to speak, freedom to do what one wishes so long as no harm is done to others, freedom to express 
one's self, freedom to investigate and seek for information, freedom to defend one's self, justice, fairness, 
honesty, orderliness in the group are examples of such preconditions for basic need satisfactions. Thwarting 
in these freedoms will be reacted to with a threat or emergency response. These conditions are not ends in 
themselves but they are almost so since they are so closely related to the basic needs, which are apparently 
the only ends in themselves. These conditions are defended because without them the basic satisfactions are 
quite impossible, or at least, very severely endangered.”(Maslow, 1943:384) 
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Motivation theories are frequently used by theories of modernization, social change and 
development. These might also emphasize the role of institutions, however, other factors 
outside the state. For example, a modernization theory forged by Ronald Inglehart and Christian 
Welzel is a more recent example of how motivation-based theories align with, but at the same 
time, offer alternatives to human rights theories. At the center of Inglehart’s work, there is the 
rise of self-expression or post-materialist values.95 When people during their formative years96  
experience problems with providing the basic necessities, they are more likely to develop 
survival related values emphasizing the safety of themselves or their families and order in a 
society. Those who experience affluence rather than the constraints of resources in their 
everyday lives would accommodate self-expressive values related to more universal/abstract 
problems affecting humanity as a whole (e.g. environmental issues) and they are more likely to 
engage with various forms of participation. (Inglehart, 2008; Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b). 
Besides postulating that the contexts of socialization matters, the theory also assumes that  
“Virtually everyone aspires to freedom and autonomy, but people tend to place the highest 
value on the most pressing needs. Material sustenance and physical security are 
immediately linked with survival, and when they are scarce people give top priority to 
these ‘materialistic’ goals; but under conditions of prosperity, people become more likely 
to emphasise ‘post-materialist’ goals such as belonging, esteem, and aesthetic and 
intellectual satisfaction.” (Inglehart, 2008:132) 
As a result, the theory is very similar to Maslow’s idea of the hierarchy of needs: first, there is 
the need for safety and only after it is successfully met, the need for freedom will rise. As 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005c) connect the satisfaction with different needs to different phases 
of modernization: Existential safety is guaranteed in the phase of modernization by the 
previously unprecedented economic growth of industrialized societies. The need for freedom 
arises in the post-industrial phase. In this second phase of modernization,97self-expressive 
values will be more prevalent, since the threats to everyday survival are mostly eliminated. The 
strengthening of self-expressive values causes people to start to care about abstract problems, 
threats to humankind instead of personal safety. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005c) note, the two 
phases of modernization differ in their relation to freedom as well. Despite existential threats 
                                                                
95 First he discussed materialist and post-materialist values, the first reflecting to survival and the second reflects 
to more abstract values (Inglehart, 1971), later he broadened the scope of values to survival and self-expressive 
values. (Inglehart, 2008) 
96 According to (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005c) childhood and adolescent years, when formal education occurs, are 
the most important years of acquiring values.  
97 The post-industrial phase in Western Europe starts with the end of world War II. 
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having been eliminated already in the phase of modernization, the principle of leaders’ selection 
will still rely on respect for authority, although the method of selection is evidently changing.98 
In the post-industrial phase, on the contrary, the emphasis is placed on human choice and 
autonomy, which leads to challenging the authority of the state and the elites. This is why the 
diffusion of self-expressive values leads to increasing elite-challenging actions. In light of these 
developments, it is hardly surprising that the notion of human rights has strengthened in post-
industrial societies.99  
According to this theory, the main factor behind modernization is socio-economic change, the 
economic growth of modern, industrial and post-industrial societies. This economic growth is 
a) capable of eliminating the feeling or perception of everyday existential threats. b) It increases 
the levels of formal education, and c) “increases occupational specialization and social 
complexity, diversifying human interactions” (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b:24). The role of 
existential security was already discussed. Education makes people more independent and 
autonomous. Increasing complexity weakens the pressure of traditional structures and 
relationships (as kin-relations). It is important to note that these factors are more important from 
the point of institutional change, on the community than on the individual level. The change of 
political, legal institutions requires a certain threshold to be passed by the level of education or 
self-expression values present in a society (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b). 
Hence, the main factor behind increasing the level of freedom is economic growth, so the 
assumed direction of causation between freedom and the state is different in Inglehart and 
Welzel’s modernization theory as compared to human rights theory. First, socio-economic 
changes liberate people from under existential threats, and then a transformation of motivations 
emerges together with changes in the value system and levels of education. Legal and political 
institutional change is only at the end of this chain of causation.   
                                                                
98  As the selection of political leaders’ happens through elections or the power of the church is at least replaced 
by the power of scientific institutions (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b). 
99 The authors are well aware, that values similar to human rights emerge among other cultural settings as well as 
that the specific forms of the human rights agenda are connected to particular historical development of the 
Western societies.  
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II.1.3. Human dignity developed by action 
The replacement of the state with the economy illustrates that non-state factors might be 
important, but it does not challenge the unidirectional link from institutions' performance to 
citizen’s rights and their behavior.  
The problem with this direction of causation will be clear if we examine how Amartya Sen 
(2004) understands the capability of exercising rights. Sen’s approach starts by simply defining 
the possibilities of practicing freedoms provided by both the state’s performance and by 
persons’ capability to practice their rights. By capability, he means whether someone has the 
opportunity to realize his or her rights, even if he or she chooses not to do so. Sen sees the 
opportunity of exercising rights similar to accessing services or goods. For example, he writes, 
someone has to have access to medical care even if he or she does not want to use this 
opportunity.100  
When rights are perceived as services, one could argue that people, even those who have the 
capability to realize them, might choose not to exercise their freedoms.  Or, theoretically, a 
situation, where there is no need for practicing political rights, other than voting is possible 
since every need might be satisfied.  
However, in a democratic political order, rights are institutions constructed by a legal 
framework for representing any interests, opinions or identities. (see Cohen - Arato, 1992). 
These rights are not representing particular issues, in which one might choose to take a stance 
or to remain silent. These rights address the assumption that everyone has at least one issue 
which is important, affecting his or her life in which he or she would like to influence how 
decisions are made. Since things constantly change, new issues, identities, interests or groups 
emerge, hence a final balance, stability, or fulfillment of interests cannot be reached in a 
democracy. The need for action – practicing political rights - is constant.101 Thus, it might be 
                                                                
100 This approach is probably fueled by Sen’s interest in social and economic rights, which are often realized by 
the use of social care or health care services. Despite its particular focus, Sen proposes this idea as a general theory 
of human rights.  
101 This argument is in line with the shift in political sociology about the ideal-type of the citizen a democracy 
requires. While Almond and Verba (1963) writes that the stable functioning of a democracy requires the majority 
of allegiant citizens, who bear a value set which allows moderate action, emphasize loyalty to the system and 
supports the maintenance of the social and political order. In the seventies, when Inglehart identified a change in 
the value system and argued that a new type of “democratic citizen” appears who is more willing to challenge the 
hierarchy in the society. As a continuation of this line of research, Dalton and Welzel (2014) formulates the model 
of the ’assertive citizen’ who is not only interested in politics, and aware of the procedures and outcomes of the 
decision-making processes, but ready to participate in collective action when it is necessary. This type of citizen 
is more likely to distrust state institutions and willing to engage in elite-challenging actions.  
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assumed that, among democratic conditions, the vast majority of people will exercise their 
rights at least once or twice in a lifetime, if not even more frequently.    
A further problem with treating rights as “access to services” is the providing of those services. 
The task will be more or less about to identify those who need this service, how to provide 
enough of this service and remove the barriers preventing citizens from accessing them (e.g. 
the services have to be available at low cost and the service provider has to inform the people.).  
The practice of rights, such as expression of opinion, freedom of association or assembly, 
however, heavily requires the resources and skills of the individuals as well: the recognition 
of their interests, the articulation of these interests, the know-how of cooperation, organizing 
and so on. Even using a specific service requires some of these skills, which points out the 
weakness in Sen’s definition of capability of exercising rights. Capability, in this sense, means 
more than the access to a service, it means the people’s capacity to be able to do these things.  
This capacity depends on many things. As research shows, besides the legal environment or 
material resources, the role of less formalized spheres and activities are also important. The role 
of the socialization in the family, the number and quality of interpersonal networks, belonging 
to communities and values acquired in peer groups are unquestionably essential factors in 
enhancing participation. (See Chapter II.3) Furthermore, the skills necessary for participation 
do not only have to be learned, but they have to be constantly practiced to be maintained.102  
Hannah Arendt proposes a theory for the development of human rights which suits this idea of 
constant learning. Isaac Isaac (1996) reconstructs her approach from Hannah Arendt’s different 
works, emphasizing the individual’s action, instead of the self-limitation or the interventions of 
the state. This approach confronts the idea of inherent human dignity which is so important for 
the institutionalist approach. In Arendt’s view, Isaac argues, human dignity has to be developed 
and maintained by action. When people are deprived of their rights, they are deprived not only 
of their freedoms – as legal construction - but of their rights to act. 
This approach implies by questioning the primacy of the state and the inherent nature of human 
rights that a measurement of rights should be based on other factors than the state’s intervention 
or non-intervention. Therefore, I recommend an inverse approach: to measure to what extent 
people exercise their rights. This way, too much weight provided to the state in measurements 
could be avoided. As a second step, through the examination of the determinants of the people’s 
                                                                
102 At least this might be the conclusion drawn from recent research, which shows that political and civil 
attitudes and participation have a reciprocal relationship (J. Gastil - Xenos, 2010) or, even the act of participation 
leads to the development of attitudes important for further participation (Quintelier - Van Deth, 2014). 
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behavior, one might be able to explore, which factors influence them in exercising their rights: 
what is the role of values, psychological factors, economic performance or even the state’s 
performance. But first, to illustrate why existing measures are insufficient, I will review these 
existing methods of measurements by quantitatively comparing different countries.   
II.1.4. Methods of measurement: missing the differences 
The use of quantitative methods is extensive in human rights measurement. (Green, 2001). 
According to Landman Landman (2004, 2006), there are two main, well-established approaches 
in the praxis of human rights measurement, both relying on taking stock of harms to human 
rights. As Landman calls them (Landman, 2006:81 and 84):  
1. Rights in principle: Examining whether rights are provided on a constitutional level 
and protected by state institutions.    
2. Rights in practice: Examining the fulfillment of the rights of the citizens in practice 
or the exercise of these rights by individuals.  
The first, “rights in principle” approach is better elaborated: International governmental 
institutions and non-governmental organizations evaluate the state of human rights mostly by 
methods relying on constitutional and legal analysis. Measurements of the second type consider 
the implementation of the rules or intend to capture to what extent individuals have the 
possibility to practice their rights. Although this type of methods contains data about 
individuals’ opinions (to what extent they support human rights or what is their opinion about 
the fulfillment of rights), none of them tries to assess to what extent citizens or individuals 
explicitly exercise their rights (Landman, 2004, 2006). Landman (2004) mentions statistics on 
participation as indicators of the outcomes of government policies on human rights, but those 
serve only as indirect measurements. Some authors use opinion surveys to measure the 
perception of human rights policies, the operation of the justice system or the experiences on 
human rights violations (Botero et al., 2011; Landman, 2006). Even though, these large-scale 
surveys are considered successful in measuring state institutions’ activity from the client’s 
perspective, while offering valuable feedback on how to improve the performance of 
institutions, they are, in fact, not able to measure the actual realization of rights.   
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These approaches to human rights measurement represent the institutional insight discussed 
above. They focus primarily on governments, states, and legal institutions.103 No doubt these 
are important actors, however, if we look at the new democracies, we should not forget Gellner's 
words about the inability of a community to decide on how to act as a democracy or Szűcs’s 
and Bibó’s thoughts about the long-term structural constraints of the political culture and power 
relations. A suitable legal environment and state policies supporting the realization of rights are 
necessary preconditions in securing human rights, but they will not necessarily cause citizens 
to actually exercise their freedoms. 
In reviewing the existing indices applied to produce a comparative, quantitative measurement, 
I have identified two types of datasets: 1. Human rights data, which explicitly aims to review 
and evaluate the state of human rights in a country, 2. Composite indicators identifying the 
political structure of a society or governmental performance using human rights indices as part 
of the larger indicator of social development or political situation.   
Comparative human rights datasets are constructed by mostly international NGOs and 
researchers.104 Among these, there are some, which cover a wide range of civil and political 
liberties, while others only evaluate the state of specific rights. Probably the most well-known 
data is produced by the Freedom House, released every year in the Freedom in the World” 
report. The report uses various variables to construct indices for civil and political liberties 
separately and the average of the two provides the overall evaluation of a country. The data is 
based both on legal analysis and on expert’s judgments to consider not only the legal but on-
ground information as well. The Freedom in the World index – since I will use it in a 
comparison to survey-based data - will be introduced in more details later.105  
                                                                
103 Many of the papers, discussing these indicators, acknowledge that these are measurements of mainly and only 
legal institutions (Botero et al., 2011; Gajduschek, 2014; Krever, 2013). However, in these papers this appears as 
a natural feature of human rights indicators. For example, Bradley Bradley (2015) criticizes the Freedom in the 
World Report, that it takes a narrow understanding of freedom leaving out social, economic and cultural rights, 
but suggesting that the institutional approach (emphasizing the state) otherwise fits to the concept of freedom. 
Bradley even writes that a measurement aims at to explore in what extent citizens are able to live with their rights 
would “have the effect of hindering the indicator’s usefulness as a measure of effective governance, because 
factors beyond the control of governments- natural disasters, resource constraints, or regional instabilities – can 
severely impact the scores” (Bradley, 2015:41) 
104 Reports on the state of human rights are produced by other organizations as well: For example, the European 
Agency for Fundamental Rights produces reports, publications on several topics, while Amnesty International also 
releases annual reports on a global and on a country level. However, these reports are not accompanied with an 
index aiming to compare the countries quantitatively.   
105 About the history of the Freedom in the World report see (R. D. Gastil, 1990) 
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Another quite exhaustive dataset of the first type is the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights 
dataset evaluating how much governments respect human rights. The data evaluates 
government policies from 1981 to 2011 based on the US State Department’s Country Reports 
and on partially Amnesty International’s annual reports. Civil liberties are assessed through 
several indicators, including social rights data as well. To evaluate political rights, four 
indicators are constructed: Freedom of Speech and the Press, The Freedom of Assembly and 
Association, Electoral Self-determination and Women’s political rights. The first three 
indicators measure to what extent the state respects or limits these rights: is there any attempt 
by the government to restrict citizens from expressing their opinion (including media 
ownership) or are there any limitations to their freedom of assembly or association? Women’s 
right indicator examines gender inequalities in the case of the right to vote, running for a 
political office, joining political parties, holding government positions and the right to petition 
government officials. (Cingranelli - Richards, 2010; David L.  Cingranelli et al., 2014; David 
L. Cingranelli et al., 2014)   
Reporters without Borders established the World Press Freedom Index106 released yearly since 
2002 and evaluating 180 countries. The index focuses on the situation of the press by defining 
seven variables (pluralism of the media, media independence, environment and self-censorship, 
legislative framework, transparency, infrastructure, and abuses against journalists). The index 
is compiled from the answers provided by experts to an online questionnaire and from 
quantitative data on the number of abuses and violent acts against journalists, also compiled by 
experts of each region. (Reporters, 2018)   
The second, broader type of indices on the performance of governments is mostly produced by 
international governmental organizations and research centers. The Center for Systemic Peace 
built the Polity Scores dataset which contains the institutional authority characteristics of 
regimes from 1800 to 2017. Their evaluation is based on the coding of monthly event-reports.  
Among other variables, Polity Scores include the democratic or autocratic nature of a polity’s 
political regime. One of the indicators used to evaluate the political order is “the guarantee of 
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation” (Marshall 
et al., 2018:14). 
                                                                




The scope of the Worldwide Governance Indicators107 by the World Bank is even broader. 
World Bank understands governance as  
“(a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the cap
acity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and 
(c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and soci
al interactions among them.” (Kaufmann et al., 2011:222)  
This quite illustrates the institutionalist approach. The index is concerned with features of 
governance but not with its outcomes and results. It is worth to note that the sources of 
measurement modify this picture to a certain extent: in the definition - and data collection - of 
the sub-indices individual perceptions have an important role.  
Three of the six dimensions of the worldwide governance Indicators touch on the areas of my 
interest. These are the rule of law, control of corruption, voice and accountability, the absence 
of violence sub-indices. ‘Voice and accountability’ is the closest to my concerns, since it tries 
to capture “the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2011:223) The index uses a wide range of data sources from experts 
assessments to surveys108 with a lack of any data on exercising political rights. Variables of 
‘trust in Parliament’ and ‘satisfaction with democracy’ are the closest to measuring the actual 
practice of rights in the whole index. (Kaufmann et al., 2009) 
At last, one of the broadest measurements is conducted by Pippa Norris at Harvard: the 
Democracy Time Series data109 which basically tries to collect all the available datasets at one 
place, including Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ or the Polity Scores. For human 
rights measurement, the dataset uses the Cingranelli‐Richards Human Rights Dataset. The only 
variable based available in the Democracy Time Series on action is the number of anti-
government demonstrations, found among the socio-economic/demographic variables. Still, it 
does not cover the proportion of people participating in actions where they are exercising their 
rights.110 
                                                                
107 Worldwide Governance Indicators  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc-sources last 
accessed: 26/10/2018. 
108 To the construction of the dataset, Freedom House’s various indices and the Cingranelli-Richards dataset was 
also used.  
109 Available at: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm last accessed 26/10/2018. 
110 In the next chapter I will also use the number of demonstrations as an indicator, but I will also show that the 
increasing number of demonstrations are not necessary correlated to the changes in the proportion of participants. 
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Even from this short list of available datasets, it is clear that these are based mainly on 
institutional characteristics. When data gathering is using other sources, such as expert 
evaluations, expert surveys or legal analysis, it is generally still restricted to attitudinal 
variables, such as trust in parliament or satisfaction with democracy.  
Since most of the databases are not available for the time-frame I examine111 or they are already 
using the Freedom House scores112or the Cingranelli-Richards Dataset (CIRI) covering my 
period to evaluate the state of human rights, I will look closely into these two datasets to 
examine to what extent they are capable to capture the differences among developed countries. 
Missing the differences: the example of Freedom in the World and the CIRI 
Both the Freedom in the World and the CIRI cover the whole period between 1990 and 2010. 
Both apply quantified rankings but only the Freedom in the World has aggregated 
measurements for civil and political rights. The CIRI evaluates the Freedom of Assembly and 
Association, Freedom of Speech and the Press and Electoral Self-determination on a scale from 
0 to 2 – where 0 indicates a situation with rights restricted and 2 indicates freedom of rights 
guaranteed to the fullest extent. The scores are counted by coding the reports prepared by the 
US State Department.  
The Freedom in the World has a more sophisticated system by using different sources. It applies 
a score (separately for political rights and civil liberties) from one to seven, where one indicates 
the best and seven the worst situation. Each score is an aggregated variable based on local and 
international experts’ judgments and contribution to the evaluation, trying to consider formal 
and informal aspects. Freedom House, similarly to my approach, acknowledges that legal 
guarantees are not equal to “the on-ground fulfillment of those rights”  (Freedom House, 
2018:1).113 
There are 25 indicators in total, grouped into seven subcategories (three for political rights and 
four for civil liberties). Political rights are measured as categories of the ‘Electoral Process’, 
the ‘Political Pluralism and the Participation and functioning of the government, while civil 
                                                                
111 Although The Democracy Time Series Data contains data between 1971 and 2007, information about Hungary 
is available only between 1994 and 2006.  The Worldwide Governance Index begins with 1996.  
112 It is missing only in cases when new countries were established during the period, as in the Balkans.  
113 The rating process goes in two steps: First, every country (or territory) is evaluated by ten political rights and 
fifteen civil liberties indicators. For every indicator a country can get four points. Therefore, 40 points is the 
maximum for political rights, and 60 for Civil Liberties. Then, according to the results, the 40 and 60 point scale 
is transformed into a seven point one. The rating has changed slightly throughout its history, but its basic structure 
and main dimensions are remained the same.  
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liberties are measured as categories of the ‘Associational and Organizational Rights’, the ’Rule 
of Law’, the Freedom of Expression and Belief, the ’Personal Autonomy and Individual 
Rights’. Thus, both groups measure rights which are in the focus of this chapter. These 
indicators cover a wide range of aspects from political features, such as the functioning of the 
government, accountability and corruption, to the fulfillment of individual freedom rights, such 
as freedom of movement. Since, Freedom House publishes only the two aggregated scores, but 
not the individual scores of the seven sub-categories, I will examine both the scoring of civil 
and political rights.   
I do not have the space to discuss these indicators in greater details, so I  just try to give a taste 
of them by citing some of the questions used for creating the indices.114 Although some of the 
indicators sound very similar to what I try to measure in my action-based approach, the 
following questions, presented as part of a checklist for the first indicator of Political Pluralism 
and Participation115, illustrate the difference well (Puddington, 2010:806):  
• Do political parties encounter undue legal or practical obstacles in their efforts to be 
formed and to operate, including onerous registration requirements, excessively large 
membership requirements, etc.? 
• Do parties face discriminatory or onerous restrictions in holding meetings, rallies, or 
other peaceful activities? 
• Are party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or subjected 
to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political activities?  
These are questions concerning the behavior of political actors, parties and state institutions, 
not the average citizen’s. The CIRI was discussed in this regard earlier. As a result of this 
approach, an important problem emerges: These indices are not really able to differentiate 
between European countries. To illustrate this problem, I will compare the scores (civil and 
political liberties of Freedom of the Word and three scores for political rights of CIRI) of the 
countries that participated in the European Values Study survey program between 1990 and 
2010. There are 25 countries in total which participated in the three waves of the period.   
                                                                
114 The questions used for examining the other aspects are listed in the Appendices. (Appendix 1) To present the 
most appropriate dimensions and sub-categories, I took the phrasing of subcategories from the yearbook of 2010. 
(Puddington, 2010) 
115 This dimension is aimed to measure whether: „Do the people have the right to organize in different political 
parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these 
competing parties or groupings?”  
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First, I examine the year furthest away from the transition, assuming that – in line with the 
assumption of learning democracy – this will show the most developed state of the countries in 
the period. In Freedom House’s 2010 index, 22 countries were listed for political rights and 21 
were listed for civil liberties with the best available score (1). The rest of the countries got ‘2’ 
in both cases.116 Naturally, all of the 25 countries were classified as free in 2010. According to 
the CIRI, the situation is a bit more complex. With regard to the ‘Freedom of Assembly and 
Association’ and ‘Electoral Self-Determination’, the picture is very similar to what Freedom in 
the World presented: five and six countries got the ‘middle’ score (1), while 19-20 have the 
highest (2) score. Most of the countries with the lower scores are post-socialist countries. 
However, in the Freedom in the World Index, Italy was scored only ‘2’ for Political Rights and 
Germany and Austria has only achieved the middle rank in CIRI’s ‘Freedom of Association 
and Assembly’, including Portugal’s ‘1’ score for the ‘Electoral Self-Determination’.117 
Interestingly, in CIRI’s ‘Freedom of Speech and the Press’, the situation is reversed: most of 
the countries reach only ‘1’, while only four countries are evaluated as totally free from any 
form of censorship (Estonia, Portugal, Slovenia, United Kingdom). 
Overall, it seems that European countries are evaluated very similarly to each other concerning 
their state policies and legal system in guaranteeing political rights in any given year, even 
when they are troubled with some problems, as the CIRI dataset implies in relation to the  
Freedom of Speech.     
Since I examine a twenty-years long period, a given year’s evaluation might be not the best 
measure to rely on: differences might be better captured by the mean score of the twenty years 
or by the change in the scoring during the period.    
In the Freedom in the World index, the distribution of the mean of scores between 1991 and 
2010 is somewhat different, but the mean score for most of the countries falls between 1 and 2. 
For political rights, 15 countries have the average of 1, which means that their score has 
remained unchanged throughout the period: only one country has an average score larger than 
two (2.6, Romania), the other nine varies between 1.1 and 1.65. For Civil Liberties, only eight 
countries have ‘1’ and 11 countries have a mean-score between 1,51 and 1,99 with three of the 
post-communist countries (Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania) having a mean higher than 2. 
(table 5)    
                                                                
116 One country, Northern Ireland had no independent evaluation in the Freedom House data. 
117 I am well aware that the Hungary’s scores have been worsening in the last years. (see footnote 89.) 
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1 15 8 
1.01-1.5 7 3 
1.51-1.99 2 11 
2 or higher 1 3 
Total (N of countries) 25 25 
The CIRI index works better only when I look into the evaluation of Freedom of Speech: the 
variable’s mean score varies between 1.05 and 1.95. For freedom of Assembly and Association, 
the mean is ‘2’ for 11 countries and larger than 1.85 for six more. Again, the countries with the 
lowest scores are mostly CEE countries, however, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic 
have 1.85 and Slovenia has 2 as a mean score. Only four countries have a mean score below 
1.8 for Electoral Self-Determination (Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic).  
Only nine, post-socialist countries had a change in their scoring by the Freedom in the World 
index. This change mostly that they reach a better, or even the best scoring after a couple years. 
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia reached ‘1’ in 1993 and their scoring 
remained unchanged until 2010. The remaining countries also reached the best score in the 
1990s. Only Romania’s ranking remained worse than ‘1’ throughout the entire period. Freedom 
House decreased the scores of only two countries: Bulgaria and Latvia in the late 2000s (table 
6).  
The changes in the CIRI index go less in the same direction. CIRI detects that the situation is 
getting worse from the middle of the 2000s, at least in the case of Freedom of Speech. While 
most of the countries had the best score in the early nineties, the evaluation worsened for a 
growing number of countries in the late nineties and 2000s. However CIRI seems to me as a 
less reliable index than the Freedom in the World: for example Romania, the Slovak Republic, 
Lithuania, and Latvia got ‘0’for ‘Electoral self-determination’ in 2008 which would mean that 
electoral rights were restricted in the country, while the situation in these countries did not 
explain this.118 Also, there are some unexpectedly low scores given to Latvia and Lithuania 
                                                                
118 Although corruption scandals and political turmoils were reported form Latvia and Romania and some 
instability was perceived in Slovakia, the implementation of electoral rights and procedures did not changed 
compared tot he previous years. (See for example the reports on these countries by Freedom House:  
Slovakia https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/slovakia,  
Romania: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/romania,  
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concerning the Freedom of Assembly and Association in 2007 and 2008. If these faults would 
be corrected in the coding process, the countries would have gotten even closer to each other.    
In sum, it seems that the ranking system of the Freedom House’s and the CIRI’s indices is best 
performing in differentiating between countries having a democratic political order on the basis 
of being an old or a new democracy. Furthermore, Freedom in the World preserves a difference 
between countries’ democratic trends only for a couple of years and assumes that a country is 
able to build a “consolidated democracy” in a relatively short period of time. 
                                                                
Latvia: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/latvia   






Table 6. Freedom in the World’s annual scores for political rights in nine countries, 1991-2010. 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bulgaria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Czech 
Republic 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Estonia 2 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Hungary 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Latvia 2 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Lithuania 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Poland 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Romania 5 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Slovak 
Republic 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Slovenia 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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A. Indicators of exercising rights 
To handle the problem of the lost differences I will propose an approach aiming to measure to 
what extent people are exercising their fundamental freedoms connected to the terrain of 
political participation. The proposed method of measurement relies on nationally representative 
surveys. Various research projects collect data which can be attributed to the four rights under 
examination. It is important to note that this type of data is generally collected with a different 
aim to measure participation or other types of political behavior, not to measure how and to 
what extent people are practicing their political freedoms. Based on this information I compose 
several aggregated variables to measure the practice of each right on the individual and 
community levels.  
To illustrate the approach, comparative research programs should be taken into consideration. 
Even though the number of these programs is growing, there are only a few ones, which contain 
the necessary data while repeating the same (or nearly the same) questions over time with data 
going back to the early nineties. The only survey project to fulfill these criteria is the European 
Values Study project (EVS, 2011). Thus, I will operationalize the measurement based on EVS 
data. EVS has four waves, one in every 9th year starting with 1981. The first wave does not 
measure political participation in the post-socialist region, so I will use only the last three waves 
(1990-1993, 1999-2000, 2008-2010) and I will include only those variables which are present 
in all of them. Of course, in discussing a specific country, other sources can be taken into 
consideration as well. To illustrate the measures, I will select a country from each larger region 
of Europe: a West-European country (France), a Northern-European (Sweden), a Southern 
(Italy) and one from the Baltic region (Estonia) and Hungary from Central-Europe.119   
Freedom of association 
The examination of the freedom of association could be based on data about belonging to, 
participating or having membership in any organization with associational characteristics. 
Associations could be defined as organizations or groups joined or established voluntarily for 
the sake of a common aim, which should be distinct from profit-making. Associations are joined 
primarily by natural persons and they have an organizational structure independent from state 
                                                                
119 None of the Eastern-European countries are involved in all of the three waves, thus I have to leave Eastern 
Europe out from this illustration.  
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and market organizations120 (Braun, 2014; Freise - Hallmann, 2014).  In terms of measurement, 
these are voluntary, civil organizations, political parties or trade unions. Besides the extent of 
participation, its intensity (how frequently or how intensely someone takes part in an 
organization's activity) might also mark important differences. The intensity of participation 
sometimes could be measured by the frequency of participation, but most of the times only by 
counting how many activity fields (e.g. sport, environmental protection) someone participates 
in.  
In the EVS data, the extent of participation can be measured by the proportion of the adult (18+) 
population belonging or volunteering to a voluntary organization, including 14 fields of 
different activity. The intensity of participation is measured by the proportion of people 
participate in at least two fields of activity (e.g. in sports and recreation and peace movement) 
and by the average number of fields of participation among those participating in any voluntary 
organization.  
Figure 3. The extent and intensity of associational participation in five countries, EVS 
IV. (2008-2010), percentage of the adult population 
 
                                                                
120 The idea behind this restriction is that associations can serve those functions through face-to-face contact. Thus, 
associations formed by organizations cannot fulfil at least the socialization task. 
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The comparison of the five countries makes a remarkable difference evident. In Sweden, for 
example 2/3rd of the population belonged to at least one association, while this proportion is 
only 22 percent for Hungary. Intensity of participation provides a similar picture, however, the 
differences between Estonia and France disappear when the ratio of people participating in at 
least two associations is presented, or by comparing the mean number of associations one 
respondent participates in.     
Freedom of peaceful assembly 
Variables examining freedom of assembly can be separated into two groups. The first group of 
variables examines the extent and intensity of participation in protests, demonstrations, strikes, 
political/election assemblies, occupying buildings, etc. By intensity, I mean how many of these 
activities someone participates in. The second group contains information about practicing 
freedom of assembly in less formal or less political ways: meeting friends, colleagues, relatives 
or attending religious services. Since attending religious services is a result of traditionalism, 
habits or a religious worldview, to imply that the more people go to church the better the 
situation is, would be a mistake. The question is, whether people are able to gather for any 
reason or not. Since in the EVS the only variable measures such a gathering is attending 
religious services, at this point, I will use only the public aspect of freedom of assembly. 
To measure the extent of exercising freedom of assembly, connected to political participation, 
I apply three variables. Each variable contains three possible answers, thus three categories:   
1. The proportion of people who ever took part in protests, occupying building or strikes.  
2. The proportion of people who might take part in protests, occupying building or 
strikes.  
3. The proportion of people who never and wouldn’t take part in protests, occupying 
buildings or strikes) 
The first category measures political participation in a slightly different way, than it is usual, 
since other instruments (as the European Social Survey) ask about participation in the last 12 
months or last couple years, while EVS counts any participation the respondent has pursued in 
his or her whole lifetime. However, the questions based on time restrictions might be more 
precise in terms of the recent level of political participation or the exploration of the experiences 
about participation, which should have a crucial role in developing one’s ‘human dignity’ in 
the light of the theory of Hannah Arendt.  
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Interestingly, the direction of changes takes several different paths in the examined countries: 
while, in 1990, a relatively large proportion of Estonia reported participation in participating in 
assemblies, this proportion has decreased with time to 6% in 2008. In Hungary, the level of 
participation remained unchanged over time, while it has grown in France and Italy. In Sweden, 
the level of participation went up and down with time. Independent from the direction of 
changes, Italy, France and Sweden produce much higher levels of participation as compared to 
Hungary and Estonia (except in 1990) and the ratio of people who would never participate in 
any area grows only in the post-socialist countries as well (table 7).  
Freedom of expression 
This is a group with more data available, including the formal or public and informal forms of 
activity as well. Similarly to the measurement of the freedom of assembly, variables measuring 
participation in various actions, all belonging to the freedom of expression are available in 
different datasets. To name a few, it is possible to gain information about the extent of signing 
a petition, participating in boycotts, buying products for political reasons, wearing political 
signs or participating in a campaign, donating money to an organization or writing public 
comments, articles. Data about less organized, more informal activities, as talking about 
politics, or persuading friends might also be considered as indicators of exercising freedom of 
expression.  
The extent of exercising freedom of expression based on the EVS data can be measured by the 
two variables of taking part in signing a petition, and joining in boycotts. The answer categories 
are the same as for participating in demonstrations, strikes.121  
Figure 3 indicates whether someone has participated in any of the two activities122. The figure 
clearly shows the difference between the countries: While in Sweden, France and Italy only the 
minority of the respondents would stay away from singing a petition or joining in boycotts, in 
Hungary and Estonia this is more the two-fifths of the population. In Hungary, actually this was 
the most frequent answer to these questions.  
The examination of the informal practice - discussing politics – is worth a separate, longitudinal 
chart illustrating the changing nature of these behaviors: In table 8. it is clear that Hungary and 
                                                                
121  Have done, Might do, Never would do  
122 A respondent is counted as ‘have done’ if he or she participated in any of the two activities, ‘might do’ if did 
not participated o any of them but indicated a ‘might do1 in one of them. Consequently, ‘never’ includes the 
respondent who would not participate in any of the two activities.  
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Estonia are the countries in 1990, where people are discussing politics the most frequently. This 
is not really surprising given 1990 is the year of transition, the year of the first free national 
elections in these countries.  Until 1999, the ratio of people discussing politics frequently 
radically decreased in both countries, while it has remained on the same levels in the other three. 
Hungary has experienced a further decrease until 2008. However, the Hungarian dynamics has 
two contradicting directions, since the proportion of people never discussing politics also 
decreased between 1999 and 2008. In other countries shocking changes cannot be identified.  
The ratio of people discussing politics frequently has increased and the ratio of “never” has 
decreased in France between 1990 and 2008 and in Italy, the middle group has grown during 
the same period.  
Figure 4. The extent of participation in signing a petition and joining boycotts, 
aggregated variable, by countries, EVS IV. (2008-2010), percentage of the adult 
population 
 
The right to take part in public affairs 
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights defines a set of rights 
considering political participation or influencing politics:  




(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
electors;” 
Data on running for any office is rare in survey databases. Fortunately, information about voting 
is much more prevalent, and there are questions about contacting a politician, representative 
or civil expert in most of the studies. Unfortunately, EVS contains only the people’s intent about 
participation in the elections. However, more accurate data might be available about voter 
turnout, despite the different electoral systems causing difficulties in comparing them.  
As a single indicator, I use voter turnout to evaluate this particular right based on the election 
held in 2010 or in the prior year.  
Although similarly to the situation experienced in the case of the other rights, the voter turnout 
was the highest in Sweden in 2010 (84.6%) the overall picture of the five countries is different. 
France, Estonia and Hungary had a similar, relatively low voter turnout, (60.4%, 61.9% and 
64.4%) while Italy was closer to the Swedish rate with its 78.1 percent voter turnout.  
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Table 7. The ratio of people participated, might participate and would not participate in protests, occupying buildings or strikes in five 
countries EVS 1990-2010, percentage of the adult population 
 























Estonia 26% 41% 33% 11% 31% 58% 6% 39% 56% 
Hungary 6% 32% 62% 5% 29% 66% 4% 21% 75% 
France 35% 33% 32% 42% 34% 24% 48% 32% 19% 
Italy 34% 37% 29% 36% 38% 27% 40% 34% 27% 
Sweden 23% 59% 18% 36% 53% 11% 22% 57% 20% 
Table 8.The ratio of people frequently, occasionally, never discussed politics with friends in five countries EVS 1990-2010, percentage of 
the adult population 
 1990 1999 2008 
 frequently occasionally never frequently occasionally never frequently occasionally never 
Estonia 42% 52% 5% 15% 67% 18% 12% 67% 21% 
France 12% 54% 35% 12% 53% 35% 18% 56% 26% 
Hungary 22% 54% 24% 10% 44% 46% 7% 56% 37% 
Italy 12% 45% 42% 13% 55% 32% 19% 52% 29% 




In this chapter, I argued that existing measurements of human rights records of states have to 
be supplemented with measurements based on another approach. Most of the indices capturing 
the state of human rights rely on sources on regulations and state policies.  Despite their crucial 
role in supporting – or threatening – human rights, measurements based on this information are 
not able to differentiate among countries of the developed world. I have argued there are three 
main reasons for missing the differences. First, when measurements are trying to capture the 
differences between a large pool of countries, among those ones that are experiencing serious 
human rights violations – as torture of state prisoners – on an everyday basis and ones that have 
a relatively stable rule of law, the scale applied will not be able to differentiate between cases 
that lie relatively close to each other. While the differences might seem quite small from this 
view, they might be quite significant if we conduct a closer examination of the same countries.  
Second, human rights theory attributes central importance to the state in guaranteeing and 
supporting human rights. Through a critical analysis, I have shown that this approach might be 
relevant to some of the civil liberties but it is certainly not sufficient in understanding rights 
connected to political participation and civil society, such as freedom of assembly, freedom of 
association, freedom of expression or the right to take part in the country’s public life. These 
are rights based on action and participation in these actions is determined by more factors than 
by only the state’s self-restriction in suppressing these rights. 
Third, human rights theory treats these rights as inherent, which means that people would start 
exercising their rights as soon as external inhibiting factors disappear. However, another 
approach is available to suggest that human dignity and the need for freedom is a result of a 
self-enhancing learning process in which taking actions plays a key role.   
When I apply these ideas, a different approach to measurement is needed: namely measuring 
the state of the four political and civil rights through the actions of the people. As I have shown, 
the two main datasets about human rights rate European countries quite similarly throughout 
the twenty years after the transition, despite the significant differences in participation or in the 
extent people are discussing politics. Thus, I introduced a grouping of information collected by 
the European Values Study – an international, comparative survey program –that suits the 
measurement requirements of the four rights and illustrated the differences between European 
countries. For example, while almost all the countries participating in the EVS since 1990 
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reached 1 or 2 or the best scores in either of the Freedom in the World’s report, a great difference 
is found if associational participation is applied as an indicator of ‘freedom of association’. In 
the last EVS Wave about Sweden (2008-2010), two-thirds of the people participate in at least 
one association and the average number of associations per person is 1.75, as compared to only 
21% of Hungarians participating in any association, with a mean of 0.3 for the same period. 
Similarly, large differences can be found with regard to the other indicators as well.  
However, it is important to note that the ranking of the countries is not always the same. Along 
different dimensions, the ranking and differences between the countries might change. Between 
the five countries used as an example, the electoral participation is the lowest in France, while 
France is generally second after Sweden in all other dimensions.  
Also, the direction of changes is not linear. Among the two human rights datasets, CIRI captures 
the deterioration of the situation of the Freedom of Speech. The survey data clearly shows the 









II.2. Institutional Change and Exercising Civil and Political 
Rights 
In Chapter I.2, I emphasize that each model of civil society is a response to the challenge that 
a newly emerging democracy not only needs to establish democratic institutions, but should 
also transform the political culture and the society in which these institutions are embedded in. 
This is a paradoxical situation, since the main tool of actors advocating the transition is to 
establish institutions, which long-term functioning is dependent on the lacking political culture 
and structural settings. To overcome the paradox of transition theories of civil society 
emphasize the importance of civic virtue and regard the independent sphere as its most 
important carrier, therefore they suggest a bottom-up approach.  
At the end of Chapter I.2, I also highlight that for political actors, the bottom-up approach is 
hardly a possibility. During the transition, they are preoccupied with securing their role in the 
forming political system, and in the political competition, therefore, they are interested in 
relatively fast solutions. Thus, they prefer top-down solutions and quickly try to establish the 
main legal institutions of the democratic system. This approach is often supported by the legalist 
perspective of human rights among members of the democratic opposition (and reform 
economists), as well as the sudden changes of circumstances and the need for urgent action. 
Finally, it leads to focusing on regulation and state institutions in political programs and actions. 
Therefore, there is a tension between the strategy and theories of civil society, and the political 
program applied by the newly emerging political actors after the transition. Whereas theories 
on civil society take a bottom-up approach to social change, political actors are engaged in a 
top-down approach. In this chapter, I analyze the validity of the top-down approach, 
investigating to what extent institutional change influences the practice of rights. In order to do 
this, I will examine the trends of exercising the four fundamental rights related to civil society 
between 1990 and 2010. My analysis is based on the action-based approach of measurement.  
Institutional conditions are defined by five factors, related with the two types of politics 
identified by Dahrendorf (1990) or Offe and Adler (1991): Constitutional politics consists of 
the constitutional framework, and the specific laws on fundamental rights, while normal politics 
is captured by policy actions and political opportunity structures.   
Since I examine the impact of the transition, the first and probably most important factor is the 
overall constitutional framework: the constitution itself, the main regulations on fundamental 
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rights related to participation and the main political and state institutions. The framework 
remained largely the same throughout the period and it might be assumed that the main 
institutions in direct interaction with civil society organizations (such as courts or the Police) 
had the same approach throughout the period. 
Normal politics includes changes in regulation and in policies. While the fine-tuning of 
regulations aimed at handling problems which emerged from the practice of new regulations in 
the early nineties, policy changes often intended to vitalize participation.  
Policy changes are closely related to political opportunity structures. This term refers to the way 
political adversaries or social actors outside dominant political forces (Kriesi, 2004) can access 
or influence decision-making processes. Even with unchanging regulation, governments and 
governing parties might use these institutions in favor of their view of democracy. Since 
political opportunity structures are expected to influence the extent and channels of 
participation, its changes might be reflected in the data. 
 Finally, connected to both layers of politics, certain important events and turmoils occurred in 
the examined period. These might have an impact on the practice of rights. Strategies based on 
large-scale mobilizations by political parties in the early nineties and in the 2000s, as well as 
the political turmoils caused by political changes in 1990 and the political and economic crisis 
following 2006 could be important breaking points in the development of political opportunity 
structures or political culture.  
Thus, in the following chapter, I will examine whether the impact of these factors could be 
traced in the level of exercising the four fundamental rights: freedom of association, the right 
to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, and the right to take part in public issues.  In doing 
so, I build timelines from different sources: mainly from surveys of the European Values Study, 
Hungarian Election Studies, and the European Social Survey. To supplement this data, I also 
use publicly available data provided by public agencies, as applicable. 
In the following section, I will introduce the general legal framework, and a few important 
policy changes in the period. I will briefly outline the concept of political opportunity structures, 
and name a number of political turmoils. Then, I will give a detailed picture of the individual 
practices connected to the four fundamental rights in Hungary between 1990 and 2010. In every 
subsection where the data allows, I will reflect on the possible impact of policy changes, 
electoral periods and political turmoils. 
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II.2.1. Legislation of associations, assemblies, and elections  
In order to examine how institutional changes influenced the exercising of rights, I will first 
summarize the main legislative framework concerning the practice of the freedom of 
association, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of expression and the right to participate in 
public life. As Dahrendorf (1990) or Offe and Adler (1991) suggest, this framework has two 
main layers: constitutional and normal politics. Constitutional politics are decisions about the  
Constitution and acts of fundamental rights, defining the borders of the polity and its basic rules. 
Normal politics is the everyday competition, the utilization of particular interests of actors 
within the rules established by constitutional politics. Among the factors examined here, the 
Constitution and fundamental laws on civil and political rights are closer to Constitutional 
politics, while policy-making and political opportunity structures are closer to normal politics. 
Political turbulences sometimes serve as an opportunity for altering constitutional politics, such 
as the transition, or for normal politics, the political crisis of 2006. 
I will start with outlining the constitutional framework and then turn to the acts regulating 
freedom of association freedom of assembly, and the different types of elections. Since 
associations might participate in decision-making processes, I will summarize the state of social 
dialogue in the period. I will not pay particular attention to the freedom of expression beyond 
the constitutional framework, since its complex and far-reaching regulation would exceed the 
limits of this chapter.   
A. The constitutional framework  
At large, the main framework constructed in 1989 and that was in effect until the beginning of 
the 2010s123 is considered as a suitable framework to European norms, to a representative 
democracy or to the European Convention of Human rights. This framework regulated the right 
of association, peaceful assembly and other rights related to the world of politics during the 
examined period.(Rixer, 2014; Roth, 1989; Máté Szabó, 1998)124 This framework was 
                                                                
123 The Constitutional framework was replaced piece by piece between 2011 and 2018. The Act XX of 1949, The 
Constitution of the Hungarian Republic was replaced by the Basic Law of Hungary in 2011, the electoral system 
was changed in 2012, while the Act II of 1989 on the Freedom of Association was replaced with the civil law in 
2013. The Act III. of 1989 on the Right to a peaceful assembly was significantly modified in 2018.   
124 Some elements of this framework can be dated a bit earlier. The form of foundations was included into the Civil 
Code in 1987 (Rixer, 2014) 
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constructed by accepting a new Constitution125, establishing a “multi-party system, democracy, 
and social market-economy”. (Act XX of 1949, 1989: Preamble) The Constitution incorporated 
human rights, starting with the right to human dignity and freedom from torture (54§), 
continuing with most of the Civil and Political Rights.126 Three of the four examined freedom 
rights were stated in article 61, (freedom of expression and media),127 62 (freedom of peaceful 
assembly) and 63, (freedom of association). The fourth right, to take part in public affairs is not 
stated as such, but ensues from several paragraphs, as from article 42, which define local 
governance as “the independent democratic governance of issues concerning local constituents” 
or from those that dispose about the right to participate in the local and national (and later the 
European) elections and popular votes, and the right to hold a public office. (§44 and §70). 
Among the fundamental laws, the most important items for me are the Act II of 1989 on the 
Freedom of Association and the Act III. of 1989 on the Right of Assembly. Naturally, these 
were supplemented by other laws or decrees, further specifying their implementation. Besides 
the former laws, the establishment of foundations was regulated by the Civil Code and the 
interest representation and the right to strike was regulated by Act VII. of 1989 on Strikes and 
the Labor Code128  (Arató - Mikecz, 2015) Instead of introducing the specific juridical texts, I 
will shortly summarize the main characteristics of the legal situation of associations (and other 
civil society organizations) and how people could engage in demonstrations and protests or 
voting and the most important policy changes regarding these issues.129  
B. Freedom of Association 
In relation to establishing associations, the main regulation was Act II. of 1989 on the Freedom 
of Association, which governed the foundation and main characteristics of so-called societal 
organizations (referred to as associations later, see Drinóczi - Petrétei, 2003) and the Civil Code, 
which regulated the establishment and operation of foundations (Arató - Mikecz, 2015).  
                                                                
125 Technically, it was only a modification of the 1949 XX. Law of the Hungarian Constitution, but its content was 
replaced to a large extent. 
126 Hungary has ratified the European Convention of Human Rights in 1992. 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Hungary_ENG.pdf Last accessed: 11/11/2018 
127 Besides the general rule, §64 also stated that everyone has the right to write a complain or petition to the relevant 
governmental organization. 
128 Act XXII of 1992.  
129 There is a new law since 201, which has changed the terminology and slight changes in the available legal 
forms of organizations. My analysis stops in 2010, I refer to the regulation available before 2011. 
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It is important to note that although the organizational structure and decision-making processes 
of foundations and associations differ significantly,130 they share even more similarities. 
Therefore, I can treat both types as ‘organizations with associational characteristics’. They both 
disregard profit-making, rely on the work of volunteers and – at least in theory – they also share 
the idea of implementing deliberation-based decision-making processes.131 
Associating does not necessarily mean that someone creates or joins a formal organization. 
Thus, the Act on the Freedom of Association commenced with the statement that the Hungarian 
Republic guarantees the rights to everyone to form communities and organizations. To form 
communities or associations without legal personalities did not require any formal procedures. 
The only condition was that the association may not violate the 2§ of the Hungarian 
Constitution and it cannot realize or call to accomplish any crime or activity in breach of laws 
(Act XX of 1949, 1989:1-2§).  
Associations with a legal personality could be set up voluntarily by at least 10 natural or legal 
persons. Anyone could be a member of associations, but only Hungarian citizens and foreigners 
with a residence permit could be on the board of such an organization.132 Associations should 
have a bylaw accepted by its members, and an elected governing body. Societal organizations 
might be established with any aim that does not contradict the laws and the Constitution of the 
Hungarian Republic. They should primarily focus on non-entrepreneurial activity. Between 
1989 and 2011, the following types of organizations were treated as associations: voluntary 
associations, political parties, trade unions, mass movements, and public bodies by this law 
(Act II. of 1989, 1989) In proper sociological terms, these mean associational organizations, 
with voluntary membership and self-government. According to Drinóczi and Petrétei (2003), 
the subjects of the right of association are voluntary organizations, as associations, trade unions, 
political parties or mass movements. Public bodies and chambers, however, do not fall into this 
                                                                
130 On these differences see (Bullain, 1995). 
131 The common practice is also to handle foundations together with associations. This is especially true when 
surveys examine the belonging to or membership and volunteering in such organizations since these surveys 
usually neither distinguish between different forms of organizations, nor between formal and informal 
organizations. For example, the question, ISSP Citizenhsip asks starts with the following question: “People 
sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations.”, The European Values Study asks about voluntary 
organizations and so on.   
132 This is somewhat stricter in the case of political parties: A party member or party board member could be a 
person only, who has the right to elect or to be elected in a local or national election. 
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category, since these are established by a law or a decree of a governmental institution and not 
by the volition of citizens.133  
The other type of registered organization is the foundation. Foundations are established on the 
ground of the Civil Code. There are two types of foundations: private and public. Both had an 
autonomous legal personality, organizational structure and a governing body independent from 
its founder, which was responsible for managing the fund and the activities carried out by the 
foundation. Foundations are also established primarily for carrying out a non-entrepreneurial 
activity. Traditionally, foundations are established to collect and distribute money, but in 
Hungary, most of them are small organizations established by social entrepreneurs. They 
usually formulate one main idea and aim for the foundation, however, due to the regulation 
which seriously limits the founder’s influence on the organization (Bullain, 2008) they usually 
do not serve as founders, but as members of the supervisory board. 
Hungarian regulations and statistics confused the notion of non-profit and civil foundations 
both before and after 2011. As it has been discussed in Chapter I.3, there are types of non-profit 
organizations, both founded and funded by governmental organizations. These can neither be 
treated as independent or established by the volition of citizens. These state-funded non-profit 
organizations were, public foundations, public benefit companies or non-profit 
companies.134This environment went through only small changes in the discussed period. Since 
2006, it is no longer possible to establish public beneficiary companies. A year later the concept 
of non-profit enterprises was introduced instead. Although non-profit companies might be civil 
organizations, most of them are probably former public benefit companies.135 
                                                                
133 This means that although there are enterprises based on association of several people (as in the case of Ltd.-s), 
these are not considered organizations based on the right of association because of their profit-oriented nature 
(Drinóczi - Petrétei, 2003). 
134 These forms were created legally in 1993. (Kuti 2008). Public bodies are bodies, having a decision-making 
process similar to associations (as the Hungarian Academy of Sciences or chambers), but having special rights and 
responsibilities and budget provided by the Central Budget secured by specific legislation. Public benefit 
companies and non-profit companies are firm-like organizations, the basic rules apply to them are the same as to 
for-profit enterprises, however their aim is to provide public goods and they do not distribute their profit among 
owners or shareholders. (Rixer, 2014)    
135 For more information, visit:  Mi az a nonprofit gazdasági társaság? (What is a nonprofit enterprise?) 
https://www.nonprofit.hu/tudastar/mi-az-nonprofit-gazdasagi-tarsasag last accessed. 11/11/2018.  
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C. The Right to Peaceful Assemblies 
The regulation concerning the right to organize and participate in a peaceful assembly is quite 
simple. Events taking place in public and aiming at expressing an opinion should be registered 
with the Police at least three days before the event. Events held in private need not be registered. 
The Police could refuse to approve an event (or the access to the public domain) in a very 
limited number of cases.136 Compared to the legislation of other countries, Hungarian regulation 
seemed to favor protesters. (Kádár - M. Tóth, 2007) Máté Szabó (1998) argues that in the first 
half of the 1990s the practice of the Police in this regard met the standards of established 
democracies. Nevertheless, the regulation, raised certain questions: first, it does not really 
define the concept of a peaceful assembly (Kádár - M. Tóth, 2007; Sólyom, 2007; Tallódi, 
2008). Thus, it is not entirely clear, what events fall under this law. Sólyom (2007) argues that 
a distinctive characteristic of an assembly is that it happens with a clear aim of a collective 
expression of opinion and that it wants to “give weight to this aim with the presence [of the 
participants]” (Sólyom, 2007:6). 
Thus, in order for an event to be treated as an assembly, it needs to be public, or it needs to be 
announced. Events falling under this definition might be protests, demonstrations, cultural 
events, sporting and religious occasions or any assembly (Tallódi, 2008)137  
The other major feature of an assembly, is that it is peaceful. Sólyom (2007) argues that a 
demonstration is not peaceful, if “participants march with guns or objects threatening the 
physical integrity of others” (Sólyom, 2007:14). He claims that harmless objects like eggs do 
not fall under this category. Consequently, a protest does not become violent only because a 
protester throws eggs at a politician. This point is crucial, for the Police might consider 
intervening in such a case. 
Kádár and M. Tóth (2007) further elaborate on the meaning of ‘peacefulness’: if one consider 
the violent nature of a protest, two aspects should be taken into account. 1) the repertoire of the 
protesters, and 2) the aim of the protest. An assembly would be violent not only when the 
protesters have guns, but when the aim is to threaten the democratic order. 
                                                                
136 The access to the public domain could be denied only if the event would do harm to the operation of the Judicial 
system or to the Parliament or would cause too much obstruction to transportation. 
137 Kádár and M. Tóth (2007) argues that electoral assemblies and other assemblies should be distinguished from 
each other, but it is not clear, whether it would mean a different status form the point of right to peaceful assembly.  
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Beyond defining what a peaceful assembly is, the regulation had more practical problems, 
namely situations where the requirement of registering the event three days in advance was in 
conflict with the Right to Peaceful Assembly. (Sólyom, 2007; Tallódi, 2008). For example, 
insisting on a three-day registration period might contradict the actuality of the event or limit 
its effectiveness. Sometimes the information triggering a protest is not available three days prior 
to an event. There are two types of such events: 
A. A spontaneous non-organized assembly, started by people who gathered on their own.  
B. An organized assembly, where the information triggering an immediate response from 
protesters was not available before, and in which case a three days delay would 
significantly lessen the effectiveness of the assembly. 
To deal with this problem, the regulation and practice of registration have changed in 2008, 
based on the decision of the Constitutional Court. The Court stated that those assemblies 
organized and held spontaneously, or those triggering an instant response are also rightful 
assemblies and the fact that they were not registered with the Police is not caused to deny 
permission for holding them (Badó, 2011). Although the problems with the definition were not 
solved, this change in the regulation might encourage protesters to go to the streets.  
D. Elections, popular votes, and initiatives 
The electoral system of the examined period was also forged in the process of transition and 
remained largely unaltered until 2011. Both national and local elections were held once in every 
four years. The national election was a two-round mixed system combining voting for 
individual candidates based on single-member districts and regional party lists. This second 
element of the system was proportional. The local elections were also two-round systems, and 
also combine the voting for individual candidates and local-level party lists. Hungarian citizens 
were eligible both to vote and to run as candidates on the national elections. On the local 
elections, foreigners with a residence permit were also eligible to vote. (C. Tóth, 2015).  
The original aim was to create a stable system enabling representation regarding both local and 
national issues. Although many of its features were subject to debates later, the conditions for 
eligibility and the fair and free nature of the elections were not questioned (C. Tóth, 2015). 
The most debated feature of the system was the 5% electoral threshold 138for party lists, and the 
resulting tendency to favor stronger parties as well as the unproportional gain of the winner in 
                                                                
138 In 1990 the threshold was 4%. It was changed to 5% in 1994, prior the Elections. (C. Tóth, 2015).  
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the elections (C. Tóth, 2015). The relatively high threshold is one of the main reasons for the 
emergence of two large political camps in Hungarian politics. The left and liberal alliance of 
the Socialist Party and The Free Democrats on the one hand, and the Centre Right-Conservative 
block led by Fidesz (joined by The Independent Smallholder’s Party and the Christian 
Democrat Popular Party) on the other. They emerged by 1998 and defined party politics until 
2008-2010. (A. Szabó, 2015)  
Since 2004, Elections to the European Parliament are also held once every five years in 
Hungary. During these, all European citizens with a registered address of residence in Hungary 
(Bux, 2018) may vote. On the European Parliamentary Elections, voters are able to choose 
among national party lists only. Similarly to the national elections, the European Parliamentary 
elections also has a five percent threshold.   
Moreover, tools of direct democracy, such as agenda initiatives and referenda were available to 
citizens. The former was a weaker tool, which could be used to press the Parliament to discuss 
an issue, while referenda could be peremptory if certain conditions were fulfilled (Kukorelli, 
2009). 
Rules of referenda changed in 1998. Whereas the previous regulation was quite permissive, as 
there were only a limited number of issues which could not be voted in a referendum, and the 
exact amount time allotted for collecting signatures was unclear, referenda were regulated in a 
more detailed manner in 1997 and 1998.  Its role became more explicit in the Constitution and 
a more coherent, although much stricter regulation was applied to it, and the procedure of 
registration and signature collection became more complex and difficult. For an obligatory 
referendum, one was obliged to collect 200,000 signatures in four months. However, the legal 
category of optional referendum was also introduced: the Parliament it was possible to could 
decide to ordain a referendum when less than 200,000, but more than 100,000 signatures were 
collected. Mandatory votes were always binding, while optional votes could be both binding or 
consultative (which means that the result of the popular vote is not binding for the legislature 
(Kukorelli, 1998, 2009). The number of signatures required meant that initiating a popular vote 
was hardly possible without considerable resources. Meanwhile, participation would not 
require much effort. 
129 
 
II.2.2. Social dialogue 
Arató and Mikecz (2015) summarize the conditions of participating in the decision-making 
process for civil organizations and trade unions. In the period, the right to participate in the 
process of forming policies and preparing decisions was regulated by Act of 1987 on 
Legislation. Based on this regulation, government institutions and municipal governments had 
to include civil society organizations in the preparation of decision-making processes. Despite 
the original aims, the process was selective for a number of reasons. Institutions only involved 
organizations that appeared on their specific lists; they only sent out expert-materials in the 
final phase of the decision-making, and they did not let their partners come up with their 
alternative concepts and policies. 
The Act of 1987 on Legislation also introduced the institution of public consultation, which in 
principle, guaranteed the right to express an opinion about draft versions of regulations. 
Basically, it meant that draft regulations were published for a short consultation period or that 
they were sent to a selected number of organizations. This practice weakened the deliberative 
nature of consultations, as they were mostly done in a one-way manner: civil society 
organizations and citizens sent their opinion to the legislator and institutions decided what to 
include into the draft if any changes were made (Kalas, 2006). 
But even this practice of social consultation was violated by numerous problems embedded in 
the bureaucracy: “non-published drafts, the governments’ non-transparent system of 
consultation, deadlines of consultations, shortened arbitrary, non-accessible officers, opinions 
neglected without justification, the practice of handling complaints” (Kalas, 2006:26)  
As part of the social dialogue processes, tripartite and bipartite Committees were responsible 
for negotiating workfare issues between employers, trade unions, and the government. These 
committees were to be consulted about any changes in the regulation affecting the Labor Code. 
When the Committee became bipartite in 2004, the state remained an observant participant and 
besides trade unions, civil organizations were also involved (Arató - Mikecz, 2015). 
II.2.3. Policies aimed for civil society 
Although the basic legal framework did not change much, a few changes did take place with 
regards to civil society organizations. The legislation became more and more elaborate, and the 
administrative weight increased in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, associations had to meet only 
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a few standards, and together with foundations, they were given tax returns on a general basis. 
(Arató - Mikecz, 2015; Rixer, 2014).   
This changed in the first half of the 1990s, as the registration became more difficult and tax 
returns were cut. Furthermore, by defining public benefit companies, the financing of the sphere 
gradually changed as most of the public funds’ money went to such organizations instead that 
of self-organized organizations. 
In 1996-1997 a new supporting concept, the 1% system was introduced. This enabled non-profit 
organizations (and churches) to receive one percent of a citizen’s tax if he or she so disposed 
of. This change, however, occurred at the same time as the introduction of the public benefit 
status of organizations. Only associations and foundations with a public benefit status were 
enabled to become beneficiaries of the tax-disposal and, such organizations had to meet stricter 
requirements.139 
After the changes of 1996-1997, the next supportive policy-action was taken in the first half of 
the 2000s. The left-wing-liberal government introduced a Civil Strategy in 2003 with which 
they launched a unified, stable fund for civil society organizations: the National Civil Fund. Its 
budget was adjusted to the tax-disposal of citizens. Each year, the Fund received an amount of 
money from the Central Budget equal to the aggregated amount of the one percent or income 
tax citizens disposed of. The Fund was managed by a supervisory board. Two-thirds of the 
board members were delegated by civil society organizations. This was the first time, apart 
from project financing, that everyday operations of organizations were supported (Kuti, 2008; 
Rixer, 2014). 
As a summary, it can be stated that the transition period gave birth to a legal framework that 
matched the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, certain 
concerns were raised about the exclusion of various groups from practicing a number of 
rights.140 All in all, most were enabled to exercise rights, and there were only a few, and 
reasonable exceptions.  
                                                                
139 1997. ClVI Law on Public Benefit Organizations. Rixer (2014) also notes that the whole process went along 
with the privatization of public services. As the resources were scarce, the state started to privatize its services to 
public benefit organizations, especially public benefit companies. However, this process also gave new meaning 
to the term ’public benefit’. From 1997 it meant that an organization provides a service, or an activity which should 
be done, in principle, by the state. 
140 E.g. a foreigner to act as an organizer of  an assembly held on a public domain.(Sólyom, 2007). 
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In the implementation of the legislation, however, there were two, contradicting tendencies. 
First, the legislation became stricter in terms of administrative requirements related to 
practicing certain rights, such as the right of association. The operation of administrative 
organizations and the judicial system was unstable. Moreover, the results of procedures were 
difficult to calculate, and similar processes could lead to different results. These two 
characteristics could discourage groups from engaging in practicing rights (at least as far as 
formal or legal actions were concerned).  
Nevertheless, the legislation remained largely the same throughout the whole period, and efforts 
were made to support the activity of civil society, and to invigorate civil activities.  
II.2.4. Political opportunity structures and political turmoils 
Changes in legislation can occur for a number of reasons. But one of the main factors behind 
them might ensue from the approach of governing forces’ to decision-making processes. 
Governing bodies might think that they could rule more easily or maintain their popular support 
if they allow other actors to participate in decision-making processes or, quite the contrary, if 
they exclude everyone else and make sure that they control both the process and its outcomes. 
The openness of the decision-making process is often called a political opportunity structure. 
The basic idea is simple. Political opportunity structures refer to the access non-governing 
actors have on the system and processes of decision-making. The question is, whether and how 
these actors (non-governing political parties, civil society organizations, trade unions etc.) are 
able to influence decision-making processes (Kriesi, 2004). The openness or closeness of 
political opportunity structures depend on several factors, such as the centralization of decision-
making processes, the bureaucracy, the separation of powers, the structure of governance (e.g. 
whether the government needs to form a coalition), how disciplined parties are,141 and what the 
strategy of the ruling party is for handling its challengers (Kriesi, 2004). Although the general 
framework remained the same throughout the entire period, different governments took 
different approaches to civil society. This is well captured by the fact that policies intended to 
revitalize the civil sphere were implemented by left-wing (or liberal-left) governments. These 
policies were born during 1994 and 1998, when the law of public benefit organizations and the 
                                                                
141 For example, whether they use unified communication channels, or whether it is possible to establish an 
independent opinion or developing different platforms in the party. 
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1% system was introduced, as well as after 2002, when the National Civil Fund was established 
and the government launched civil strategies. 
On the other hand, parties often relied on mass mobilization. There were three main „waves” 
of politically driven mobilizations. First, in the early nineties, politicians belonging to the 
Alliance of Free Democrats (then in opposition) organized a movement, called the Democratic 
Chart. The Hungarian Socialist Party (also in opposition) joined the movement. During its short 
existence, a long list of organizations joined the movement which used the repertoire of 
demonstrations, petitions and different forms of media-representation.  The movement was 
partly fueled by the actions and demonstrations of the increasingly organized extreme right. 
The movement lasted until 1994 when the Socialist Party won the elections and then it formed 
a coalition government with the Alliance of Free Democrats (Bozóki, 1996). 
The second wave of politically driven mobilizations occurred during and after the electoral 
campaign of 2002. In 2002, Fidesz surprisingly lost the first round of Parliamentary elections. 
As a reaction, their campaign between the first and second rounds relied on mass mobilization. 
Although the campaign mobilized its voters (Mihályffy, 2005), the incumbent Party still lost 
the elections.  After the Fidesz lost, its leading figure, Viktor Orbán announced the initiation of 
the movement of Civic Circles and asked people to form small clubs, associations, circles all 
around the country. Although after several years, the movement lost its significance, it was the 
basis for the strategy of engaging in a repertoire way more similar to a social movement, than 
a Parliamentary party (Gerő - Kopper, 2013; Máté Szabó, 2006). 
In 2006, a recording of a speech of incumbent Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány was leaked 
(this was the so-called Őszöd Speech). In a non-public speech, held after the electoral victory 
of the Hungarian Socialist Party the Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány said that his pre-2006 
government lied about the economic situation of the last 1.5-2 years and that the government’ 
only aimed at covering this lie. His words (‘we did not govern but lied for the last couple years’) 
incited protests in Budapest and in other cities. The events of the autumn of 2006 were 
characterized by a diversity of actors, aims, and ideologies. Most of them, however, were 
related to the far right. The events of 2006 were exploited and in some case even organized by 
Fidesz and by the Jobbik Movement for Hungary, a far-right party that managed to get into the 
Parliament in 2010 (Mikecz, 2012, 2014; András Tóth - Grajczjár, 2015).  
One major transformation and a political turmoil of the Hungarian political structure might be 
important even beyond its connection with civil society and the use of mass mobilization: 
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namely, Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004. This not only meant additional 
resources for the country, but it was largely anticipated with positive feelings by the general 
public (Grzymalała-Busse - Innes, 2003). The EU did not only promote democratization(Raik, 
2004), but it also strengthened a framework of multilevel governance, in which actors could 
use the international political scene for their domestic purposes (Holzhacker, 2006).  
Political turmoils and crises might also change opportunity structures by re-shaping the political 
sphere. One obvious example is the transition in 1990 itself, which was followed by a turmoil 
that unleashed a crucial change in the political structure and the explosion of the two-party 
system of Hungarian politics. The political crisis unleashed by the Őszöd Speech in the autumn 
of 2006 took place right before local elections.142 
When the speech was leaked and protests broke out, the situation quickly evolved into a 
legitimacy crisis, lasting for years. This was a major factor contributing to the formation of new 
parties, to the rise of the extreme right JOBBIK and Fidesz’ landslide victory (they gained a 2/3 
majority) in 2010. (Deák, 2013; Enyedi - Benoit, 2010; Grajczjár - Tóth, 2011) Thus, it is fair 
to say the speech and its consequences led to the reshaping of the Hungarian political sphere. 
Policy periods and electoral cycles 
Based on the literature reviewed above, I propose two different versions of dividing the period 
between 1990 and 2010.  
The first one is based on major policy changes towards civil society and the legal-institutional 
environment. From this perspective, the first period between 1990 and 1996 would be the period 
of professionalization and consolidation. The second one starts with the introduction of the law 
on public benefit status and on the 1% system, while the third would start in 2004, with the 
establishment of the National Civil Fund and Hungary’s accession to the European Union. 
As an alternative, one could divide the period according to elections. However, there are authors 
suggesting that these periods could be grouped by the political ideologies of the governments 
(conservative vs. left-right), or their respective attempts at forming structures of open or closed 
political opportunities (Róbert - Szabó, 2017), there are too many contingencies that may 
                                                                
142 It is worth to note that the speech was only a trigger of the crisis. The incumbent, left-wing and liberal parties 
won the national elections in 2006. Although their campaign was built on the increase of social expenditures after 
the elections they engaged to restrictive policies. Thus, when the speech leaked out it found a disappointed 




influence the relationship of political parties and civil society organizations as well as social 
movements.143 Therefore, I will examine electoral periods separately. (See table 9.) 
Table 9. Electoral cycles and governing parties 1990-2010 
Year Government 
1990-1994 (Right-wing) Coalition of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the 
Independent Smallholder’s Party and the Christian 
Democratic Peoples Party 
1994-1998 (Left-wing, liberal) Coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the 
Alliance of Free Democrats 
1998-2002 (Right-wing) Coalition of Fidesz Hungarian Civic Party, the 
Independent Smallholder’s Party and the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum  
2002-2006 (Left-wing) Coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the 
Alliance of Free Democrats 
2006-2010 (Left-wing, liberal) Coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the 
Alliance of Free Democrats (2006-2008) 
Hungarian Socialist Party (2008-2010) 
II.2.5. Previous research  
Since measuring the practice of rights by action is not a well-developed domain of political 
sociology, I rely on research concerning associational and political participation and non-profit 
research. Although these are different domains of political sociology I emphasize the 
importance of the realization of these rights, thus to take actions. Therefore, exercising the 
rights I examine could be also understood as a wide range of political participation, or voluntary 
actions “by people in their role as citizens” (van Deth, 2014:352)  
The evidence collected by previous research suggests that the overall activity has not changed 
much in the examined period (Arató - Mikecz, 2015; Gerő, 2012; Kern - Szabó, 2011; Róbert 
- Szabó, 2017).  It is not clear, however, how institutional changes contributed to trends of 
participation they support or suppress participation. In relation to that, it is also not discussed 
in the scholarly literature, whether the different institutional changes highlighted above 
strengthen or counteract each other. 
                                                                
143 For example, the first years of the period are the beginning of the transition, when the whole political system 
was under construction. The stable two-party block system was stabilized only by 1998, and it collapsed after 
2006. The hopes towards the EU accession might also have influenced people’s behaviors beyond the effects of 
actual policies.   
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Moreover, the existing literature is limited in its scope of activities or in its timeframe. Articles 
that discuss trends of participation, either focus on only one of its forms, Kukorelli (1998, 2009) 
for example, discusses only popular votes (1998, 2009), or they examine only parts of the period 
I cover. While Angelusz and Tardos (2005) examine electoral participation, participation in 
voluntary organizations and protest activities up to 2003144, Kern and Szabó (2011) and Róbert 
and Szabó (2017) discuss the 2000s. In my analysis, I try to complete these shortages of the 
literature. I cover both the 1990s and the 2000s and I also draw a broader picture by examining 
different types of participation at the same time.  Furthermore, since other studies focus on 
associational and political participation they cover a somewhat narrower set of data. Moreover, 
their grouping is also different from that of my analysis, as I focus on fundamental rights as the 
basis of operationalization instead of focusing on resources required by different forms of 
participation, or their relationship with political institutions.  
The extent of the impact of institutional changes on participation in Hungary is not known.  
Róbert and Szabó (2017) examine the impact of political opportunity structures, using the 
government’s political affiliation as a proxy. The political opportunity structures are assumed 
to be closed during the reign of right-wing governments, while they are thought to be more 
open under left-wing governments. Although they expected significant differences concerning 
the social profile of mobilized groups, only minor ones were found.  
Research on the number of associations and non-profit organizations show a somewhat 
different picture. It seems that institutional changes have an impact on the number of 
organizations. For example, the introduction of the ‘one percent’ system and the establishment 
of the National Civil Fund affected the number of associations. In general, the number of active 
organizations increased throughout the period, from an initial 8.796 to 60.536.145 After the 
relatively vital first few years, the number of organizations stagnated until 1997. After that, 
there was a slight increase, which developed into a new wave by 2004 (Bocz, 2009). On the 
other hand, changes in the legal environment and the government’s changing attitude towards 
civil society after 2010 coincided with the significant destruction of the sphere of nonprofit 
organizations. It has at least slowed down the growth of civil society in terms of the number of 
                                                                
144 However, they give a detailed analysis only for 2003.  
145 Including associations, private foundations, trade unions, employer’s advocacy groups, and professional 
organizations. My own calculation, based on the Nonprofit Database of the HCSO. Data source: (Bocz, 2009 until 
2003; HCSO, 2014 between 2003 and 2010)..  
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organizations and shaken their financial bases (Kuti, 2016, 2017) which might give us the 
impression that institutional configuration matters. 
II.2.6. What to expect?  
Although my analysis is mainly exploratory, I could form some preliminary hypotheses. Most 
importantly, although the existing research points to a different direction, one might assume 
that among democratic institutions, activities related to most of the examined rights will 
gradually increase (H1). 
The general trends, however, would not indicate that the direction of changes should be linear 
and continuous. Policy changes sometimes supplement, sometimes counteract the influence of 
the general framework. Thus, the increasing administrative load in the first half of the 1990s 
might slow down organizations, while the changes introduced in 1997 and 2004 foster them, 
especially when associational participation is examined (H2). 
Political opportunity structures sometimes support policy changes aimed to vitalize the practice 
of rights, and sometimes counteract them. Between 1990 and 1994, political opportunity 
structures gradually became closed, in line with the stricter and more detailed regulation. 
Between 1994 and 1998, regulations gradually clarified the way popular votes could be used. 
Then, the one-percent system was introduced, which might have contributed to the growing 
number of popular votes launched and to associational activities. However, closing opportunity 
structures between 1998 and 2002 might have counteracted the positive influence of these 
policy changes. After 2002, establishing the National Civil Fund, and introducing a Civil 
Strategy indicated an opening of opportunity structures, which would vitalize associational 
participation and consequently, the organizing of assemblies and other forms of expressing an 
opinion. (H3) 
Protesting and expressing opinions could be the most intense during times of crises. Therefore, 
the transition itself and the period after 2006 should be the most intense in this regard. Thus, I 
expect that people have engaged in protest activities, signing a petition, boycotts or talking 
about politics mostly in the first years of the 1990s and after 2006. (H4) 
II.2.7. Methodology 
The impact of institutional changes is examined through time series of exercising the four 
fundamental rights. After introducing the available data and by building a twenty-year long 
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time series (when it is possible) the changes in the level of individual practice at relevant points 
in time can be examined. Following the initial examination, the different policy and electoral 
periods can be compared. I will do this by comparing the annual means of the level of activity 
in a period where such data is available. 
The data is collected from various sources. These include the secondary analysis of nationally 
representative surveys, data generated by the functioning of the political system (such as voter 
turnout) or during bureaucratic procedures (such as registering associations). Although I give a 
detailed introduction of the data for every subsection, I shall give a general outline of the 
sources used. 
First of all, in the cases of the freedom of association, the right to assembly and the freedom of 
expression, I will primarily use information extracted from large-scale, nationally 
representative surveys.146 The main source of a comparative research asking similar questions 
is the European Values Study taken in 1991, 1999 and 2008. (EVS, 2011) This will be 
supplemented by the first five waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) between 2002 and 
2010 (ESS, 2012), the data of the  International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on Citizenship 
from 2004, (ISSP Research Group, 2012) and the two waves of Hungarian Election Studies 
(HES) from 2003, 2008 and 2009 (Tardos, 2003, 2008-2009). For a detailed picture of 
participation, I mainly rely on the proportion of people who participate. It is important to note, 
that in order to build a twenty-year long time-series, I have to use surveys that ask somewhat 
different questions. They apply different time scales, phrasing and sometimes even a different 
number of items were asked. As  Ulzurrun and Morales (2002) show, the number and phrasing 
of items might change the results significantly. As a consequence, I have to be really cautious 
about comparing them. Fortunately, in some cases, I have multiple data from the same year, 
which allows me to explore the differences that the phrasing of the questions might generate. I 
will constantly refer to this in the interpretation of the results. 
As a second source of information, I use data provided by authorities. For example, the National 
Office for the Judiciary provided data about the number of registrations of associations and 
foundations. The Police also publishes statistics about the events that fall under the effect of 
Act III of 1989.147 The National Tax and Customs Administration Office releases the number 
of people designating the 1% of their personal income tax to civil organizations, whereas the 
                                                                
146 I provide a short overview of their representativeness in the Appendices (Appendix 2). 
147 However, this information is available only sporadically. 
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National Election Office publishes data about participation on elections, popular votes, and 
popular initiatives. 
To supplement and to control the results of my secondary analysis, I will review the relevant 
literature and compare its results to the sets of data I analyze. Due to differences in the data, I 
will introduce it in detail in every subchapter. 
II.2.8. Trends in exercising rights 
A. Freedom of association 
In examining the practice of the freedom of association, I focus on two indicators: the 
proportion of people that belong to associations and the annual number of registrations of 
associations and foundations at the court. 
I use the concept of belonging, instead of membership. In many cases, formal membership does 
not apply very well. Besides, the formal membership does not suit certain types of association 
(such as religious ones) well. Forms of participation vary in general and they became less formal 
in the last decades, especially among the youth (Hustinx et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, belonging to an association is a broader concept than membership, as it can not 
only refer to formal membership, but also to a sense of emotional engagement. Belonging 
includes voluntary work done by non-members as well. In the operationalization of the concept, 
however, this does not mean great variability when a survey is used as an instrument:  These 
surveys typically measure belonging by a sense of identification with an association: belonging 
to, being a member or volunteering.  
The data comes from two sources. The extent of associational participation is derived from a 
secondary analysis of large-scale, nationally representative surveys, such as the European 
Values Study (EVS), the European Social Survey (ESS), or the Hungarian Election Study 
(HES). The number of registered associations and the number of annual registrations is based 
on a database about registrations constructed by the National Office for the Judiciary. 
The variables used to measure the ratio of participation are based on questions of belonging, 
membership, participating and volunteering in voluntary organizations. The examined surveys 
ask their questions by enquiring whether the respondent belongs to an association working on 
given activity fields (such as human rights, education, sports and recreation, etc.) or in 
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associations of a given type, such as political parties or trade unions. EVS and ESS 2002 have 
the most, and ISSP 2004 the least detailed list of fields or organizational types.148  
The questions also vary by the time frame they are asking about. EVS, HES and ISSP 2004 
refer to the moment of data gathering, while the question asked by the ESS 2002 contains a 12-
month time frame.  
Apart from belonging, EVS also gathered replies about volunteering. ESS 2002 provides a more 
detailed overview by asking questions about membership, participation in the organization’s 
activity, donating money and volunteering. 
Belonging to or membership in associations 
Table 10 presents the frequencies for belonging, membership, and participation. Surprisingly, 
the year 1990 seems salient. But this is a remnant of mass trade union organizations. Before 
1989, membership in trade unions was almost compulsory for professionals. These unions were, 
however, not really advocacy organizations but rather satellites of the Party, serving as 
‘transmission belts’149. After the transition, to the end of the millennium, membership in trade 
unions decreased by two-thirds (from 32 to 7-11 percent.150)  But even without trade unions, 
the sporadic data from the ’90s shows a slight decline (from 29% to 25%), which persists. It 
seems that to the 2000s, levels of belonging or membership in any association or voluntary 
organization stabilized around 20 percent. The only exception is the ISSP in 2004 which 
measure that 40 percent of the respondents belong to voluntary organizations. However, 29 
percent of the respondents indicated that they belong to a religious or church organization, 
which is unexceptionally large, compared to the other dataset, thus the respondents probably 
people indicated not only belonging to religious voluntary organizations but identification with 
a denomination as well.151 
  
                                                                
148 The list of activity fields by research program and the ratio of participation in individual fields is reported in 
the Appendices (Appendix 3) 
149 The expression ‘transmission belt’ is used to describe associations, such as trade unions, mainly under state 
socialism, aiming at interest representation in principle, but functioning as organizations enhancing the goals, 
policies etc. of the government. (Makó, 2010) 
150 According to EVS, membership in trade unions was 7% in 1999, while ESS measured it to 11% in 2002.  
151 This assumption is supported by the large difference between the ratio of respondents marked active 
participation and belonging without participation. Only 9 percent of the respondents participate actively in such a 
religious organization and 20 percent answered that they ‘belong but do not participate’. The difference between 
the two groups is much larger than in other fields. The ratio of those, who marked ’belong but do not participate’ 
exceeds the ratio of active participants only for trade unions but the difference is only 1.3 percent (4.4% vs. 5.7%).    
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Please look carefully at the following 
list of voluntary organizations and 
activities and say which, if any, do you 
belong to?  
50 29 
 
    21 (EVS)   
For each of the voluntary organisations I 
will now mention, please use this card to 
tell me whether any of these things apply 
to you now or in the last 12 months, and, 
if so, which (member+participated) 
  32152     
We listed various types of associations 
in the following card. Please indicate if 
you have any memberships or leading 
function in any of them. 
    
 
19   21 (HES) 19 
People sometimes belong to different 
kinds of groups or associations. For 
each type of group, please indicate 
whether you, (belong to and actively 
participate in them + or belong to but 
do not participate in them) 
    
 
  41     
Volunteering 
Data about volunteering is fuzzier than that about membership or belonging. Although, there 
are a number of available datasets and results from the 1990s and the 2000s are all published, 
they are controversial. EVS, supplemented with ESS shows a decreasing or stagnating trend 
similar to that observed concerning membership. HCSO data show stagnation, whereas studies 
based on two comparable Hungarian surveys from 1994 and 2005 show increasing engagement 
to volunteer work. 
Similarly to the direction of changes, the ratio of volunteers also differs radically. There are 
some methodological issues behind the contradicting results. First, measurements apply 
different definitions of volunteering. Some research focuses on organized activities, while 
others also include non-organized activities. Second, the unit of analysis might be different: 
individuals versus organizations. By briefly addressing these, I will try to clarify the data and 
                                                                
152 ESS and ISSP are datasets distinguishing between membership and participation. According to the ESS 2002, 
27 percent of the respondents mentioned that they are a member of any organizations, while only 20 percent of 
them indicated participation.  in the ISSP citizenship data active participation is 19 percent while passive belonging 
is 27 percent. From the aggregated figures it is clear that the two types of belonging are overlapping only partially.  
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argue that from the point of freedom of associations, organized volunteer activities should 
be taken into account.  
Under the term organized volunteering, I refer to voluntary work done for organizations. The 
subjects of non-organized voluntary work or informal help are however individuals (strangers, 
acquaintances, friends or family members). The broadest definition is applied by Czakó et al. 
(1995) and Czike and Kuti (2006) in their research conducted in 1993 and 2004 respectively. 
Czakó et al. define volunteer work as “assistance to any individual or organization that does not 
belong to the individual’s kin- or friendship circles” (Czakó et al., 1995:7). The definition of 
Czike and Kuti is similar:  
„We define volunteering in this study as a voluntary activity, for which the individual 
does not accept any payment in return, and which is conducted primarily beyond his/her 
own and her families’ advance, for the sake of other people, groups or the building of 
the community (2006:13 highlights are mine).  
Although they would exclude family members from the beneficiaries of voluntary work, later 
Czike and Kuti abandon this restricting element, and sometimes they include helping a family 
member in volunteering.153 Fortunately, they differentiate between organized and non-
organized volunteering.  
EVS, ESS, and Hungarian Statistical Office (HCSO) are interested in organized volunteering. 
Thus, they implicitly apply a narrower definition, as per their method of measurement). EVS 
measures volunteering in the same structure in all of its waves, while ESS only measured it in 
the first (2002) and third (2006) wave, but with different batteries. The first wave records 
volunteering related to certain fields, as in the case of associational membership, while in 2006 
the questionnaire includes two general questions about organized and one about non-organized 
activities. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office conducts research almost yearly among non-
profit organizations and since 1995, they have also been recording the number of volunteers at 
each organization. The EVS asks individuals and their activity at the time of filling in the 
questionnaire (EVS) and 12 months before it (ESS), whereas HCSO asks organizations about 
the previous calendar year. The HCSO’s definition is the narrowest since it only deals with the 
number of regularly working volunteers. 
                                                                
153 For example „According to our research, more than 36% of the Hungarian population above 14 years old,  helps 




According to different definitions and methodologies, the results are also different: EVS and 
ESS report a proportion of volunteers ranging from 5.8% to 16.4%. HCSO (Bocz, 2009; HCSO, 
2014) declares that there are about 350-440.000 volunteers (four to five percent of the adult 
population), while Czike and Bartal (2005) or Czike and Kuti (2006) state that 30-40 percent 
of the adult population participated in volunteer work.154 The latter contains non-organized 
volunteer activities as well. Organized volunteering was around 7% in 1993 and 10.5%155 in 
2005 according to Czakó et al. (1995) and Czike and Kuti (2006).156  This result is much closer 
to those published by others (table 11).157 
The five-ten percent discrepancy between the HCSO’s data and the results based on individual 
surveys might be due to the lack of volunteering for churches158 and political parties in the 
HCSO’s data and to the research design (only organizations were asked). Organizations count 
only “official” volunteers, those who do not take part in their daily operation but help instead 
to organize its programmes or provide its services.  
Organized voluntary-work is perhaps a too narrow metric to measure the actual proportion of 
volunteers. But a too broad definition is equally problematic. For example, although assistance 
in the closer community or acquaintances might fall into the category of the quite modern 
phenomena of volunteering, they might be the results of pressure exposed by kinship networks 
or constraints of employment. Systems of giving presents and reciprocal help are able to 
maintain traditional networks not only at the level of kinship but on the level of whole 
                                                                
154 The population of people older than 14 years old, in 2005. 
155 The data from 2005 contains volunteer-work organized by state-owned organizations as well, thus the ratio of 
„civil” voluntary workers is lower. Czike and Kuti suggest, that there is a difference based on people volunteering 
for state institutions - which would be possible since its ratio was 6.1% in 1994 and 8.4% in 2005, but none of the 
other surveys have asked about it. 
156 The identification of the subject of volunteer work appears among the a questions only in the survey conducted 
in 2005. Their identification varies on a wide spectrum: Respondents primarily named their settlement (27%) and 
individuals (19.8%). After these two, they mentioned state institutions, (8.4%) care-taking, fund-raising, (7.7 and 
5.9%) as the goal of volunteer work. 4.7% mentioned churches and only a small proportion (0.8-1%) help 
organizations (of which they were either in the board of trustees or helping in administration) and volunteering for 
parties. (Czike - Kuti, 2006:35). 
157 Kuti (2017) still writes that one-third of the Hungarian adult population does volunteer work in 2017, but she 
admits that only a minority of this is organized by civil society organizations. 
158 According to Czakó et al. (1995) in the middle of the nineties, 2.3 percent of the adult population conducted 
voluntary work for religious organizations, which would explain 25-50 percent of the difference. EVS and ESS 
both ask about volunteering conducted for religious voluntary organizations, but not churches specifically. The 
proportion of people who volunteer only for religious organizations is only 1.3-1.7 percent of the population. The 
total results (volunteering for religious and other organizations) vary between 1.9 and 5.4 percent, which is similar 
to the data collected in 1994 and 2004 by Czike and Kuti (2006). Volunteering for political parties explain less 
than 10 percent of the differences (0.5 percent of the population is engaged in political organizations). 
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settlements (Sik 1988).159 Even when the activities or the motivations reportedly driving them 
are seemingly similar to volunteer activities, their social consequences can be totally different. 
More importantly, traditional networks or volunteer groups organized by state institutions 
cannot be considered as agents exercising the right to associate. In order to be counted as such, 
self-organized voluntary associations with public aims, as well as shared, public common goals 
are necessary. Thus, only volunteering within the framework of independent, non-state owned 
organizations can be considered as acts of ‘associating’. Furthermore, it is the kind of activity 
which has the potential to maintain an organizational sphere independent from the state or 
governmental organizations. 
Therefore, it is best to consider only activities organized by or belonging to voluntary 
associations. As table 11 shows, this type of activity is stagnating at best, according to any 
recorded data. The first row of the table below contains the extent of organized volunteer-work 
and although there are changes, higher ratios of volunteering tend to include volunteering 
organized by non-voluntary organizations. This was the case in 1994, when organized 
volunteering reached 11 percent only with counting activities organized by non-voluntary 
organizations which approached the frequency of volunteering recorded in 2004. The data from 
2006 and 2008 is somewhat ambiguous, probably due to differences in questions, or maybe to 
the context (inquiring about local activities) in which they were raised in ESS 2006. 
  
                                                                
159 For example, ‘kaláka’ a form of reciprocal help-networks aiming at providing the necessary labor force to build 
a house might be interpreted as a stable, informal organization which is supported by the network  in which it is 
embedded. Although this network is informal, the pressure it places on individual leads to an almost obligatory 
participation.  (E. Sik, 1988). Similarly, data on non-organized volunteering might cover personalized inter-
organizational relationships or actions performed to maintain these networks  (Cf. E. Sik - Czakó, 1987). 
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Voluntary work160, organized by 
voluntary organizations 16 
7 161 
(11)162 15 9 11
163 19164 11 
Voluntary work (organized and 
non-organized)  29   40   
In the past 12 months, how often 
did you help with or attend 
activities organized in your local 
area165 
     27  
*The date indicates the year of data collection. 
Local participation 
Questions about local participation also highlight possible problems of measurement: local 
participation might not be captured by questions concerning membership since it can be less 
formal and more fluid than participating in regional or national organizations. Therefore, 
boundaries between self-organized actions and events organized by local governments might 
be blurry. This might be well captured in the differences between the results of ESS 2006 and 
HES 2008. In the third wave of ESS (2006), local participation was referred to through a general 
question and the ratio of people participating in any local event (attending or helping with) 
outnumbered the proportion of volunteers by 8 percent. However, this might be the result of 
phrasing: HES in 2008 also asked about membership in local organizations and in organizing 
local activities, such as sports events. Altogether only 6% of the population answered that they 
are members of any organization as such. 
  
                                                                
160 Questions were similar, only slightly different in the ESS and EVS. Both questionnaires asked about voluntary 
work with the same questions proposed for memberships/belonging above. (see table 11).  
161 Counted based on table 8.4 in Czakó et al. (1995:33)  
162 Contains voluntary work organized by non-voluntary organizations as well.  
163 Contains voluntary work organized by non-voluntary organizations as well.  
164 The question was: “Were you involved in work for voluntary or charitable organizations, and if so how often 
in the past 12 months?” 
165 Although the question did not involve the term volunteer or voluntary work, it was asked in the context of two 





An attempt of registering an association is clearly a form of exercising one’s right to the 
freedom of association. The prevalence of this practice could be examined by the raw numbers 
of registrations handed in to the Court. The data provided by the National Office for the 
Judiciary includes the registrations of associations166 and foundations as well. As I mentioned 
earlier, in this analysis, I consider foundations as associations thus I will also include their 
registrations in the analysis.  
During the 21 years following 1989, 105,062 organizations were registered. Two-thirds of them 
are as associations. The total number of organizations with a valid registration was lower in 
2010, since 23,511 organizations were dissolved by the court during the period. 
In 1989 more than 9000 organizations appeared in the registry. However, this includes 
organizations that had already existed before 1989 and which had to be re-registered or gained 
legal personality due to changes in the legal and political environment. As Kuti (1998) 
mentions, in the first years of the nineties many local organizations vanished, since their main 
supporters, the cooperatives were dissolved. These associations (mostly sports and recreation) 
were often saved by local governments or their supporters and re-registered later or simply 
changed their name. Some organizations, which were founded before 1945 and nationalized (as 
large umbrella organizations of the disabled persons regained their independence and registered 
as associations.167 Other, formerly non-formal organizations – such as political organizations of 
the opposition, or environmental organizations – gained legal personality as soon as it was 
possible.  
Excluding 1989, the number of registrations peaked in 1991 (8240 registrations) and until 2010 
it slowly dropped to around an annual 3000. The cumulative trend of registrations display the 
same phenomena, as its curve is similar to the Mitscherlich model. (Fokasz, 2006) (Figure 5) 
This shape has a characteristic of growth, which is usually caused by an external factor, such 
as a changing legal framework enabling the free registration of organizations or fast 
mobilizations by the mass media, which gives a great impetus to hidden potentials. 
                                                                
166 The data is a bit different than the law on associations would suggests, since this data contains churches as well. 




Figure 5. Cumulative number of registrations, 1989-2010 
 
The motor of the potential for growth until 1995-1996 was probably the formalization of 
previously existing communities within new possibilities of self-organization the tax-
allowances for non-profit organizations. Then, around 1998 the curve became similar to a linear 
growth model, meaning that after that people attempt to register the same number of 
organizations every year  
A closer examination of the data divided into different organizational forms168 uncovers the role 
foundations play in the time series. The growth of 1991 is a result of the number of foundations 
registered. These organizations (or even their registrations) should have existed at least partially 
already in 1989, since the possibility of establishing foundations opened in 1987 (Kuti, 1998) 
and the HCSO registered 400 functioning foundations already in 1989  (Nagy - Sebestény, 
2008). The annual distribution of the two types changed accordingly: In 1990-1991 the 
proportion of foundations rose to 54 percent then it constantly fell during the period. In 2010, 
26% of the registrations aimed at establishing a foundation. 
Except for 1990 and 1991 association was a more popular form. The gap between the two forms 
narrowed in the late nineties but opened up again in the 2000s. While it seems that registration  
                                                                
168 1989 is exclued from the time series. 
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of associations found its stable level around an annual 2200-2300 (or around 2500 in average 
of the last 5 years), registering foundations became less and less popular after 2005 (Figure 3). 
Figure 6. Number of registrations per year, 1990-2010 associations, and foundations and 
foundations 
   
Data source: (OBH, 2010) 
The cumulative data shows, that although association remained the dominant form, the 
proportion of foundations grew rapidly until 1998, reaching more than one-third (38 
%) of the organizational population. Then, after five years of stagnation, their proportion 
dropped a bit. In 2010, the proportion of foundations was 35% among organizations with active 
registrations.  
The figure on yearly changes (figure 7) provides a more detailed picture of how the trend 
changes. At first, it seems that the first years witnessed the largest changes (an average of 15 
percent decline per year until 1994), and the average fluctuation decreased to less than +/-5 
percent until the end of the period (with the exception of 2008). However, a closer look reveals, 
that although the trend smoothened, there were years, when the ratio of decline compared to the 
previous year was 10 percent or more. The number of new registrations increased with 10 




Figure 7. Yearly change in the number of registrations, % of the previous year 
 
Belonging and registrations by policy and electoral periods 
Belonging to associations and volunteer activities have somewhat contradicting tendencies. 
While the number of memberships in associations has decreased since 1990, it seems that it 
stabilized around 20 percent by 2010. As for organized volunteering, we have two types of data: 
the comparable dataset of the EVS shows a decline (from 16 to 11 percent), while the ESS 
indicates an increase from 9 to 19 percent in the same period. The Hungarian data shows a 
rather stable result, considering that in 2005, activities organized by state institutions were also 
counted. These results are contradicting, and we cannot relate it either to policy, or to electoral 
periods. It seems, that none of these have a direct impact on the changes in belonging to 
associations, and in volunteer activities.  
The case of registering associations is quite different. Although the raw number of registrations 
declines continuously, the steepness of this trend is changing.169 By policy periods, there is a 
clear positive tendency: Although the number of registrations is declining, the extent of the 
average change between years is also declining. Thus, the decline in the average number of 
annual registrations slowed down. By policy-periods, the trend seems straightforward: the first 
                                                                
169 Although none of the two produces statistically significant differences, I think it is worth considering these 




period experienced the largest decline, while the second and third had significantly smaller 
negative changes (table 12). 
Table 12. The annual, average number of registrations and the yearly change in the 
number of registrations by policy periods, 1990-2010 
Policy period Average N/year Average change/year 
1990-1996 6195 -10% 
1997-2003 4059 -4% 
2004-2010 3454.7 -3% 
Table 13. The average number of registrations and the annual change in the number of 
registrations by electoral periods, 1990-2010 
Electoral 
period Average N/year 
Average 
change/year 
1990-1994 6616 -14% 
1994-1998 4892.2 -4% 
1998-2002 3985.4 -7% 
2002-2006 3680.6 -1% 
2006-2010 3362.6 -4% 
The picture is different, if one considers electoral periods: The first couple years had the largest 
number of registrations per year and also, the largest changes between years. Although all other 
electoral periods experienced a less steep decline in the registrations, there are important 
differences among them. After the first electoral period, the third one had the largest average 
fluctuation between years, and also the most decreasing trend. Between 1998 and 2002 there 
was no single year when the year-to-year change was positive. Compared to 1994-1998 the 
1998-2002 period accelerated the decline, while the 2002-2006 period slowed it down. This is 
the only period when the number of registration increased as compared to the previous year 
respectively. Then in the last electoral period (2006-2010), the results deteriorate once again, 
inasmuch as the number of registrations decreases. (table 13) 
The differences in the average yearly change can be partly explained by the political affiliation 
of the government. The first and third governments were conservative, or right-wing oriented, 
while the others considered themselves left-liberal. However, it is important to remember that 
behind the first period’s high average decrease we will find the already existing but re-registered 
which make the number of registrations from the first year seem deceptively high. 
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To sum up, it seems that the trends of belonging decreased in the middle of the period while 
volunteering stagnated or maybe even increased. The number of registrations also decreased 
from 9 to 3 thousand per year. While the trends of belonging and volunteering cannot be tied to 
electoral or policy periods, they contribute to the changes in the numbers of registrations. 
B. Freedom of assembly 
The second set of indicators belongs to activities which fulfill the definition of peaceful 
assemblies provided by Sólyom (2007) and Tallódi (2008).170 These activities cover various 
forms of protest (participation in demonstrations, strikes, occupations), electoral assemblies, 
and religious activities. The selected variables refer to 
As Tallódi (2008) writes, the right to a peaceful assembly could be practiced, for example, in 
relation to politics, sports and religious events. The available data measure a) individual 
participation in political and religious events, b) the number of assemblies. Among political 
gatherings, electoral assemblies, demonstrations, strikes, occupying buildings were asked in a 
way that participation in them is comparable, while religious participation is generally 
measured by the attendance of religious events.171 In discussing the data, I will separate extra-
parliamentary activities, which are activities not necessarily connected to the institutionalized 
channels of representation172, electoral assemblies and participation on religious events.  
As for phrasing the questions, similar phrasing was applied by different research programs. 
Nevertheless, their referred time scale is different. Questions vary from referring to the last 12 
months (ESS) to the last couple years (HES) or ‘ever’ (EVS). Since changing the time frame 
might affects the results, in the tables below I publish their results in separate columns. (Table 
14-Table 17) 
Besides the surveys, I use the data provided by the Police on the number of events that fall 
under the effect of Act III. of 1989 on the Right to Peaceful Assembly. Since this data is 
available only from the second half of the 2000s, I will supplement it with the sporadic data 
collected and published by other scholars.  
                                                                
170 Assemblies require the physical presence of people and should aim to express an opinion publicly. The 
peacefulness of events could be assumed only, since we do not know, what are the exact aims of participants or 
what are the means they used to express their convictions. 
171 Attending religious services could be an indicator of freedom of religion too. The reason I chose this as an 
indicator of freedom of assembly was that under state socialism, attending religious services fell under the same 
category as any other assembly, as it was not welcomed by the regime and it was often similarly suppressed.  
172 In more details, see chapter II.3 
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Demonstrations, occupations and strikes 
Related to protest activities four activities are measured: 1) Attendance or taking part in 
peaceful demonstrations, 2) participating in illegal protests, 3) occupying buildings and 4) 
joining strikes.  
Although from a methodological point of view the comparison is not easy, the data gives little 
room for multiple interpretations. The proportion of the population that participates in different 
forms of extra-parliamentary political action stagnates. Participation in lawful demonstrations 
varies from 2 to 5 percent. The lower ratios belong to a more limited timescale in 2004-2005. 
It seems that in 2006, there is a small increase in the ratio (4 percent) of people attending 
demonstrations.  
Table 14. Forms of political participation between 1991-2010, percentage of adult 
population, various datasets 
 
Years 
Attended/took part in a 
lawful demonstration 
Attended/took 
















months ever ever 
1991 (EVS II) 4     0.1 3173 
1999 (EVS III) 5     0.6 1 
2002 (ESS I)   4  1   
2003 (HES)  4  1    
2004 (ISSP) 5  2     
2005 ESS II   2     
2006 ESS III   4     











2009 HES  4  1    
2010 ESS V   3     
Participation in illegal protests shows a similar trend.  Irrespective of the time scale included in 
the questions, its prevalence is one percent in the entire period.  This is the case after 2008 as 
well when the meaning of “illegal” or non-announced protest changed because of the inclusion 
                                                                
173 In 1990 the Hungarian version was wrongly translated to ’official strike’, later the question was translated as 
’unofficial strike’ in line with the source questionnaire.   
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of spontaneous protest in the legislation, which has broadened the legally guarded possibilities 
of protesters.  
Since EVS, ESS and HES also measure more than one of the above-mentioned variables, they 
allow a limited comparison of an aggregated variable. Although EVS cannot be compared to 
the ESS and HES data, and the latter two are conducted in different years, EVS allows to 
compare its three waves separately and HES and ESS together could be used to examine the 
years between 2002 and 2009.  
The aggregated data from 1990, 1999 and 2008 shows a little decrease in the prevalence of the 
examined activities,174 while the ESS-HES data series show complete stagnation and does not 
reflect on electoral periods, or policy periods at all.    
Table 15. Participation in demonstrations, occupying buildings and strikes, 1991-2008 
percentage of adult population EVS, HES, ESS 
Year Lawful demonstrations, 
occupying buildings, 
strikes 
Lawful and illegal 
demonstrations 
1991 6 (EVS)  
1999 5 (EVS)  
2002  4 (ESS) 
2003 - 4 (HES) 
2008 4 (EVS) 3 (ESS) 
2009 . 4 (HES) 
Electoral assemblies 
Information about participation on electoral assemblies is available only from 2003 and 2008. 
This information is based on the HES and ISSP datasets. It seems, that independently of the 
slightly different measurement methods, the results are similar and show stagnation. However, 
compared to other forms of participation, the prevalence of this activity seems to be relatively 
high.  
Table 16. Attending political or electoral assemblies 
  2003 (HES) 2004 (ISSP) 2008 (HES) 
Participated in a 
political 
assembly 
Ever  7  
Last 12 months  3  
Participated in a political assembly 
during an electoral campaign 9  9 
                                                                




The last category of examination is the attendance of religious events (table 17). It seems that 
the level of participation in religious events has not changed much since 1990. The majority, 
around 65 percent of the population, attends religious events at least once a year. The proportion 
of non-attendants varies between 32 and 43 percent, but the fluctuation of the results does not 
have a clear direction. Right after the transition, attending religious events was more 
fashionable, thus the ratio of people attending such events at least once in a month dropped 
from 23 percent in 1990 to 17-18 percent by the 2000s.175 
Table 17. How often do you attend religious services/events? 1990-2010 percentage of 
adult population 
Year at least once in a month On holidays/couple times a year 
less often 
/maximum 
once a year 
never 
1990 (EVS II) 23 20 23 32 
1999 (EVS III) 18 19 20 43 
2002 (ESS I) 18 23 22 37 
2004 (ISSP) 14 15 34 36 
2005 ESS II 19 17 23 42 
2006 (ESS III) 18 19 23 40 
2008 (HES) 15 22 30 33 
2008 (EVS IV) 15 22 19 43 
2008 (ESS IV) 17 21 28 34 
2010 (ESS V) 18 20 26 37 
The number of assemblies 
Besides the ratio of participants, the number of events qualifies as assemblies could be a proxy 
for examining the practice of the freedom of assembly. There are several sources to take into 
account, however, none of them is complete. One of them is the data provided by the Hungarian 
Police about the number of events falling under the effect of Act III. of 1989 on the Right to 
                                                                
175 In 1999 EVS asked a different question, capturing a sense of commitment to the community as well: “How 
often do you spend time with church?”. A strong commitment is much less frequent then participation in religious 
events. Most of the people (70%) never spend time with their church. Only 16 percent of the respondents assemble 
with their religious community at least once in a month, 15 percent only a few times a year.   
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Peaceful Assembly. These might be protests or any other peaceful, public assemblies. 
Naturally, the data do not include assemblies held on private property (as most religious events) 
and spontaneous protests are probably also missing. 
The second source of data is studies, applying protest-event analysis. (A. Szabó, 2009; Máté 
Szabó, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1998). Protest event analysis usually relies on the media, and it has 
its own methodological problems.176  First of all, the media covers only a minority of the 
events.177 Second, usually, one examines national newspapers. Therefore, most local events are 
missing from these datasets, and the given newspapers might have a strong selection bias based 
on their ideological background or topics of interest (Fillieule - Jiménez, 2003). In the case of 
Hungary, both sources, newspapers and the Police’s data have their shortcomings in their 
coverage of the period. The data provided by the Police, which reports the number of public 
assemblies is available only between 2005 and 2010. Besides, Máté Szabó (1998) analyzes and 
reports such statistics between 1989 and 1993. 
Protest event analysis also provides only sporadic information. While there are a number of 
analyses covering the first quarter of the period, (Máté Szabó, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1998) there 
is much less information from the late 1990s and the 2000s. Andrea Szabó compares the number 
of protests on several topics in 1993 and 2003 (A. Szabó, 2009), while Berki collects the number 
of direct actions organized by trade unions between 1989 and 2010 (Berki, 2000, 2011). 
The results published by different authors and those provided by the Police, summarized in 
table 18, are incomparable for various reasons. First, the definition and scope of the events 
considered are different: Máté Szabó, Andrea Szabó, and Berki examined protest actions, while 
the Police has a wider scope of events. From among events registered with the Police between 
1991 and 1993, only 5-12 percent are considered protests (Máté Szabó, 1998).178 Berki (2000, 
2011) collects actions taken by trade unions, while the other authors focus on other actors, such 
as non-formal social movements, civil society organizations, and sometimes political parties. 
Second, the sources of information are different. As it becomes clear from the data presented 
by Máté Szabó’s articles, the more sources are used, the more events are explored. In various 
                                                                
176 Berki (2000); (Berki, 2011) uses organizational surveys as well to collect data about direct actions. 
Organizational documents are also often used, however the media is the most convenient source of collecting 
comparative e data, despite its strong selection bias. 
177 According to Fillieule and Jiménez (2003) the media covers between two and ten percent of the events.  
178 My own calculations, based on the data presented in table 18.  
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articles, he counts with different numbers of protests for the year 1993: 45, 96 and 148179. The 
difference in the results reflects the difference in the range of sources considered.180 
Thus, instead of comparing the different data, I just examine whether the direction of changes 
has any similarity. It is important to note that since the data is gathered from sources on different 
topics, the results should not be taken as reflecting a general tendency of practicing the freedom 
of assembly. 













1989   122 44  24 
1990   126 55  18 
1991 1629  191 66  22 
1992 1961  112 36  16 
1993 2009 96 148 45 148 26 
1994   44* 26  19 
1995      26 
1996      15 
1997      31 
1998      22 
1999      22 
2000      28 
2001      22 
2002      22 
2003     337 38 
2004      29 
2005 2863     26 
2006 6981     33 
2007 6059     56 
2008 4684     37 
2009 4033     47 
2010 1920     29 
*only until 1 July 1994 
**Calculated from the numbers published (Berki 2011:2). Only such actions are considered 
that imply people assembling (strikes, protests, other collective actions at the workplace). 
                                                                
179 Szabó counts 45 events in (Máté Szabó, 1998) 96 in (Máté Szabó, 1995a) and 148 in (Máté Szabó, 1995b) 




The data reveals two phenomena: First, it seems that compared to the beginning of the period, 
the number of events has risen on every account. This is clear for direct actions on labor issues, 
and concerning the number of events registered with the Police. However, the direction of 
changes is not linear. Thus, the second phenomenon is the fall of the number of protests in the 
early nineties and the small number of direct actions related to labor issues in the middle of the 
period. 
Examining the average and the total number of direct actions of labor issues by electoral and 
policy periods, reveals that the growth is rather continuous, especially when we count the 
average number of annual events by electoral periods (table 19). However, the differences 
between the first three periods are rather small, while that between the third and fourth and the 
last two periods is rather significant. 
Table 19. Annual, average number of direct actions by electoral periods and the total 
number of direct actions per electoral periods.    
Electoral period Average number of direct 
actions/year* 
Total number of direct 
actions* 
1990-1994 20.2 101 
1994-1998 22.6 113 
1998-2002 23.2 116 
2002-2006 29.6 148 
2006-2010 40.4 202 
* overlapping years are included in both periods 
data source: (Berki, 2011) 
The results are similar if policy periods are examined. The average annual number of events 
was 20.3 between 1990 and 1996. 26.4 in the second period and 36.7 between 2004 and 2010. 
There is apparently a growth after 1996. Since the second period contains four years with the 
lowest number of actions (22/year), the growth compared to the previous period is mainly 
thanks to three years (1997, 2000 and 2003) with a higher number of events. In the last policy-
period, differences between individual years could be significant, however, the lowest number 
of events is 26, higher than in most of the years between 1997 and 2003. 
Although it is not possible to conduct such an analysis with the number of events falling under 
Act III. on the Right to Peaceful Assembly, the sudden spike between 2005 and 2006, from 
2863 to 6981 events, is striking. Later on, the number of events return to a level similar to those 
of the early 1990s or 2005.  
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These results suggest that the number of events is influenced by political turmoils and the 
relationship between civil society and the state. Around 1990, general political turmoils caused 
by the transition affected trade unions: former socialist mass unions had to re-organize 
themselves, and new grass-roots organizations emerged, which could take a relatively active 
role in demonstrations (András Tóth - Neumann, 2010). According to Máté Szabó (1995b), 
trade unions organized 23-30 percent of protest events between 1989 and 1994.181 Berki (2000)  
further examined the trends of direct actions organized by trade unions. Their activity peaked 
first in 1997 and fell back afterward. This is in line with Tóth and Neumann’s assertion (2010) 
that trade unions and their large confederations consolidated during the 90s, whereas grass-
roots movements vanished and the main tool of interest representation was to participate in 
established forums of social dialogue. In the 2000s the situation has changed and unions once 
again became more active in organizing extra-parliamentary actions. After 2003, they were 
more active in general than in the early nineties (Berki, 2011). 
The results regarding protests and the number of events registered with the Police reflects a 
return to contentious politics after 2006. While the beginning of the 1990s saw the 
institutionalization of the formerly informal and politicized civil society, the stabilization of 
institutions gave space to the birth of the non-profit sector (Glózer, 2008; Kuti, 1998). State 
policies and the lack of small-scale services pushed organizations to become service providers 
either working together with state institutions or providing services themselves. Thus, the 
period between 1995 and 2005 was the most silent in this regard in the last twenty years. In 
2006 a political crisis brought back contention, mostly on the right. Between 2006 and 2009 the 
annual number of registered gatherings (protests among them) was at least one and a half times 
more than in 2005. Data from the Hungarian Police also suggests that the number of protests 
suddenly increased in 2006, as a consequence of the non-public speech of the Prime Minister 
that leaked out in September.182 In 2005 there were 2863 events,183 while there were 6981 in 
2006 (almost two-thirds of them (4497) took place in September, October or November). Until 
                                                                
181 1989 and 1991 were exceptional in this regard: in these years, only 15-16 percent of the events were organized 
by trade unions. (Máté Szabó, 1995b:63).  
182 The speech was held on 17th September, 2006 in a non-public meeting of the ruling party (MSZP), a couple of 
months after national and a couple of weeks before local elections. The re-elected prime minister said that they 
had lied and that they had not governed in the last four years. The speech leaked out and led to protests. 
183 Not all of these events are protests. Some have been announced under the effect of the Act III of 1989 on the 
right to Peaceful Assembly. These events can be protests, but any cultural events as well. For example, in 2005, 
almost half of them were organized in March, probably as a commemoration of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-
1849. Figures are based on the information provided by the ORFK (2010)  
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2010, the number of registered events returned to the level of 2005.184 It is also possible that in 
2002 and 2006 the mass movement of Civic Circles185 (organized by Fidesz) or their 
demonstrations in 2006 influenced the figures. This is supported by a survey conducted in 2014 
(Fokasz et al., 2014), people indicated that they remember 2006 as a year with an increased 
number of protests.  
As a summary, we can state that on the one hand, the proportion of people practicing the 
freedom of assembly stagnated through the examined period, at least this is suggested by 
the results, after examining extra-parliamentary activities, electoral assemblies and attending 
religious events. On the other hand, the number of events might rose throughout the period 
and especially after 2002. Not only the more open nature of governance could contribute to 
the rising number of events, but the return of contentious politics as Fidesz started to organize 
its civic movement and fostered by the upheaval of the autumn of 2006. 
C. Freedom of expression 
Freedom of expression is practiced both publicly and in the private sphere. The well-embedded 
forms of anti-politics (see the Havelian or Konradian understanding of civil society in Chapter 
I.2) shows, that one of the crucial questions is whether people are able to express their views 
inside and outside of the close circles of family and friends. One way to avoid conflicts is to 
express views and thoughts as expected by others, while another is to avoid talking about 
politics at all. Democratization suggests that people start discussing public issues more openly, 
thus they will start to talk about politics not only in their private circles but also with their less 
close acquaintances. 
Therefore, in the case of the freedom of expression, organized or public and non-formal or 
private forms of exercising the freedom of expression should be distinguished. The organized 
forms of expression of opinions are related to established institutions, such as media outlets, or 
at least requires some actor organizing a collective action. These organized or public forms 
could be divided into two groups: 
                                                                
184 In 2007, there were 6059 events, whereas there were 4684 in 2008, 4033 in 2009, and 1920 in 2010. (source: 
ORFK, 2010, 2014) 
185 In 2002, FIDESZ lost the national elections. After the elections, they organized a mass assembly, where the 
Prime Minister announced the foundation of a movement, called Civic Circles and asked people to form small 
clubs, associations and circles everywhere around the country. The movement was the basis of mobilization for 
the following years, but it lost its significance later. (Gerő - Kopper, 2013) 
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1. Collective actions without the physical presence that assemblies require, such as 
signing petitions, boycotting or buying certain products because of political/ideological 
reasons, donating money, wearing political symbols. 
2. Individual actions, such as expressing an opinion by writing an article or comment, 
calling into a radio show, voting or commenting by SMS on a television show.  
Private forms of expression are measured by the extent and frequency of people talking about 
politics with their family, friends, acquaintances outside their family, as well as with their 
neighbors or co-workers. 
Public or organized activities will be examined mostly by using EVS, HES and ESS. The 
differences between the questions used by the various datasets are similar to those between 
questions relating to the freedom of assembly. Some of the questions refer to the last 12 months 
(ESS), to the last couple year (HES) or “ever” (EVS). Since changing the time frame might 
affect the results, I publish them in separated columns in the table below (table 20). In the case 
of donations, the results of published research will also be taken into account (Czakó et al., 
1995; Czike - Kuti, 2006), while the extent and frequency of people talking about politics will 
be explored on the basis of EVS and HES.  
The two datasets are different. EVS asks only about talking about politics with friends, while 
HES applies a more diverse setting, which enables me to examine the gaps between private 
sphere (family and friends) and more public networks (co-workers and neighbors).  
Organized and public forms of expressing opinions 
Among organized activities, the most prevalent is to ‘sign a petition’. However, the exact result 
of measurement is strongly influenced by the time frame the question refers to. The highest 
proportion is measured when the referenced frame is “ever” (15-18 percent). As the time frame 
gets shorter, the proportion of people signing a petition also gets lower: when it is a couple of 
years, the level of participation falls to 8-9 percent and when the question refers to the last 12 
months it falls to (3-9 percent).  
In the direction of changes there is a further difference: EVS, which measures the highest ratio 
throughout the period, detects a decline in signing petitions between 1990 and 1999. After 1999, 
neither EVS nor ISSP 2004 show any significant change in the results. HES, which has three 
data points in the 2000s detects a stagnating trend of 8-9 percent throughout the decade. 
However, the trends of signing a petition in the “last 12 months” (ESS and ISSP) shows a more 
fluctuating trend between 2002 and 2010. The ratio of people signing a petition is the lowest in 
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2002 and in 2010, while a higher ratio is found in 2004-2006. ISSP 2004 measured a nine 
percent prevalence, which suits the trend of growth and decline. However, the results might be 
positively influenced by the topic of the questionnaire, which focuses on citizenship (table 20). 
Table 20. Signing a petition and wearing a political symbol, 1990-2010 percentage of 
adult population 
 signed a petition 
 
worn or displayed 
political signs 








1990 (EVS II) 18     
1999 (EVS III) 15     
2002 (ESS I)   4  3 
2003 (HES)  8  3  
2004 (ISSP) 16  9   
2005 (ESS II)   7  1 
2006 (ESS III)   6  3 
2008 (HES)  8    
2008 (EVS IV) 15     
2008 (ESS IV)   7 2 1 
2009 (HES)  9  2  
2010 (ESS V)   3  3 
Measuring the form of ‘Wearing or displaying political symbols’, which might indicate a closer 
affiliation to a political party or group, clearly indicates stagnation if we consider it on a broader 
time scale. The ups and downs of the narrower timescale are probably the results of electoral 
cycles (the proportion of those wearing such symbols is higher in election years).  
Another public form of expressing opinions is participation in ‘boycotts or conscious 
consumption’. Its examination reveals two surprising phenomena: First, results regarding 
boycotts vary in a quite wide range among different surveys, but results do not reflect the 
phrasing of the questions, or at least not the way it is expected. In case the question is phrased 
for the ‘last couple years’ or ‘last 12 months’, prevalence is higher than when ‘ever’ is used. 
The importance of the applied time frame is supported by that results are changing by the 
various research programs. Each of them measures the similar prevalence of conscious 
consumption in different time points, only the EVS measures two-three percent while ESS and 
HES measures five to seven percent.186 
                                                                
186 The solution may lie in the slightly different questions. EVS used the laconic phrase “joining in boycotts” while 
ESS and HES explained the term a bit. Both questionnaires used the same items: “Deliberately haven’t bought, 
boycotted certain products?” The ISSP-citizenship applied an extended question, that was narrower in other way, 
161 
 
Assuming that the difference depends mostly from the phrasing of the question and that it would 
be similar in the early nineties as well, we could argue that the overall participation in boycotts 
can be around six percent, and it has a stable prevalence since the transition. 
Table 21. Joining boycotts and buying certain products, 1990-2010, percentage of adult 
population 















1990 (EVS II) 2     
1999 (EVS III) 3     
2002 (ESS I)   5  10 
2003 (HES)  6  7  
2004 (ISSP) 5  3   
2005 (ESS II)   5   









2008/9(ESS IV)   6   
2009 (HES)  7  8  
2010 (ESS V)   6   
The second “surprise” is the prevalence of conscious consuming. It is among the most prevalent 
forms of expressing opinions. The data is missing from the 1990s, but through the 2000s it was 
between 7-10 percent. According to ESS 2002, a greater proportion of people participated in 
conscious consuming in the ‘last 12 months’ than later, in the ‘last couple years’.187 The 
phrasing of the question was the same and the surrounding questions were similar. In 
accordance with that, this form of expressing an opinion slightly decreased after the beginning 
of the 2000s. 
Thus, the forms that fit into the collective action category seem to produce a more or less 
stagnating trend. However, we might presume that electoral cycles have an influence on the 
                                                                
as it related the action of boycotting to political, ethical or environmental reasons. Besides, it inquired ‘boycotting’ 
and ‘buying’ certain products in one and the same item. 
187 In the results of 2002 a large-scale boycott from 2001 might be reflected. In 2001 Danone was about to close a 
popular sweets factory located in Győr with a long-standing tradition (Győri Kekszgyár). The boycott received a 
nation-wide attention and was supported even by celebrities (see Danone Bojkott (Danone Boycott)  
http://tudatosvasarlo.hu/cikk/danone-bojkott last accessed: 11/11/2018.) 
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‘wearing of political symbols’. Besides, the early 1990s might exhibit a higher prevalence of 
signing petitions. Aside from that, another clear influence is not identifiable.  
Donations  
Philanthropy or any activity involving donations is usually a subject treated separately from 
other forms of participation. In the following pages, I will refer to philanthropic activities such 
as individual donations in cash or donations-in-kind to civil or political organizations, the 
church, people or to a cause. Similarly to volunteering, I will examine organizational and 
informal forms of philanthropy. 
Similarly to volunteering, various definitions of philanthropy were meant under items asked by 
different research projects. This led to significantly different results. First of all, there were two 
research projects, already cited above (Czakó et al., 1995; Czike - Kuti, 2006)(Czakó et. al 
1995, Czike-Kuti 2006) focusing on volunteering and philanthropy in 1993 and 2004 
respectively. Apart from ESS 2002, ISSP Citizenship also asked about donating money to 
organizations. 
The definition of philanthropy that was applied is again too different for a simple comparison: 
While ESS and ISSP understand philanthropy as donating to organizations (both civic and 
political), the projects from 1994 and 2004 understood philanthropy in broader terms (including 
volunteering as well): “We treated those individuals as philanthropist, who supported 
individuals outside of their kinship relations and closer friendship circle or foundations, 
associations, churches or state institutions with contribution-in-kind (clothes, food, books, toys, 
etc.) or money” (Czike - Kuti, 2006:78).  
Czike and Kuti (2006) distinguish between donations in cash and donations-in-kind. 
Donations in cash are also divided into three forms: ‘direct fundraising’ (giving money to 
beggars, money boxes in churches or at public venues etc.), ‘philanthropy fairs’, or buying 
products to help a cause (e.g. postcards) and ‘organizational fundraising’ when people give 
money to an organization directly. They note that these forms are not mutually exclusive or in 
competition with each other. They often overlap (e.g. money boxes in churches can also be 
treated as organizational fundraising). 
Different approaches taken by surveys produce different results once again. The two research 
projects of 1993 and 2004 measure the importance of philanthropy to a much higher degree, 
since they consider not only organizational donations, but all sorts. The overall ratio of the 
population that took part in philanthropic deeds was almost sixty (58) percent in 1993 and 
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almost seventy-five in 2004. (74%). In 2004, 48 percent of the adult population contributed to 
a cause or helped with donations-in-kind. (Czike - Kuti, 2006). 
Direct fundraising mobilized most of the population, (55 %) followed by philanthropy fairs 
(39%). Only 21% of the population supported organizations, although this group gave almost 
half of all of the amount of donations reported by the respondents (47%). 
Czike and Kuti (2006) do not distinguish between different organizational spheres, since the 
border between them is not clear and citizens are often not able to differentiate between 
churches and religious organizations on the one hand, and non-profit and governmental 
institutions on the other. ESS and ISSP asked about donations to voluntary organizations – 
again not necessarily distinguishing between churches and religious organizations, but 
excluding state institutions. According to these datasets, about 6-9 percent of the population 
took part in any kind of fundraising activity in 2002 and 2004. Taking their different question-
designs into account,188the difference between ESS and ISSP seems reasonable. The scale of 
donating money measured by these two surveys is similar and much lower than what Czike and 
Kuti found. Differentiation by the subject of donation corroborates the claim that the 13-15 
percent difference between the prevalence of donations measured by ESS, ISSP and the results 
published by Czike and Kuti is related to the fact that they operationalized organized and non-
organized activities differently. However, when various researches measure donations to 
political parties and groups, their results are similar. For example, HES measured 1 to 2 
percent189 between 2003 and 2009, and Czike and Kuti (2006) also estimated the size of the 
group donating money to such organizations around one percent (0.8%) in 2004. 
The frequency of donating gives insight into practicing this form of actions. Probably two ways 
of measurement this frequency come to mind: The proportion of those who support more than 
one cause, or the activity and the amount of the donation. Unfortunately, there is only one 
dataset that measures the support for more than one cause, (ESS 2002), thus, I cannot identify 
changes in this regard.190  
Measuring the amount of donations is also difficult, as there are too many uncertainties 
involved. Although I have data from the two surveys of 1993 and 2004 concerning individuals, 
                                                                
188 ISSP Citizenship asked about donating and participating in fund-raising activities as well. 
189 2 percent in 2003, 0.8 percent in 2008 and 2.2 percent in 2009. 




and from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office concerning the organizational and sectorial191 
levels, the amount people give probably depends on different economic factors. Furthermore, 
simply the amount of money would tell us little. It should be contrasted to inflation, GDP 
growth and a variety of other factors. Even then, many uncertainties would remain. 
Therefore, it might be more appropriate to only measure the types of donations people give: 
that is money (cash), and in-kind. Czike and Kuti (2006) note that it is not only the ratio of 
philanthropists that has grown, but also of those that offer support through both of these types 
(table 22). 
Table 22. Extent and types of donations in 1993 and 2004, percentage of the adult 
population* 
Type of donation 1993 2004 
Only in cash 24 27 
Only donation-in-kind 13 8 
Both 22 39 
*My calculation is based on the data provided by Czike and Kuti (2006:169) 
By 2004, the proportion of people providing both forms of donations got larger than that of 
those providing only one type of support. 
From 1993 to 2004, engagement in philanthropic activities became more frequent. Among 
people giving donations-in-kind, the ratio of occasional donors slightly decreased, whereas the 
ratio of those, who gave donations at least every half year increased. I do not have the exact 
figures concerning donations in cash from 1993 and 2004, but it seems that the proportion of 
those, offering donations regularly (once in a year, once every six months or monthly) has 
increased. Meanwhile, the number of weekly donors decreased (table 23). 
Table 23. The frequency of different types of donations, 1993 and 2004, percentage of 
the respondents 
 donations-in-kind donations in cash 
 1993 2004 1993 2004 




to individuals and 
organizations 
At one specific 
occasion 11 4 15 16 9 
occasionally, but 
several times 53 50 60 34 46 
                                                                
191 The non-profit sector is the sectorial level  
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regularly, once in a 
year 14 13 7 17 15 
regularly, in every 
half year 16 23 10 11 15 
regularly, monthly 5 8 6 11 11 
regularly, weekly 1 3 2 11 5 
source: Czike-Kuti 2006: 169, 170 and table 3 and 4, numbers are rounded.  
The 1% system  
Since 1997, Hungarian citizens can designate one percent of their income-tax to non-profit 
organizations. Some studies discuss the 1% system together with donations (for example Czike 
- Kuti, 2006), however, it is well noted that tax designations differs significantly from 
donations. While donating is an act, where the individuals offer their own property, designation 
of the 1% of someone’s income tax is an act, where individuals only decide the fate of a public 
good that already belongs to the state. Nevertheless, the act of such a designation may incite a 
feeling of having donated, even if not in the classical sense, and it might curb motivations for 
donating in the classical sense (Mészáros - Sebestény, 2000; Mészáros et al., 2000). According 
to Czike and Kuti (2006) this does not seem to be the case. Apparently, the two acts strengthen 
each other. For me, the main question is not whether the one percent is a donation, but whether 
citizens feel that by deciding its fate they practice their rights to express an opinion. By going 
through the studies concerning the ‘one percent law’, I could not find a reference to the freedom 
of expression. Only the title of a book (Mészáros et al., 2000) and a study by Vajda and Kuti 
(2000) refer to the designation as a kind of “voting” about public goods and civil organizations 
by citizens. The note that since the decision is not about their own property, citizens only weigh 
the “charm and usefulness of possible beneficiaries’ aims and activities. In accordance with 
that, decisions concerning the one percent can be seen as a “poll” which result reflects the 
citizen’s opinion of civil organizations” (Vajda - Kuti, 2000:16). 
There is another uncertainty, namely that the one percent system is only partly public. While 
the public sees only the results of the designation, the act of designating itself is anonymous. 
Although this is often the case for other acts of expressing opinions (especially donations) this 
is not a principle. Despite these ambiguities, I tend to accept that designating one percent of the 
income tax is a form of expressing an opinion since the aggregated results of designations might 
be considered as a form of public support for an organization or a cause.  
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Tax designation shows the greatest development through the years among all forms of 
expressing one’s opinion: in 1997, one million taxpayers designated their one percent to civil 
organizations, while in 2010 1.8. million. (NAV, 2011) 
The growth of beneficiaries is also almost linear. Between 1997 and 2010, the number of 
supported organizations increased from 15,949 to 30,701. The ratio of growth is higher than the 
growth of non-profit organizations in Hungary, which can be read as a sign of growing 
consciousness about civil society organizations.  
Freedom of expression in the media 
The last organized form of expression that is discussed here that of communicating through the 
media. This category includes writing articles or comments, giving an interview, calling a radio 
show or voting and commenting in a text message. 
I have comparable data about these forms of participation from three years (2003, 2008, 2009), 
thanks to the Hungarian Election Studies. The ISSP Citizenship dataset contains similar 
variables, but it is comparable only with regards to offline activity (table 24.).  










Wrote an article or comment 2  2 2 
Contacted a journalist to express an opinion in 
a newspaper or on the radio 
 4   
Expressed an opinion in online newsrooms, 
portals, political forums 
 2 2 2 
Called a radio show 3  2 2 
Voted or commented by SMS in a tv- show 7  4 4 
The ratio of active citizens is similar throughout the six years period and remains around two 
or three percent for each form of expression. The solitary exception is voting or commenting 
by text message, which reached seven percent in 2003. Although this last form is still the most 
performed activity, its prevalence is declining and it was less frequent at the end of the decade 
than it was earlier despite the rapid diffusion of cell phones.192 
  
                                                                
192 The first cell-phone service in Hungary was offered from 1990. In 2011, 80% of the population owned a cell 
phone. (Pintér, 2011) 
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Freedom of expression in the family, among friends and acquaintances   
The extent of practicing the freedom of expression in the private sphere may be even more 
important and tells us more about the milieu of a country, than the prevalence of more formal 
ways of doing so. As I mentioned in chapter I.2, prior to 1989, Hungarians withdrew themselves 
into their closed circles of family and close friends. In contrast with the socialist rule, it is 
expected that in times of freedom, people will open themselves up and that they establish more 
heterogeneous relations and start speaking about public issues. A possible way of confirming 
these expectations is to ask people how often they talk about politics with their different 
acquaintances and how often they try to persuade friends about their opinions, especially 
concerning political issues. 
In the selected datasets, various forms and questions are available for measurement. EVS and 
HES measure how often respondents discuss politics with their friends, and how often they try 
to persuade them about their political views. Unfortunately, most of the data is from the 2000s, 
and only EVS provides data from the 1990s, and as mentioned only about friends. But even this 
limited data provides a striking picture of how the number of people discussing politics with 
their friends decreased after 1990 (table 25). During the events of the transition, politics was an 
interesting topic. The sudden changes in the political structure and the new experience of 
speaking about public issues without the threat of any retaliation is very well reflected in the 
data. As the value of novelty passed and people started to experience the sometimes harsh 
features of politics, it lost its charm. As a consequence, in 1999 almost twice as many people 
claimed (24 vs 46 percent) that they never talk about politics with their friend. The proportion 
of people talking about politics on a regular basis also decreased (from 22 to 10 percent). 
The 2000s exhibit a process of opening up. The proportion of people that ‘never talk about 
politics’ decreased to 37-38 percent. While the ratio of people that ‘frequently discuss politics’ 
has remained similar to what it was in 1999. The amount of those that ‘talk about politics 
occasionally’ also increased. It seems that those who really wanted to talk about politics 
maintained their behavior throughout the period, while for the less engaged citizens, it takes 
time to find politics interesting again. 
Discussing politics and persuading others are somewhat different activities. The latter requires 
more commitment to an opinion and some confidence in its correctness. The question about 
persuading others also refers not only to friends but also to acquaintances, colleagues and 
sometimes kins (in 2004), which makes an exact comparison problematic. EVS in 1990 asked 
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people about persuading friends, kins, acquaintances, and colleagues about any opinion – not 
exclusively politics – and not unsurprisingly only 11 percent of the population responded that 
they never tried that, whereas 30 percent stated that they often try to do so. In the 2000s the 
questions referred to politics. Since 2003, around half of the respondents claimed that they never 
tried to persuade others about their political opinions and 6-8 percent responded that they try to 
do so frequently. Among the remaining 40-45 percent, a greater proportion seldom, whereas a 
smaller number tries to persuade others sometimes (Table 26.) 













frequently 22 10 14 8 11 
occasionally 54 44 43 56 51 
never 24 46 43 37 38 
Table 26. If you have an unequivocal opinion about a political issue, how often do you 










Frequently 8 6 7 6 
Sometimes 13 19 15 17 
Seldom 23 26 25 29 
Never 56 49 53 49 
The Hungarian Election Studies applied a more diverse methodology. They asked separately, 
how often people discuss politics within their family, with their friends, further acquaintances, 
their neighbors and (ex)colleagues. In 2003, they asked the question in general and referring 
to times around elections, probably in order to filter the effects of elections.193 In 2008, the 
question referred to ‘time around elections’ while in 2009 the general question was phrased 
without specifying the context.   
As the figures (8-9) show, more people talk about politics among family members and close 
friends than outside these closed circles. This is valid for 2003, 2008 as well as 2009, however, 
the ratio of those that never discuss politics decreased between 2003 and the end of the decade. 
A comparison of the two figures reveals that the situation has an effect on the extent of 
discussing politics outside the family and friends. The proportion of people, who do not discuss 
                                                                
193 2002 was an electoral year in Hungary. 
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politics even with their family and friends in general, is similar to the ratio of those who do not 
talk around elections either. Outside of the close circles, significantly fewer people discuss 
politics. For example, in 2003, 59 percent of the respondents claimed that they do not discuss 
politics with their colleagues, while during election periods the respective figure is five percent 
higher. I find similar differences with regard to neighbors (69 versus 75 percent). The 
differences between discussing politics in general and around elections with colleagues and 
neighbors show similar characteristics in 2008-2009 as well. While in 2009 52-54 percent of 
the respondents answered that they never discuss politics with their colleagues or neighbors, 
when the question includes elections the figure is 58 and 68 percent, respectively. 
Between 2003 and 2008-2009, the ratio of people discussing politics has increased. This holds 
for discussing politics in general as well as around elections. This increase affects the proportion 
of people ‘seldom’ discussing politics, while the overall proportion of people discussing politics 
‘often’ remains roughly the same. 
The trends of practicing the freedom of expression might be the most difficult aspect to evaluate 
based on policy periods or electoral cycles since most of the data is sporadic. It seems, however, 
that there are two directions of changes: Participation in organized and collective actions seems 
to stagnate in most cases, with the exception of donations and designating the 1%. The 
prevalence of these two forms (especially the latter) is growing throughout the period. 
Designation of the 1% is related to a policy action, although its growth is linear since its 
introduction, regardless of electoral cycles or policy periods. As for donations, I am only able 
to identify the growth between 1993 and 2004, but I could not connect this to any policy or 
electoral periods. 
Private forms of expressing opinions have non-linear change. It seems, that the events of 1989-
1990 contributed to the temporary vitalization of discussing politics. A setback followed this 
exceptional period, after which, in the 2000s a slow opening was experienced. Since the data 
from the 2000s starts in 2003, I cannot be sure whether this is due to the relative openness of 
political opportunity structures. 
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Figure 8.  How often do you discuss politics with… 2003 and 2009, Hungarian Election 
Studies, percentage of the adult population 
 
Figure 9.  How often do you discuss politics or elections with… at the time of elections? 




D. Taking part in public affairs 
Based on Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a citizen has 
the right to take part in elections, to be elected, and to influence politics directly or through a 
representative. There are well-established institutions that provide the means to practice such a 
right, such as national and local elections, national and local referenda, as well as popular 
initiatives. A less institutionalized way of practicing this right is to contact politicians when an 
issue comes to mind, going to their office hours or writing letters to them. 
The data about participation in elections can easily be accessed through the website of the 
Hungarian National Election Office.194 The extent of participation in national referenda is also 
accessible for the entire period, however, data on local referenda is published only since 1999. 
Due to this and the different nature of national and local referenda (thus, participation in local 
popular votes indicates practice for only a settlement or a county), I will use only the number 
of local referenda and disregard turnout rates in the examination. 
For agenda initiatives, since their aim is to put a question on the agenda of the Parliament, the 
number of initiatives is in itself a relevant indicator. However, both the data about referenda 
and initiatives have a shortcoming. In their case, mostly it is only the number of successful 
initiatives (in the case of which the necessary number of signatures were collected) is available. 
The case is better for national referenda, since secondary literature refers to cases in which the 
number of necessary signatures was not collected or the initiative was withdrawn (Gulyás, 
1999) and the National Election Office releases the number of initiated referenda by electoral 
periods. For local referenda and agenda initiatives, the only available annual data was published 
by Kukorelli (2009), who does not differentiate between local and national causes or between 
referenda and initiatives. 
Contacting a politician was frequently measured by surveys in a comparable way, such as the 
European Social Survey and the Hungarian Election Study195 in the 2000s. In their case, only 
the time frame is different. As in other forms of participation, the ESS asks the question with 
reference to the last 12 months, while HES does it for the past few years. 
                                                                
194 Választások, Népszavazások (Elections, Referenda): http://www.valasztas.hu/valasztasok-szavazasok last 
accessed 11/11/2018. 
195 ISSP citizenship in 2004 also applies a question on contacting a politician. However, because of the different 
design and the varying results, I decided to exclude this data from the analysis. 
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In the following section, I firstly provide a review on the participation in national elections and 
referenda, secondly on the number of local referenda and popular initiatives, focusing on the 
2000s. Finally, I introduce the figures of contacting a politician between 2002 and 2010. 
Participation in elections and referenda 
Between 1989 and 2010, there were six national and local elections and six national 
referenda.196 In 2004, the country joined the European Union, thus in 2004 and 2009, 
additionally there were European Parliamentary elections (only party lists). 
Electoral participation is probably the most thoroughly examined political activity of 
Hungarians. For example, the whole Hungarian Election Studies program is designed to study 
voting behavior.197 Longitudinal studies, analyzing how and why Hungarians vote are available 
(Angelusz - Tardos, 2005; Karácsony, 2009; Kern - Szabó, 2011; Kmetty, 2013). Most of these 
studies note that although the extent of participation in any kind of elections or popular votes is 
much higher than any other forms of participation, it is ranked as low and in European 
comparison and similar to figures of other countries’ in the Central and Eastern European region 
(Angelusz - Tardos, 1996, 2005). 
Parliamentary elections always had a higher voter turnout than local elections. Participation in 
the former always exceeded the latter by at least 10 percent.198 The direction of trends, however, 
is different: The participation in local elections increased from 40 to 53 percent until 2006 and 
fell back to 46.6 in 2010. Participation in national elections shows stability: with one 
exceptional year, 1998, participation is around 65-70%. Interestingly, the setback in 1998 is 
followed by the highest level of participation in 2002. In comparison with the election in 2002, 
voter turnout decreased both in 2006 and in 2010. 
Voter turnout for national referenda fluctuates even more than for national or local elections. 
199. In 1990, only 14 percent of those eligible participated, while in 1989 and in 2008, more than 
                                                                
196 These were: the four yes referenda (Négyigenes népszavazás) in 1989; the referendum on the election of the 
President in 1990; the referendum on joining the NATO in 1997; the referendum on joining the European Union 
in 2003; the referendum on introducing a patient’s fee in the Health care System and on the double citizenship for 
Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries in 2004; the referendum on health care fees and tuition fees in 2008.  
197 See the homepage: http://www.valasztaskutatas.hu/kiadvanyok-en/view?set_language=en (last accessed: 2015. 
11.10.) 





50 percent. Voter turnout at the two European Parliamentary elections are quite similar (table 
27). 
Table 27. Participation in elections and national referenda in Hungary 1989-2010, 












1989    58 
1990 65.1 40.2  14 
1994 68.9 43.4   
1997    49.2 
1998 56.3 45.7   
2002 70.5 51.1   
2003    45.6 
2004   38.5 37.5 
2006 67.8 53.1   
2008    50.5 
2009   36.3  
2010 64.4 46.6   
Source: National Electoral Office (www.valasztas.hu) 
*The table contains those years only, in which an election or referendum were held.  
**First rounds of elections 
The number of initialized referenda and popular initiatives could give a more precise picture 
about the scope of the intentions to participate in public issues. The number of such initiatives 
(agenda initiatives and referenda) between 1990 and 2008 is collected by Kukorelli (2009). For 
the period of 1990 and 1997, Gulyás (1999) collects the initiatives that lacked the necessary 
number of signatures to be processed or those that were opposed by the National Electoral 
Committee or the Constitutional court. He lists 9 attempts of referenda. Only two of these led 
to actual referenda, in 1990 and 1997 respectively. 
The tools of direct democracy were less frequently used in the first half of the period, while 
more and more frequently after 2002 (Kukorelli, 2009). The year 2006 seems to be a breaking 
point in this regard. Between 2006 and 2007, the growth of the number of initiated actions was 
more than 700%. Although, it is worth to note that the numbers had already been increasing 
before. In 2002 and in 2005, there was also a significant growth as compared to the previous 




Table 28. The number of initiated national referenda votes and agenda initiatives 
Year No* 
% of growth 
compared to the 
previous year 
1989–1997 10 - 
1998 4 - 
1999 8 100% 
2000 0 -100% 
2001 7 - 
2002 18 157% 
2003 25 39% 
2004 9 -64% 
2005 28 211% 
2006 48 71% 
2007 385 702% 
2008 261 -32% 
Total 803 - 
  Source: Kukorelli (2009) 
  *my calculation 
 
Local popular votes 
The National Election Office released200 the number of initiated referenda by electoral periods 
since 2002. According to their statistics, between 2002 and 2006 there have been 100 initiated 
referenda, while between 2006 and 2010 there were 1022 (NVI, 2018b). However, the yearly 
distribution of this data is not available and I do not have data on popular initiatives, this also 
indicates a significant growth after 2006.201 
The number of local popular votes or local referenda is also released by the National Election 
Office since 1999.202 This data is also discussed by Kukorelli (2009) and (Adrienn Tóth, 2012). 
Tamás (2014) also examined the frequency of popular votes, although only for three selected 
periods. The novelty of her research was to examine local referenda in the early 1990s as well. 
                                                                
200 Statistics from (NVI, 2018b) 
201 The composition of actors initiating referenda has probably also transformed. Until 2006, the main actors behind 
attempts of initiating referenda were mostly political parties or the government. However, this must have changed 
with the increasing number of attempts. 
202 (NVI, 2018a) 
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Thus, Tamás selected the periods of 1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2007-2009.203 This is the only 
research, which reports data from the nineties. According to Tamás, there were 79 local 
referenda in the period of 1991-1993 (2014:148). 
Table 29. Local referenda 1999-2010 
Year N Valid and successful 
1999 15 8 
2000 21 7 
2001 15 13 
2002 9 7 
2003 22 13 
2004 22 10 
2005 19 11 
2006 19 9 
2007 5 3 
2008 27 19 
2009 23 11 
2010 8 6 
Összesen 205 117 
            Source:  (Kukorelli, 2009; NVI, 2018a) 
Table 29 shows a different picture than those on national referenda. The numbers fluctuate and 
it is hard to identify a clear direction. On the one hand, the early 2000s seem to be less intense 
than the early nineties. On the other hand, the number of referenda is growing (although some 
years experience an exceptionally low number of initiated referenda).  
By examining the average number of initiated national referenda, agenda initiatives and local 
referenda per year in electoral cycles (table 30), I can clearly differentiate between the trends 
regarding national and local actions: The number of initiated referenda on the national level 
increased between 2002-2006 and even more after the political crisis of 2006. During the 2000s 
the annual mean number of local referenda is lower than in the early 90s. Between 2002 and 
2006, it increased a bit, but it decreased once again in the last electoral period (table 30). 
                                                                
203 It is important to note that the source of her data is somewhat different due to a different method of data 
collection and sources. In the second period, the author mentions 58 referenda, while the Election Office’s data 
mentions only 51. 
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Table 30. The average number of national and popular votes/year by electoral cycles. 
Electoral cycle National popular votes and 
agenda initiatives 
Local popular votes  
1990-1994  26.3 
1994-1998   
1998-2002 7.4 15 
2002-2006 25.6 18.2 
2006-2010 231 16.4 
Contacting a politician 
Contacting a politician or a representative is a primary way of getting involved in public 
issues. In every measurement, its prevalence is around 10 percent or even higher. ESS data 
shows that in election years (2002, 2006, 2010) contacting a politician becomes even more 
prevalent. In line with earlier research, (Róbert - Szabó, 2017), results of the HES seem less 
dependent on elections. In accordance with both datasets, the extent of this practice seems 
stable. It changes by three to five percent in electoral cycles, but it does not grow or decrease 
in a linear direction (table 31). 
Table 31. In the last 12 months, have you contacted a politician, elective, representative, 
of the local or national government, 2002-2010, ESS, percentage of adult population 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Contacted a politician 15% 10% 13% 9% 12% 
N 1603 1427 1450 1499 1529 
Unfortunately, data is available only from the 2000s and from periods under the reign of two 
left-wing governments. However, it is quite clear that even the turmoils of 2006 did not have a 
permanent effect on the number of people contacting politicians and if this type of participation 
has grown during the examined twenty years, it has reached its peak by the early 2000s and 
stagnated until 2010 (table 32). 
Table 32. In the past few years have you contacted a politician or local elective?, HES 
2003-2009, percentage of adult population 
 2003 2008 2009 
contacted a politician 15% 13% 17% 




This chapter has two aims: First, to examine, whether exercising the freedom of association, 
the freedom of assembly, the freedom of expression and the right to take part in public issues 
became more prevalent in the two decades following the Revolution in 1989. Second, to 
investigate how institutional characteristics of the new system and its changes shaped these 
trends. As for institutional changes, four aspects were examined: The constitutional framework 
(the Constitution and fundamental laws on the examined rights), policy changes concerning the 
civil society and the examined freedoms, political opportunity structures (electoral cycles) and 
turmoils of the political system. To examine trends of exercising rights I used the action-based 
approach I have developed in the previous chapter.  
Four hypotheses were formed:  
H1: In general, among democratic institutions, one could expect gradually increasing activities 
in relation to most of the examined rights.  
H2: The general expectations would, however, not indicate that the trends should be linear. 
Policy changes sometimes supplement, sometimes counteract the influence of the general 
framework. Thus, the increasing administrative load in the first half of the 1990s might slows 
down while the changes introduced in 1997 and 2004 foster associational participation. 
H3: Between 1990 and 1994, political opportunity structures might gradually close, which is in 
line with the regulation becoming more professionalized and, in some cases, stricter. Between 
1994 and 1998, regulation gradually clarified the way popular votes could be used. Moreover, 
the one percent system was introduced, which might contribute to the growth of the number of 
popular votes initiated and associational activities. However, closing opportunity structures 
between 1998 and 2002 might counteract the positive influence of these policy changes. After 
2002, establishing the National Civil Fund, and introducing a Civil strategy indicates the 
opening of opportunity structures which should vitalize associational participation and 
consequently assemblies and other forms of expressing an opinion. 
H4: Protesting and expressing opinions could be the most intense during times of crises. 
Therefore, the years after the transition itself and the period after 2006 should be the most 
intense. Thus, I expected that people will engage the most in protest activities, signing petitions, 
participating boycotts or talking about politics after 1990 and 2006. 
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The first hypothesis was clearly proven false. Although in some aspects the prevalence of 
participation or exercising rights have increased, in most aspects, they are stagnating at best. 
Associational participation, measured by individual engagement (membership, belonging and 
volunteering) or by the number of acts registering associations, decreases throughout the period. 
Participation in different kinds of assemblies stagnates as well. The changes in the frequency 
of activities aiming to exercise rights to take part in public affairs, such as electoral 
participation, and contacting politicians do not have a clear direction. The changes in the latter 
reflect electoral cycles only as its prevalence becomes higher in electoral years.  
Only private forms of freedom of expression (discussing politics) seems to grow in the 2000s, 
following a setback in the early nineties. One of the surprises is, thus, that sometimes the early 
nineties show more vitality than later periods. 
The second hypothesis also proved to be false: policy periods rarely have an identifiable effect 
on practicing rights. There are, however, exceptions, namely rights related to a given policy, 
such as the case of designing the one percent of personal income tax to civil organizations. 
Similarly, one can observe that trying to initiate a referenda and attempts of agenda initiatives 
became more prevalent following the clarification of the legislation.  
The case of political opportunities (H3) seems to be different. It seems that the level of 
individual participation is not affected by electoral cycles. Registering associations or the 
number of assemblies and to a smaller extent, the number of initiated local referenda is 
influenced by the electoral cycles. When opportunity structures are open, the number of such 
attempts is higher, while closing opportunity structures decreases them. 
Finally, political turmoils (H4) undoubtedly have an impact on exercising the freedom of 
expression in the private sphere (discussing politics). Political upheavals motivate people to 
talk about politics, however, expectations formed during times of social and political change 
can have an adverse effect as well. (by discouraging interest in politics when expectations prove 
to be exaggerated). Political turmoils probably have an impact on practicing the freedom of 
assembly, and taking part in public affairs: both, the number of assemblies and the number of 
referenda initiated as well as popular initiatives show an unexpected growth after 2006. 
Although the number of assemblies returns to the level experienced before 2006, attempts to 
initiate referenda seems to grow further. 
To summarize the results, two main tendency is identifiable: First, exercising freedom rights 
measured by individual forms of participation mostly remain stable throughout the period, 
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while attempts on the “event” level (registering associations, number of assemblies, number of 
initiated referenda) seems to be influenced by political opportunity structures or political 
turmoils. Thus, it seems that the proportion of people ready to participate is similar throughout 
the period, which is probably caused by strong structural causes, while openness of opportunity 




II.3. The Role of Associational Participation in Explaining 
Political Participation 
II.3.1. Introduction 
The lengthy evaluation offered in chapter II.2 of trends in exercising rights shows that despite 
the institutional framework, the main trajectory of practicing political freedoms in Hungary was 
characterized by stagnation, or even decline between 1990 and 2010 Although the frequency 
of protests or attempts at popular votes increased, the extent to which people practice their rights 
had stayed mostly unchanged since 1990. This main feature is associated with suspicion 
towards politics and political institutions, creating an environment in which political 
participation is an unfavorable choice for citizens (Gerő - Kopper, 2013; Hajdu, 2012; E. Sik - 
Giczi, 2009). 
In such an environment, the role of associations might be even more important than 
expectations around the transition suggested. Associations are expected to counterbalance the 
structural constraints of the given environment by creating a micro-milieu in which 
participation appears to be an important social norm, and which fosters participation by 
developing democratic skills. Thus, even when participation stagnates on the national level, the 
thesis about the influence of associational participation on political participation might still be 
valid.  
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between associational 
and political participation in the Hungarian context. In line with the expectations formulated 
at the time of the transition, this relationship should be a strengthening one: people involved 
with associations are more likely to practice other forms of (political) participation.  
The expectations toward civil society as an associational sphere are similar to those that the 
Tocquevillian or neo-Tocquevillian approach proposes: a universal mechanism through 
which political participation is supported by associational engagement. However, this universal 
mechanism is taken for granted, since it is a fruit of research grounded in the old democracies.204 
Thus, the main body of this literature does not problematize whether the mechanism is working 
(when it is working) because of the general characteristics of associations, or democratic 
                                                                
204 As Tocqueville examined the role of Associations in the United States in the 19th century, the neo-Tocquevillian 
research also proposes that processes in the USA or regions with a longer tradition of democracy are universal 
(Foley - Edwards, 1996; Putnam, 1995a, 1995b; Putnam et al., 1993; Tocqueville, 2006).  
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experience may play a role in it. In the latter case, associations and their members have to 
develop or learn these mechanisms (Korkut, 2005; Roßteutscher, 2005).205 Only with a 
longitudinal analysis the tracks of such a ‘learning process’ could be found.  
Although advocates of the neo-Tocquevillian approach expect associational engagement to 
increase the probability of participation in general, a differentiation between two types of 
political participation should be considered: electoral and extra-parliamentary 
participation. This is due to the different prevalence and different characteristics of groups 
practicing the two types of political participation.  
Besides types of political participation, types of associations should also be defined. Although 
the associational sphere is often treated as a unified pool of civil organizations promoting the 
same values and behavior, this view is clearly false. Associations differ by the values they 
promote, their fields of activity or how much participation they require. Their various 
characteristics might attract different groups and cause different outcomes.  
Thus, to conduct the analysis, I have to use a dataset which allows the longitudinal examination 
of the relationship between various types of associations and electoral and extra-parliamentary 
participation. To do that, there is only one dataset that covers the examined period: the three 
waves (1991, 1999, 2008) of the European Values Study (EVS, 2011), in which both 
associational and political participation were addressed in a comparable way.  
First, I will briefly discuss the definition of political and associational participation used for the 
sake of this particular analysis. Then, based on the literature, I will explore whether 
associational engagement has any impact on political participation and how the types of 
associations might influence that relationship. Before turning to Hungary, I review other 
possible determinants of political participation, and finally, I will present the data I am using 
and the results of the analysis.  
II.3.2. Political participation 
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that the outcome of activities in civil society is 
expected to be the application of rights, most importantly rights connected to the democratic 
                                                                
205 Roßteutscher (2002) argues that although associations indeed play an important role in developing certain 
communication skills, fostering a better understanding of politics, this does not lead to a democratic culture in 
itself. Instead, associations mirror the dominant political culture of their environment. Thus, associations produce 




participation in the polity’s matters. By emphasizing rights, I focus on political participation as 
a voluntary action “by people in their role as citizens, not as, say, politicians or professional 
lobbyists” (van Deth, 2014:352) even if they are not aware of that role. 
The separation of activities by rights, as introduced earlier, is more of an analytic approach than 
a representation of how rights are practiced. Therefore, in an explanatory examination, it is 
worth applying them together rather than separately. On the one hand, political activities are 
connected to more than one freedom right. For example, an act of protest is an act where 
freedom of assembly might be most important, but freedom of expression is also present. On 
the other hand, since the socio-economic background is a highly influential factor in explaining 
participation, people who engage in one particular activity might be more likely to engage in 
other forms of participation as well (Brady et al., 1995; Gallego, 2007). 
Although political participation is more likely among people from a better social background 
and political participation could be defined as a distinct type of action,206 two important 
distinctions should be made. First, the distinction between associational participation and 
political participation. As noted in chapter I.3, I define associations as organizations or groups 
(with an organizational structure) that are independent of state and market organizations, are 
voluntarily joined primarily by natural persons, established for the sake of a common aim, and 
should be distinct from profit-making207 (Braun, 2014; Freise - Hallmann, 2014).208 These 
common aims could be anything, but since they are ‘common’, associations deal with issues of 
a community.  As such, associational participation could also be considered a form of political 
participation (Norris, 2002a). However, in my view, it is different from other forms of 
participation. 
Associations, aside from other instruments of participation, do not necessarily target public 
aims, political or economic institutions. An association might focus on its own members or on 
leisure activities without any attempt at causing changes in the political (or economic) system.  
Furthermore, not only do such non-political associations exist, but they are, in fact, the majority 
of associations. Second, in the approach I am using, associations are assumed to be the 
incubators of other political activities. They should have the strongest socialization effect 
                                                                
206 This is despite the fact that the expansion in the repertoire of politically motivated activities provides a great 
challenge to the existing classifications (van Deth, 2014). 
207 The idea behind this restriction is that associations can serve those functions through face-to-face contact. Thus, 
associations formed by organizations cannot fulfil the function of political socialization. 




among forms of participation. Thus, they serve as the influential factor, the independent variable 
in a model built by the relationship between different types of participation.  
The second distinction should be made between forms of political activities based on the 
probability that they are exercised together. As Dalton (2014) notes, there is strong evidence 
that certain forms of participation tend to form clusters of activities. There are several 
dimensions that might be considered as a theoretical background of such clustering: most 
importantly, their difficulty, such as the risk and time they involve, or the channel through 
which they influence the system, or the amount of cooperation they require209 (Teorell et al., 
2007; Verba et al., 1973). 
Based on these dimensions, several groupings of activities have been proposed. Teorell et al. 
(2007) or Ekman and Amnå (2012) suggest that channels of representations should be used as 
a main dimension of differentiation. As Ekman and Amnå (2012) note, certain forms of 
participation once seen as non-institutionalized or exceptional have become part of everyday 
politics. Thus, the risk and effort attributed to them are also changing. Therefore, it would be 
better to emphasize whether they are connected to representative institutions, or to the direct 
participation of the citizens. This distinction is supported by empirical observations. Based on 
these considerations and their empirically well-grounded position (see Dalton, 2014; Teorell et 
al., 2007) and partly following Ekman and Amnå, I label these types as electoral and extra-
parliamentary participation. The former category is constituted of participation in national 
and local elections, or popular votes, while the latter is understood as more dynamic collective 
actions, which put pressure on politics, e.g. protests, boycotts or signing petitions.210  
II.3.3. Associations and political participation 
According to the classical Tocquevillian tradition, political participation should be fostered by 
associational involvement on different levels. First, members of associations shall engage in 
public and organizational issues, and through these, they acquire skills to cooperate, negotiate 
and make decisions. All of this leads to an increased interest in politics, increased political 
efficacy, and tolerance towards others’ opinions (Archon, 2003; Edwards, 2009; Maloney - 
                                                                
209 Verba et al. (1973) list the scope of the expected outcome as well (e.g. local or national), but this is not relevant 
given the data I will use in this chapter.  
210 Although on a practical level my human rights approach fits into the mainstream understanding of political 
action, there are important differences as well. Teorell et al. (2007), for example, exclude activities as discussing 
politics among “friends, relatives and peers” (Teorell et al., 2007:336), which I would encounter as a form of 
exercising fundamental rights. However, as noted, in this chapter this difference does not have further relevance.   
184 
 
Roßteutscher, 2007; Stolle, 2001). Second, people engaged in associations find partners for 
common or collective actions more easily and, as such, associations serve as a network pool of 
mobilization (Teorell, 2003; Vráblíková, 2013).211  
The Tocquevillian theory also suggests that associational participation should increase the 
probability of engagement in both types of political participation. Robert Putnam’s famous 
argument that the decline in associational engagement is directly linked to the decline in 
electoral participation is a well-known example of the assumed linkage between associational 
and electoral participation. (Putnam, 1995a, 1995b). This assumption is backed by further 
evidence. Norris (2002c) finds that trade union and party membership or religious attendance 
increase electoral participation,212 and Armingeon (2007) points out that voting is more 
prevalent among trade union and sports club members. However, in a regression model with 
the control of socio-economic background, Armingeon does not find any statistical relationship 
between associational involvement and electoral participation. 
It is also well documented that in western settings, participation in associations increased the 
level of participation in elite-challenging actions, as in protests, signing petitions and strikes or 
boycotts. (Armingeon, 2007; Putnam et al., 1993; Stolle, 2001; Stolle - Rochon, 1998; Welzel 
et al., 2005). 
However, Stolle and Rochon (1998) found important differences by associational sectors in 
three western countries.213 They demonstrate that associations are influential on political 
engagement primarily in the field of political, community, economic and cultural organizations, 
even more than on the politically more embedded activity fields of group rights, and social and 
personal interest organizations.  
Armingeon (2007) analyzed the impact of associations on protest voting and consumer activity 
using data collected between 1999 and 2002 in 12 European countries. In turn, Vrabliková 
(2013) analyzed International Social Survey Programme’s Citizenship data from 2004, while214 
                                                                
211 Besides involvement, associations create an environment in which public debates are more likely to happen, 
thus they contribute to a vital public sphere. Also, they are seen as a force of legitimation and control mechanism  
of democratic institutions (Warren, 2001). These functions are important, however their examination is not the 
subject of this chapter.  
212 According to Norris (2002b) the relationship exist on the country level as well and country level membership 
and church attendance rate is linked to voter turnout.  
213 Sweden, Germany and the United States. 
214 Dekker (2014) used the fourth wave (2008-2009) of European Values Study and the sixth wave (2012-2013) 
of the European Social Survey, while Vráblíková (2013) used the ISSP citizenship dataset from 2004. Although 
there are differences between EVS and ESS, Dekker obtained similar results by applying a somewhat different 
variable. Using the EVS 2008, Dekker defined political participation with the following items: Taking part in a 
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Dekker (2014) conducted a similar analysis using the fourth wave of the European Values Study 
(2008-2010) examining the correlation between associational and extra-parliamentary 
participation in Europe. Armingeon and Dekker both found only a weak, while Vrabliková a 
stronger relationship between associational engagement and extra-parliamentary participation. 
Their conclusions are also somewhat different: Armingeon (2007) argues that self-selectivity 
explains political participation better, while. Dekker (2014) concludes that the general thesis of 
associational impact might be false, and the relationship might exist only in particular types of 
associations.   
A. Types of associations and their differences 
Typologies of associations are mainly based on associations’ main activity (purposive-activity 
typologies) or on some analytical-theoretical aspects. Purposive-activity typologies tend to rely 
more on the empirical observations of organizations’ activities, while analytic-theoretical 
categorization applies aspects theoretically embedded into organizational sociology, such as 
the associations’ internal organization, or the type of membership they have (Smith et al.  2016). 
As it is clear from the categorization applied by Dekker (2014), Stolle and Rochon (1998), or 
the categorization proposed by Smith et al. (2016)  surveys targeting individuals as respondents 
usually apply an activity-based typology. 
These typologies vary from applying three to ten categories (in measurement tools even more). 
According to Smith et al. (2016), the problem with these typologies is that they mix up activities 
with membership types. For example, youth organizations could be advocacy organizations for 
representing young people’s interests, organizations providing services for them, or clubs based 
on a membership recruited from the youth. As another example, Maloney and Roßteutscher 
(2007) and van der Meer et al. (2009) suggest that three types of associations should be 
differentiated based on their relation to the sub-systems of a society.  Leisure organizations are 
connected to the private sphere, activist organizations to the state, and interest organizations to 
the economy. Although this typology tries to build on one dimension, Smith et al. argue that 
typologies as such always refer implicitly to membership types as well.215 In response, Smith 
                                                                
lawful demonstration, taking part in a boycott, signing a petition and belonging to political parties and groups, 
while in associational participation he included attending religious events, and each category of belonging to a 
voluntary association excluded political parties and activist groups as local community actions or environmental 
organizations. Vrabliková used the items available on political participation, such as: Signing a petition, taking 
part in a demonstration, attending a political meeting or rally, contacting a political or a civil servant to express 
one’s views, donating money or raising funds for a social or political activity, contacting or appearing in the media 
to express one’s views, and simply aggregated membership categories.  
215 For example, women’s organizations are categorized as leisure organizations by van der Meer et al. (2009), 
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proposes a ten-category216 typology based only on the activities of organizations. This attempt 
does not seem to be entirely successful either since the authors propose categories with unclear 
content or activities, such as “social movement organizations/associations and activism”, or 
“community improvement-protection-economic development-poverty alleviation associations” 
(Smith et al., 2016:100). 
The reason why such attempts are only partially successful is probably that associations’ impact 
is influenced by more than one of their characteristics. Thus, their activity field is only one of 
them. Furthermore, it is a characteristic which is likely to be in correlation with other important 
features of associations, such as their internal organizations or membership types. As a 
consequence, the typology should also take other features into account. For the political 
socialization effect, three important characteristics are emphasized.  
First, connected to the activity field, the mechanism might work differently for associations 
aiming to influence the state or politics. Members of political parties and political or activist 
organizations dealing with highly politicized issues probably also participate in direct political 
actions more readily. This assumption is supported by the Arato-Cohen model (1992) in which 
political and civil society, although both are associational spheres, are differentiated. In this 
theory, political society is seen as a sphere tied to political institutions.  On the other hand, 
while civil society clearly engages in political activities as well, it might be more involved in 
issues less directed at political institutions.  
Second, the political socialization effect of associations assumes that there is an internal 
organization of associations which favors the development of democratic virtue. This internal 
organization would require a democratic decision-making structure, relatively low hierarchy 
and frequent face to face contacts between members. (Korkut, 2005; Putnam, 1995a) As a 
counter-example Putnam (1995) mentions “checkbook” or tertiary associations – mainly trade 
unions and professional organizations – in which members are required only to pay their 
membership fees, thus the Tocquevillian processes might not be working properly.  
                                                                
 however it is not clear whether they are social clubs for women or human rights organizations.  
216 The ten (11 including ‘other associations’) categories resemble the categories applied by the EVS (cf. Smith et 
al., 2016:100).1. Philanthropic/charity, 2. Political influence-advocacy-rights associations and parties, 3. Social 
movement organizations/associations and activism, 4. Community improvement-protection-economic 
development-poverty alleviation associations and human rights, 5. Occupational-economic support associations, 
6. Religious-ideological-morality associations, 7. Self-help-support-improvement-personal growth associations, 8. 
Sports-recreational-exercise associations, 9. Arts-music-culture-study associations, 10. Sociability-conversation-
conviviality associations, 11. Other associations. 
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Third, the values proposed by the association might be important. Gellner (1994) proposes that 
religion might support attitudes that are against the recognition of basic human rights or might 
counteract deliberative processes: the obligation to the transcendent leads to the unquestioned 
respect of authority, hamper the development of self-reflectivity and doubt, which are essential 
to democratic societies. These characteristics will hamper political participation, which might 
be based on criticizing and challenging authority.   
In contrast, Tomka (2009) claims that in Central and Eastern Europe religious organizations 
counterbalance atomization and that they practically serve as the basis for civil society. He also 
argues that belonging to a religion fosters participation since religious people have a moral 
standard which makes them sensitive to social and political issues. The counter-argument on 
the impact of religious moral standards returns to the Tocquevillian tradition and reminds us 
that the seeming correlation between these moral standards and participation is a result of 
belonging to a community, not of religious values themselves (Becker - Dhingra, 2001). 
Chambers and Kopstein (2001) argue that it is important to distinguish between ‘good’ and 
‘bad” associations. While good associations (explicitly or implicitly) promote democratic 
values, bad civil society promotes non-democratic values, mainly the exclusion of certain 
groups from the polity. At this point, rather than assessing the argument that bad civil society 
might undermine democracy, I merely point out that even Chambers and Kopstein recognize 
that extremist groups also foster political participation and have a socialization effect similar to 
‘good’ associations.   
The pool of bad, or non-democratic associations might be larger than that of extremist groups.  
Letki (2003, 2004) examines the socialization effect of membership in the socialist state party. 
She finds that after 1990 even this type of membership increases the likelihood of political 
participation. Thus, it seems that regardless of the values promoted by associations, their 
positive impact on political participation still holds.  
In sum, based on these important dimensions, I propose a simple typology of associations, 
following mainly Maloney and Roßteutscher (2007) and Meer-Grotenhuis Scheepers van der 
Meer et al. (2009) for the purposes of this analysis. In this typology, I identify four categories 
of associations: political and activist, non-political, interest and religious associations. Based 
on the distinction of being political or not, political and activist associations (parties and 
associations with the primary aim to influence the political system) must be differentiated from 
the others. On the other side of being political, there is a diverse pool of non-political 
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associations. These associations might target public issues (for example, the state of the 
healthcare system) or might mainly aim to function as leisure organizations.  
Associations’ internal structure might be the easiest to capture based on the members’ required 
presence in the organizations. Interest organizations (e.g. trade unions) tend to work on a 
representative basis where the majority of work is done by the leaders and administration, while 
other organizations require more frequent participation. The debate on religious values 
indicates that religious associations might differ from other associations in having their 
proposed value set, and also in their internal organizational structure.  
Although openly non-democratic associations could be in a fifth category, generally it is not 
possible to distinguish them based on their activity. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether 
these associations have a different impact on participation than other ‘democratic’ associations.   
II.3.4. Other determinants of political participation 
Although the role of associations might be important in fostering political participation, there 
are other factors at play as well. First of all, civic skills developed by associations might be 
learned somewhere else, most importantly in the family or in education. (Beck - Jennings, 1982; 
Verba, 2015) The basic assumption is that higher educational attainment provides more 
favorable conditions to develop the necessary language, communication and organizational 
skills (Brady et al., 1995) According to Brady and colleagues (1995),  the very same skills might 
be acquired in the workplace when the job requires making decisions, working in teams or 
giving speeches. Ayala (2000) however criticizes Brady and colleagues for overestimating the 
importance of the workplace. Using the same dataset, he shows that voluntary organizations 
(associations and the church) have twice as large an impact on developing civic skills as 
involuntary organizations.  
The claim that civic skills might be developed elsewhere, especially in education, yields a 
counter-argument of associations’ socialization effects. The self-selectivity thesis states that 
people who join associations are already interested in politics and have the necessary skills. 
Thus, associations do not have an educative role, instead, they have a mere selection bias 
(Armingeon, 2007).    
The resources model proposes that the set of civic skills is only one of the factors that serve as 
resources for participation. Besides civic skills, people need 1) time and money, 2) 
psychological engagement and 3) recruitment networks to engage in political actions (Brady et 
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al., 1995).  Although the importance of these factors is widely accepted, their role is much less 
clear in explaining participation than that of associational participation. 
Usually, the amount of free time is negatively correlated with having a family or a high-ranked 
job, while it might correlate positively with income or wealth. As the biographical availability 
argument puts it, the fewer time constraints someone has, the less costly the participation in 
terms of time expenses is. That is why younger people tend to participate more in protest 
activities (Schussman - Soule, 2005). Although this argument should apply to pensioners or the 
unemployed as well, political participation among these groups is generally lower than among 
the employed. Thus, the amount of free time seems to account only among people who already 
want to participate: the more free time someone already engaged in some kind of participation 
has, the more she/he will take part in political actions. Money, on the other hand, seems to 
contribute only to certain forms of participation that require money, as for example donating to 
a political cause (Brady et al., 1995).  
Political participation is certainly influenced by psychological engagement, usually measured 
by values and attitudes concerning public life and politics. These values, however, are not 
necessarily the results of associational participation, but more likely acquired in the family or 
during education. Ronald Inglehart (1971, 2008) argues that the development of these values is 
influenced mainly by two factors: the fulfillment of the basic needs connected with survival, 
and the circumstances under which one’s formative years were spent. Inglehart sees the latter 
as more important, since the individual’s basic values shaped during childhood are unlikely to 
radically change in adulthood. He identifies two main sets of values: Materialist values focus 
on the individual’s physical and economic security, and post-materialist values emphasize more 
the “needs for belonging, esteem and intellectual and self-expression” (2008:132). By this 
approach, the value set mediates the impact of economic growth and stability. When everyday 
struggles of survival disappear, people start to care about political issues, social problems and 
so on, thus post-materialist values are expected to influence political participation, most 
importantly extra-parliamentary actions (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b). 
Both post-materialist values and civic engagement have a strong relationship with interest in 
politics, public issues and confidence in institutions. Confidence in political institutions might 
matter for the outcomes of participation. Governments’ responsiveness has been shown to have 
a relationship with civic engagement and political participation. Confidence in state institutions 
can be seen as an indicator of this responsiveness since to express political opinions, a belief 
that institutions will acknowledge citizens’ concerns is needed (Kim, 2015). Evidently, interest 
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in politics and public issues is always in strong correlation with political participation. It is 
considered an important precondition of participation, which is shaped by political 
socialization. Thus, it is also mostly formed by early life socialization in the family and schools, 
and as such is expected to be influenced, at least partly, by socio-economic background (Beck 
- Jennings, 1982). 
The resource model intends to explain how social and economic background have a strong 
explanatory power in the models examining participation. It is generally noted that variables 
such as gender, age, size of settlement and level of education have the largest or at least 
considerable effect on participation. Men are generally more willing to participate than women, 
and the more educated one is, the more likely one is to participate. The impact of age is not 
always linear: it is different for voting when the middle-aged or older people tend to vote with 
a higher probability, while younger people are more likely to engage in extra-parliamentary 
actions (Gallego, 2007; Inglehart - Welzel, 2005a; Stolle - Rochon, 1998; A. Szabó - Oross, 
2012). Also, since participation might be time-consuming and risky, especially for extra-
parliamentary participation, people with family might participate less (Inglehart - Welzel, 
2005b). 
The last factor influencing political participation is social or recruitment networks. In this, there 
are mainly two factors taken into account: the size and heterogeneity of the ego’s network. 
While the general assumption is that the size of egocentric networks is positively correlated 
with participation, its heterogeneity is more complex (Gerő - Hajdu, 2018). While the 
possibility of deliberation between various groups is stated as desirable, the heterogeneity of 
egocentric networks might lead to undesirable consequences, as discouraging people from 
engaging in public debate, because they want to avoid conflicts  (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), and 
causing uncertainty (Mutz, 2002). 
As a more general feature of interpersonal relations, generalized interpersonal trust is often 
examined as a determinant of political participation. (Letki, 2004) People who trust people they 
do not personally know will be much more likely to publicly support a cause. The mechanism 
behind this phenomenon is that a high level of trust shall eliminate the free-rider problem and 
decrease the perceived costs of political participation (Welzel et al., 2005). 
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II.3.5. Associational engagement and political participation in Hungary 
Although research on political participation in Central and Eastern Europe is growing (Ekman 
et al., 2016), the discussion of the role of associations in fostering participation in the region is 
rare. In relation to electoral participation, Bernhagen and Marsh (2007) found that party and 
union membership have positive correlation with voting in Eastern Europe. Letki (2004) 
examined the role of associations in discussing politics, supporting a party and party 
membership. By analyzing data from 1994, collected in ten Central and Eastern European 
countries, Letki found that engagement with each type of association (lifestyle and professional, 
labor, and community) and even membership in the Communist Party prior to 1989 had a 
positive correlation with the aggregated index of the three forms of political participation. 
However, this result might not be so robust at present, or the relationship might have changed 
since around the millennium, Armingeon (2007) did not find any relationship between 
associational and electoral participation and identified only a weak explanatory power for extra-
parliamentary forms of participation in four Eastern European countries.217 In his analysis, 
associational engagement performed best with boycotting and buying certain products, while it 
had a negligible relationship with protesting. 
On the Hungarian level, Kmetty and Tóth (2013) found that associational membership in itself 
does not have any impact on voting. They find, however, that the local milieu could be 
important. On the one hand, the higher the number of associations in a settlement the more 
voter turnout increases.  On the other hand, the more institutionalized the associations are, the 
lower the turnout will be.  
Kern and Szabó (2011) and Susánszky et al. (2016) examined the role of associational 
engagement in explaining political participation. Kern and Szabó (2011) find that the more 
associations someone is involved with, the more likely he or she is to participate in a wide range 
of non-electoral political activities218.  
Susánszky et al. (2016) point out the importance of activity fields. While participation in human 
rights and social-care associations increases the likelihood of participation in demonstrations 
critical of the government, engagement with religious associations and organizations dealing 
                                                                
217 Armingeon’s analysis does not include Hungary.  
218 Including non-electoral forms of participation, as contact with a politician and forms closer to my definition of 
extra-parliamentary participation, as participation in demonstrations (Kern - Szabó, 2011:45). 
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with issues of national culture (preservation of culture, aiding Hungarians across the borders 
etc.) supports participation on pro-governmental demonstrations.  
These few available research results suggest that some kind of correlation between associational 
and both types of political participation should be expected. However, it is likely that this 
relationship should be different with electoral and extra-parliamentary participation.  
The most important reason for expecting a difference lies in the extent of the two types of 
political participation. While extra-parliamentary participation is outnumbered by associational 
participation, electoral participation is three or four times larger than the former. Thus, in 
explaining electoral participation, associational participation should have a minor role.  
This leads to the different characteristics of groups of participants by type. While the groups 
engaging in extra-parliamentary participation have similar socioeconomic backgrounds to those 
who belong to associations, voters show more differences. Mainly better-educated men living 
in Budapest or in larger cities are more likely to be engaged with associations. The relationship 
of age and associational participation is changing: while traditionally the younger generations 
seemed to be more engaged (Kern - Szabó, 2011), the differences between the younger (under 
30) and middle-aged (30-60) slowly dissolves throughout the period of 1990-2010 (Susánszky 
- Gerő, 2013). The correlation with religiousness is changing too: since the early 1990s when 
there was no correlation it has become a significant and positive one (Susánszky - Gerő, 2013).  
For both electoral and extra-parliamentary participation, education and income are important 
predictors, and men are more likely to participate than women. (Kern - Szabó, 2011; Róbert - 
Szabó, 2017; A. Szabó - Oross, 2016). The role of other socio-demographic variables is 
ambiguous: Age has a U shaped effect in explaining electoral participation. The willingness of 
electoral participation is increasing with age until around 65 and then starts to decrease. 
(Angelusz - Tardos, 2003; Kern - Szabó, 2011) Among participants of extra-parliamentary 
forms, younger generations were more active (Kern - Szabó, 2011), however, this correlation 
impact seems to dissolve, and the middle-aged or older generations became as active as the 
youth (Susánszky et al., 2016). Probably in relation with age, the married are more likely to 
vote.  
Social networks are important for both types of participation. However, it seems that for 
electoral participation, in contrast to extra-parliamentary participation, it is important only to 
have friends rather than to have many friends. Also, to engage in extra-parliamentary activities, 
having a heterogeneous (consisting not only of relatives) egocentric network is important (Gerő 
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- Hajdu, 2018). Both types of political participation are correlated with the type of settlement, 
however differently. People tend to be the most active in elections in small villages and in the 
capital (and the least active in smaller towns), while the size of settlement has a positive, linear 
correlation within participation in extra-parliamentary activities (Angelusz - Tardos, 2005, 
2006; Róbert - Szabó, 2017). Extra-parliamentary participation – especially demonstrations – 
is overrepresented among inhabitants of the capital (Kern - Szabó, 2011)  
As for values and psychological engagement, interest in politics219 is a defining factor for both 
types of participation. (Kmetty, 2015; A. Szabó - Oross, 2012) Satisfaction with the current 
state of democracy also seems to be important, however, as Susánszky et al. (2016) show, under 
a right-wing government it works differently for critical and pro-government demonstrators. 
While participants in demonstrations criticizing the government are unsatisfied, pro-
government demonstrators are satisfied with democracy. A recent research strengthens the view 
that the most active citizens have more confidence in institutions than less active ones. (A. 
Szabó - Gerő, 2015).  
Religiousness improves the likelihood of electoral participation (Angelusz - Tardos, 1996, 
2006), while the clear indication of how religiosity influences extra-parliamentary participation 
is missing. Róbert and Szabó (2017) suggest that its influence depends on the ideological 
background of the governing party. While under right-wing governments religious citizens 
exploit institutional channels of participation more (e.g. contacting a politician or 
representative), during the reign of left-wing governments religious people were more active in 
extra-parliamentary participation (as demonstrations, signing petitions etc.). It must be noted 
that the latter impact might be the result of the time-coverage of the analysis since it applies 
data between 2002 and 2015. The events of 2006 might have had a significant effect on protests 
in the period between 2006 and 2010 when a left-wing government ruled, but right-wing parties 
and groups became more active on the streets than they had previously been.  
The characteristics of the associational sphere in Hungary also suggest that the relationship 
between associational and political participation might be weak or weakened through the period 
and that it might not be that strong or true for all types of associations.  
                                                                
219 The European Values Study measures the ’importance of politics’. However interest in politics and importance 
of politics are different concepts it is plausible to assume that the two have strong correlations: those, who are 




First, many of the registered associations and foundations220are not actually functioning as 
associations or are not working at all. There are many of them established as a fund-raising tool 
for public schools or other institutions, they do not have an independent organization or 
activities. Besides, there are small organizations which might be small enterprises in reality, 
since it is a well-known tax avoidance strategy to establish non-profit organizations instead of 
small enterprises (Bocz, 2009).   But here size has major importance. Since inequalities among 
organizations in the associational sphere are large, one could expect that at least half the 
organizations have only a couple members or volunteers in which, although there are face to 
face contacts, the frequency of meetings might be low, the way of dealing with issues is quite 
informal, thus the environment they provide does not serve as a ground for developing citizens’ 
skills. Also, because of the small number of members, these associations might not fulfill the 
role of mobilization.221 
Second, many associations founded after the transition were the formalization of associations 
of the different groups of the pre-transition opposition, such as the human rights or 
environmental movement, or the re-establishment of trade unions or local associations (Kuti, 
1998). In other words, political associations were established by people who were already 
active in politics, thus in these cases, a self-selection mechanism might have taken place. 
Trade unions and cultural or other local and non-political associations might have worked 
prior to 1989, although to a limited extent. Therefore, they may have been able to perform the 
socialization mechanism in 1991.   
Third, the internal structures of associations might not always support skills development. As 
opposed to a small organization’s informality, larger organizations might become too 
formalized and bureaucratic. The sphere has been through a considerable level of 
professionalization since the early 1990s (Bocz, 2009). As Kmetty and Kmetty and Tóth (2013) 
have found, the level of formalization is counteracting the impact of associations on the local 
level.  
Lastly, in larger and more professionalized organizations the danger of becoming checkbook 
organizations is more viable. Tóth (1995) and  Korkut (2005) argue that in the internal structure 
                                                                
220 As noted, I treat foundations as “association-like” organizations.  
221 The problem with the size of organizations is highlighted by the ratio of members serving as officers of 
associations. In 2003 and 2009 besides participation HES asked about the role of respondents employed in 
associations. In 2003, 25%, in 2009, 29% of the people belonging to associations served as officers, which seem 
to be very high percentages.   
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of Hungarian trade unions and interest organizations hierarchy is important and they require no 
more than minimal participation of their members.   
II.3.6. Hypotheses 
The general assumption is that there is a correlation between associational and political 
participation. Based on the universal mechanisms proposed, this correlation should appear at 
any time during the period examined, regardless of the extent of participation. Thus, the first 
hypothesis is:  
H1: The correlation between associational and political participation will be positive throughout 
the period. 
In the early nineties, however, the newly established political associations could have been 
exposed to a self-selection mechanism, thus 
H2. At the beginning of the period, the correlation between engagement with political 
associations and any type of political participation might be weak or missing. Later, the 
selection bias might change, and the correlation appears.  
Although it is possible that the self-selection bias remains and together with growing 
professionalization and differences in the internal characteristics of associations might cause 
that: 
H3: At the beginning of the period, the relationship between associational and political 
participation will be the strongest in the case of trade unions, but later professionalization 
and the development of internal mechanism of political socialization cause that the this 
difference between trade unions and other types of associations might vanish.  
H4. The relationship between participation in religious associations and extra-
parliamentary associations is changing from a lack of correlation to a positive correlation. 
With electoral participation, participation in religious associations will have a continuous 
positive correlation.  
II.3.7. Method of analysis, dependent and control variables 
In this chapter, I use the three waves of the European Values Study (EVS). EVS is an 
international survey program conducted every nine years. In Hungary, four waves have been 
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carried out, but only the three waves carried out after 1989 included questions about 
associational and political participation.  
Associational participation in empirical terms is understood as belonging to or volunteering for 
any voluntary organization. The surveys asked their respondents whether they belong to and 
volunteer for any voluntary organization of a 14-item list, from ‘sports and recreation’ to ‘trade 
unions’.  To examine the different types, I used the aforementioned four categories of 
associations: 1. ‘political and activist’222 and 2. ‘interest’223 organizations, 3. ‘non-political 
associations’224, and 4. religious associations. All categories are constructed as dummy 
variables, where ‘1’ indicates that the respondent belongs to or volunteers for the given type of 
organization and ‘0’ if not. Table 33 introduces the prevalence of each category from 1990 to 
2008.   
Table 33. Associational participation by the four types of associations, EVS 1990-2008, 
percentage of the adult population 
 
1990 1999 2008 
Political associations 5 5 2 
Non-political associations 16 15 14 
Interest associations 35 10 6 
Religious associations 11 14 6 
Total 51 32 22 
Total N 999 1000 1513 
Besides the continuous decline in overall participation, it is important to note that the changes 
between 1990 and 1999, and between 1999 and 2008 are different in nature: for the decline 
during the first decade, the loss in trade union membership is responsible.225 During the second 
decade, a more general loss of membership is observed. While participation in trade unions 
declined further, participation in political and religious associations also decreased 
significantly.    
                                                                
222 Political parties and groups, human rights, peace movements and environmental associations,   
223 Trade unions and professional associations. 
224 Welfare organizations, voluntary health organizations, sports and recreation, cultural activities, local 
community actions, youth work, women’s groups, consumer groups and others.  
225 Trade unions lost almost 80 percent of their members between 1990 and 1998. The changes in the participaion 
by activity fields between 1991 and 2008 is reported in the Appendices (Appendix 3). 
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Extra-parliamentary participation is measured by four items: participation in demonstrations, 
unlawful strikes226 and boycotts, and signing petitions. The four items were aggregated by 
Principal Component Analysis into a single continuous variable. The higher the value, the more 
participatory the behavior of the respondent.227 
As table 34 shows, the extent of extra-parliamentary participation did not change much 
throughout the period. The only significant changes occurred with joining strikes. The reason 
for the larger proportion of “might do” in 1991 is that in this year, the question referred to 
official strikes. Despite the change of question, I decided to include this item in the principal 
component. I ran the following regression models with different variables, without strikes, but 
the results were similar and the explanatory power of the model is somewhat better. Thus, it 
seems that the principal component including each of the four items is a good proxy for 
participation.228  
Table 34. Extra-Parliamentary participation 1991-20088 EVS, percentage of the adult 
population  
 




















Signed a petition 18 30 52 15 32 53 15 31 54 
Attended lawful 
demonstration 4 27 67 5 30 66 4 21 75 




3 27 70 1 10 90 0 6 94 
Total 20 45 35 15 45 40 16 41 43 
N 999 1000 1513 
Electoral participation was asked about in all of the waves. It should be noted that the question 
asked about the willingness of participation in a future election, not participation in a previous 
                                                                
226 In 1990, the Hungarian questionnaire had a mistranslation and asked about official strikes, which explains the 
relatively high willingness to participate. 
227 Data loss is prevented by imputation. Missing cases are replaced by the mean of the four items. The process 
did not change the direction and nature of correspondences found in the model without imputation. 
228 It is important to consider these items as a proxy of participation, since the repertoire for participation is 
constantly changing and expanding. This is especially true with the introduction of new online  platforms of 
participation and with new, online and mobile communication tools (van Deth, 2014). However, despite this 




one.229 As such, it inquiries the intention of participation, which cannot be taken as equal to 
participation. That is the reason I apply a dummy variable with only two categories:  1) Non-
voters, i.e. the respondents who clearly indicated they would not vote or would cast a blank 
vote or do not know if they would vote, 2) voters, who said they would participate in the 
elections.230 
Table 35. The ratio of respondents that would and would not participate in the national  
elections, 1991-2008 EVS percentage of the adult population 
 1991 1999 2008 
Would not vote 39 46 29 
Would vote 61 54 71 
The figures are changing and not necessarily in line with electoral participation. Besides 
methodological reasons231, the difference might be attributed to the time of the surveys. While 
in the first and second waves the survey took place in the year following the elections, in 2008 
it was conducted in the middle of the election cycle. 232 
Control variables 
Control variables are defined by the resources model of participation and by the most important 
socio-demographic determinants explored in the literature.  
Socio-demographic variables: gender233, age, and age squared to control the non-linear 
relationship of age and electoral participation and the size of the settlement.234  
                                                                
229 The question was worded as ”If there were to be a general election tomorrow, would you vote?” 
230 The possible answer in 1991 and 1999 was designed as if voting was almost equal to choosing a party. 
Respondents could choose an ‘other party‘ option, but they did not have the possibility to say that they would go 
to the polls but did not know which party they would choose. In 2008, respondents first had to tell if they would 
vote, and if they marked ‘yes’ then they had to choose a party. This might contribute to the higher proportion of 
voters that year. I have run a regression model with a variable in which respondents of the survey in 2008 who did 
not choose a party were registered as non-voters. The results are the same. This has not changed the results of the 
regression model.  
231 The willingness to participate seems to be low in 1991 and in 1999. Another research conducted prior to the 
elections in 1990 suggests that willingness to participate was 10 percent higher. (Angelusz - Tardos, 1996). 
232 The dates of surveys conducted in Hungary. 2nd wave: between May 1991 and June 1991, 3rd wave: between 
November 1999 and December 1999, 4th wave: between November, 2008 and January 2009.  Source: 
http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/.  last accessed: 26/10/2018. 
233 1. male 2. female. 
234 Included in the analysis as four dummy variables: 1. 0-5.000 inhabitants, 2. 5.001-20.000 inhabitants, 3. 20.001-
500.000 inhabitants, 4. Capital.  
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Resources: EVS provides the possibility to measure material and cultural resources. Cultural 
resources are measured by the level of education,235 economic resources by employment 
status236 and monthly income.237 Employment status might be an indicator of free time together 
with marital status.238 The latter is also an indicator of social networks, to which EVS does not 
offer any other measurement comparable through the period.   
Psychological engagement and values: Interest in politics is measured through the importance 
of politics in the respondent's life,239 left-right scale240, generalized trust241 and confidence in 
institutions, 242 the position on the materialism, post-materialism scale243, belonging to a religion 
and religious attendance.244 
The correlation of associational participation and extra-parliamentary and electoral 
participation will be tested by two types of regression models. Since the dependent variables 
are on a different measurement level, the correlation of associational participation with extra-
                                                                
235 Since in 1991, the only variable about educational level is the age when the respondent completed their 
education. This is the variable I am using in every wave.  
236 A four-category variable, included as dummy variables: employed, retired, unemployed/housewife and others 
237 Included only into the model of electoral participation, since after several trials, it does not show any 
correlation with extra-parliamentary participation, but increased the missing cases for the last waves by 246 cases. 
On the other hand, in the case of electoral participation, even if the variable has no significant correlation with the 
dependent variable, the explanatory power of the model increases. Monthly income is aggregated into 11 ranks in 
each of the waves. In the variable involved, the first six ranks appear separated and the highest five are aggregated 
into one category. 
238 ‘0’ living alone, ‘1’ cohabited.  
239 Since the standard question, ‘How interested are you in politics?’ is missing from the second wave. Instead 
the question about the importance of politics is included in all the waves: “Please say how important politics is in 
your life:” Respondents could answer on a 1-4 scale. In the analysis, 1 stands for not at all important, while 4 
means very important. 
240 Participation might be influenced by the political wing of the government since oppositional actors could be 
more active in extra-parliamentary actions. During the fieldwork of the 1990 and 1999 wave, a right wing 
government, while in 2008 a left wing one was in office.240 To control this impact, I included the left-right scale 
divided into three categories: Left (0-4), middle (5), right (6-10).   
241 ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?’ The possible answers are: ‘Most people can be trusted’ or ‘Can’t be too careful’. 
242  In this chapter, confidence in institutions is measured by an average of answers given to six items: confidence 
in the education system, police, parliament, civil service, social security system, and the justice system. The 
question was: “Please look at this card and tell me, for each item I read out, how much confidence you have in 
them” (A great deal, quite a lot, not very much, none at all). Missing cases were imputed with the average of the 
other answers when there were at least five answers out of six, then a principal component was computed. 
243 Materialism-post materialism is measured by the four-item battery of forced choice question, applied by 
Inglehart (2008). When the respondent chooses only materialist or post-materialist values, her position will be a 
clear materialist or post-materialist one.  
244 The frequency of participation in religious events (practically never, on holy days, or at least once a month) for 
the religious community and belonging to a religious denomination (yes/no) for religious values.  
200 
 
parliamentary participation will be tested with a linear regression model, while with electoral 
participation a logistic regression model is used. 
To account for the extent of the influence of associational participation, and to see how this 
influence might be affected by the control variables, first I will present the results without 
control variables. (Models I and II, table 36 and 37). If there is a significant relationship in 
Model I, this could be the result of the associations’ own effect or the interplaying variables 
used as control variables in Model II. Model II includes control variables. If the relationship of 
associational participation with political participation remains on a statistically significant level 
in Model II, I might conclude that associations’ own effect is also at play.   
II.3.8. Results 
Results are presented in tables 36 and 37. In Model I, coefficients of the relationship between 
associational and political participation without control variables are presented, while in Model 
II coefficients for models with control variables. 
First of all, it seems that there are important differences between the model for electoral and 
extra-parliamentary participation, even without including the control variables. In the case of 
extra-parliamentary participation, there are only two cases out of 12 where the correlation in 
Model I is non-significant. Eight of the other ten cases are significant on the p<0.01 level. 
Statistically significant relationships between associational and electoral participation are less 
prevalent. Only half of the cases are significant on the p<0.05 or p<0.1 level.  
The missing correlations occur between participation in political and religious associations and 
extra-parliamentary participation in 1991. In the third and fourth waves (1999 and 2008), 
engagement in both types of associations shows a significant correlation with extra-
parliamentary participation. However, the direction of this correlation is inverse: political 
associations have positive, while religious associations have a negative correlation with extra-
parliamentary participation.  
With electoral participation, engagement in non-political associations has a statistically 
significant relationship throughout the period. Political and religious associations in 1991, while 
participation in interest associations in 2008 show such a relationship with electoral 
participation. It seems that the expectations towards electoral participation should not be high, 
probably given the differences between the extent of electoral and associational participation.  
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Table 36. Correlations of associational and extra-parliamentary participation. 1991-
2008 OLS regression, standardized ß coefficients  
 Model I Model II  
1991 1999 2008 1991 1999 2008 
Political associations 0.037 0.088** 0.095*** -0.00 0.08** 0.06** 
Non-political associations 0.186*** 0.118*** 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.04 0.09*** 
Interest associations 0.158*** 0.066** 0.065** 0.114*** 0.01 0.04 
Religious associations -0.051 -0.1*** 0.054** 0.1 -0.07* 0.04* 
Socio-demographic variables 
Age 
   
-0.173 0.34* 0.18 
Age2 
   
-0.082 -0.48** -0.29* 
Gender (ref: men) 
   
-0.128*** -0.54* -0.05** 
Marital status (ref: living alone)  
  
-0.11*** 0.02 0.01 
Resources 
Age completed education (zscore)  
  
0.08** 0.167*** 0.04 
Employment (ref: employed) 
empl: retired 
   
-0.025 0.02 -0.014* 
empl: unemployed 
   
-0-014 -0.17* 0.04* 
empl: other 
   
-0.1 0.04 -0.02 
Size of town (ref max 5000) 
     
5.000-20.000 
   
0.57 0.03 -0.06** 
20.000-500.000 
   
0.098*** 0.05 0.05 
Capital 
   
0.146*** 0.02 0.05* 
Political values 
Generalized trust 
   
0.03 0.08** 0.03 




-0.05 -0.1*** -0.085*** 
Importance of politics (z score)  
  
0.1843*** 0.07** 0.124*** 
Left-right orientation (ref: left) 
Left-right orientation: center  
  
-0.007 -0.06* -0.1 
Left-right orientation: left  
  
0.047 0.1 0.15*** 
Post-materialist orientation (ref: materialist) 
Mixed 
   
0.017 0.9*** 0.1*** 
Post-materialist 
   
0.025 0.87*** 0.15*** 
Religiousness 
      




0.06 -0.02 0.08** 
Attendance on religious events (ref: never) 
on holy days or less frequently 
  
-0.01 -0.06* -0.01 
at least once  a month 
   
-0.03 0.02 -0.034 
P 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R2  7.0% 3.9% 4.1% 24.8% 17.0% 17.2% 




Table 37. Correlations of associational and electoral participation. 1991-2008 Binomial Logistic 
Regression odds-ratios       Model I  Model II  
1991 1999 2008 1991 1999 2008 
Political associations 1,95* 1,49 2,19 1,58 1,57 2,46 
Non-political associations 2,1*** 1,92*** 1,45** 2,06*** 2,72*** 1,4 
Interest associations 1,25 0,85 2,14** 1,23 0,66 1,14 
Religious associations 1,52* 1,04 1,21 1,76* 0,55** 1 
Socio-demographic variables 
age 
   
0,97 1,1*** 1,07*** 
Age2 
   
1 0,999*** 0,999*** 
Gender (ref: men) 
   
0,69** 1,05 1,02 
Size of town (ref max 5000) 
5.000-20.000 
   
1,13 0,71 1,2 
20.000-500.000 
   
1,11 0,63** 0,98 
Capital 
   
0,73 0,7 1 
Resources 
Age Completed education (zscore) 
   
1,14 0,93 1,41 
Marital status (ref: living alone) 
   
1,45 0,71* 1,14 
Employment (ref: employed) 
empl: retired 
   
1,43 1,64 0,83 
empl: unemployed 
   
2 1,09 0,99 
empl: other 
   
1,4 1,51 0,98 
Monthly income (ref 1st rank) 
2nd 
   
1,500 1,3 1,35 
3rd 
   
2,096 1,16 1,25 
4th 
   
,992 1,7 1,11 
5th 
   
1,338 1,2 1,46 
6th 
   
1,075 1,95* 0,74 
7th-11th 
   
1,229 1,68 0,42 
Political and religious values 
Generalized trust 
   
1,33 1,04 0,68** 
Confidence in institutions (z score) 
   
1,1 1,04 1,04 
Importance of politics (z score) 
   
1,29*** 1,22** 1,5*** 
Left-right orientation (ref: left) 
Center 
   
0,9 0,44*** 0,6** 
Right 
   
1,33 1,065 2,9*** 
Post-materialist orientation (ref: materialist) 
Mixed 
   
1,08 1,07 0,93 
Post-materialist 
   
0,79 0,76 1,17 
Religiousness 
Belonging to a religious denomination   0,7 1,31 1 
Attendance on religious events (ref: never)      
on Holy days or less  frequently    1,3 1,08 1,31 
At least once a month    1,9** 1,27 1,64** 
*p<0.1 **p<0,05 ***p<0,01 
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The comparison of Models I and II, shows only a small difference for electoral participation 
between the two models.  The inclusion of control variables eliminates the co-effect of political 
associations in 1991, and interest and non-political associations in 2008 is eliminated.245  
The comparison in the case of extra-parliamentary participation shows a more diverse picture. 
First of all, in most cases the coefficients are smaller in Model II than in Model I. This is most 
conspicuous in 1999, where the correlation between engagement with non-political associations 
and trade unions and political participation becomes non-significant, and the level of 
significance decreases in the case of religious associations as well. In 2008, the changes in the 
coefficients are largest in the case of interest organizations and religious associations.  
In Model II, it is possible to detect the direction of correlations or relationships, and in the 
cases of extra-parliamentary participation, the strength of correlation could be estimated as well. 
Non-political associations’ impact seems to be strongest in 1991 and 2008.  In the case of 
engagement with political associations, a significant correlation appears in 1999, which remains 
similarly strong in 2008. The correlation between engagement with interest associations and 
extra-parliamentary participation vanishes after 1991, while a weak correlation appears in the 
case of religious associations, however with a different precursor: in 1999 it is negative, while 
in 2008 it is positive.  
Based on the results, H1 seems to be valid only for extra-parliamentary participation. The effect 
of associational participation is weak, the R2 varies between 7% and 4% for Model I, which 
means that the majority of the explanatory power in Model II belongs to other factors.  It is also 
true that, as Dekker (2014) expects, this correlation exists only with particular types of 
associations.  
H2. is proved to be valid, however, self-selection or the impact of control variables play a role 
only in the case of electoral participation.  
H3. is only partially valid: First of all, when control variables were included, interest 
associations had a positive, statistically significant relationship only with extra-parliamentary 
participation. With electoral participation, the relationship is non-significant for the entire 
period. In 2008, control variables weaken (eliminate) the initial relationship between 
participation in interest associations and electoral participation.  
                                                                
245 Surprisingly, the coefficients also changed for religious associations and the relationship became significant, 
which refers to multicollinearity between engagement with religious associations and some control variables. 
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H4. is also valid partially, since religious associations have a positive relationship with 
electoral participation only in 1991, and associational participation lost its explanatory power 
entirely by the last wave. The nature of the relationship between engagement in religious 
associations and extra-parliamentary associations changed from neutral to a negative and then 
to a positive relationship, but there is only a weak correlation both in 1999 and 2008.   
II.3.9. Discussion 
The debate on associations’ impact on political participation assumes a universal mechanism, 
grounded in the general characteristics of associations, as the main cause of this impact. This 
assumption is then made more complex by acknowledging that the universal mechanism might 
work differently in various types of associations. The direction of correlation between 
associational and political participation is not clear either. Some say that engagement in political 
associations impacts political participation more than participation in other types of 
associations, while others argue in a different direction.  
The results obtained have shown that the relationship between associational participation 
and political participation is changing. Not only in general, but it is changing also by 
particular types of associations. If the changes were a result of a learning mechanism, thus 
associations developed their socialization mechanisms through gaining experience, the changes 
would be linear: from a weak or no correlation towards a strengthening one. It is clear that in 
Hungary this is hardly the case.   
Behind the hectic changes, there might be the transformations that took place in the 
associational sphere and in politics. The associational sphere went through a considerable 
development in numbers: the institutionalization of the formerly informal oppositional 
organizations, the relatively strong environmental movement, the first generation of human 
rights organizations and, naturally, many non-political organizations. Nevertheless, their 
foundation was seen as a new democratic opportunity, and in practice, citizens had to deal with 
bureaucratic, organizational issues. The transition affected interest associations as well: former 
socialist mass unions had to re-organize themselves, and new grass-roots organizations 
emerged, which played a relatively active role in demonstrations (András Tóth - Neumann, 
2010). According to Máté Szabó (1995b), trade unions organized 23-30 percent of protest 
205 
 
events between 1989 and 1994.246 The number of direct actions organized by trade unions 
peaked in 1997 and fell back afterward. (Berki, 2000) This is in line with Tóth and Neumann’s 
assertion (2010) that trade unions and their large confederations consolidated during the 
nineties, grass-roots movements vanished and the main tool of interest representation was to 
participate in established forums of social dialogue. In the 2000s, the situation changed and 
unions became more active in organizing extra-parliamentary actions. After 2003, they were 
more active in general than in the early nineties (Berki, 2011).   
The development of a professionalized, less conflict-ridden role is similar to the processes 
political and non-political associations experienced. First, in the nineties service provision 
became increasingly important for associations (Bocz, 2009). While the beginning of the 1990s 
saw the institutionalization of the formerly informal civil society, which had a strong political 
character, the stabilization of institutions gave space to the birth of the non-profit sector (Glózer, 
2008; Kuti, 1998). State policies and the lack of small-scale services pushed organizations to 
become service providers either working together with state institutions or providing services 
themselves. Thus, the period between 1995 and 2005 has been the most silent period in the last 
twenty years. During the 1990s and the early 2000s organizations developed a similar strategy 
of interest representation as trade unions: they influence politics through negotiations and 
policy recommendations rather than by direct pressure (Gerő - Fonyó, 2013).  
The more contentious politics returned after 2002 with a new Fidesz strategy, which affected 
the associational sphere, and mobilizations as well. The events of 2006 contributed to the re-
emergence of contentious politics. The crisis in 2006 activated a new group: right-wing and 
extreme right protesters, embedded in religious organizations. This is the period when Jobbik, 
an extreme right party gains enough support to enter Parliament in 2010 (András Tóth - 
Grajczjár, 2015). This is well reflected in the relationship of the left-right scale and extra-
parliamentary participation: in 1990 the position occupied on this scale was not important. In 
1999 being in the middle of the scale had a negative correlation with participation, while in 
2008 being “right-wing” increased the likelihood of participation compared to being left-wing 
(see table 36).    
The relationship between engagement in religious associations and extra-parliamentary 
participation also fits into the previous knowledge about the influence of the government’s 
political ideology on the use of non-electoral means of participation.  As Róbert and Szabó 
                                                                
246 1989 and 1991 were exceptional in this regard: in these years only 15-16 percent of the events were organized 
by trade unions (Máté Szabó, 1995b:63).  
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(2017) put it, under a right-wing government citizens with a religious background tend to use 
such institutionalized channels as contacting a politician, while under a left-wing government 
they turn to the repertoire of expressing direct pressure (e.g. protests).  This picture is supported 
by the negative correlation between participation in religious associations and extra-
parliamentary participation in 1999 and its reversal to a positive one by 2008.  
Despite the changes in the statistical relationship explored and the complex processes 
highlighted here, it is worth noting that engagement with non-political associations has a stable 
influence on political participation. This leads to the conclusion that when I examine the role 
of associations in supporting and developing political participation, I should look into three 
distinct factors. 
In the case of non-political participation, universal socialization, information distribution, and 
social networking factors operate. In other cases, with changes in the associational sphere and 
the political structure, a self-selection mechanism, or the impact of other control variables are 
responsible for the presumed influence of associations. In the case of religious and political 
associations, agency, which is neglected by the neo-Tocquevillian literature, might play an 
important role. Their changing relationship with political participation suggests that they do not 
serve only as a terrain for socialization or simply a networking site, but more as mobilizing 
agencies. Thus, their relationship with political participation (especially its extra-parliamentary 
forms) is changing according to their actual role in mobilization.   
II.3.10. Summary 
In this Chapter, I have examined the extent associational participation influenced electoral and 
extra-parliamentary participation in Hungary between 1991 and 2008. Tocquevillian and neo-
Tocquevillian theories on associations and civil society propose that associations have a crucial 
role in fostering political participation. The main assumption is that associations serve as an 
incubator of a system of universal values and skills supporting democratic political 
participation, they are sites of information distribution and developing social networks.  
These mechanisms are presented as universal mechanisms, emerging from the general 
characteristics of associations. However, empirical research points out that the relationship 
between associational and political participation is changing with time, by region or by types 
of associations.   
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To examine the validity of the assumption about the universal mechanism in the Hungarian 
case, I have presented an empirical analysis of the three waves of the European Values Study 
between 1991 and 2008. In this analysis, political participation was defined as electoral 
participation on the one hand, and extra-parliamentary participation on the other, while 
associational participation is based on the belonging and volunteering to four types of 
associations: political, non-political, interest and religious associations.   
The results reveal that the relationship between associational and political participation differs 
for the two types of political participation. Associational participation has a more frequent and 
perhaps stronger relationship with extra-parliamentary associations than with electoral 
participation. At the end of the period, the relationship between associational and electoral 
participation vanishes entirely.  
The relationship of associational and extra-parliamentary participation is also changing through 
the period, however not consistently for the different types of associations. While this 
relationship is missing for political associations in 1991 and appears from 1999, the existing 
relationship between belonging to other types of associations and extra-parliamentary 
participation vanishes by 1999. In 2008, the relationship is revived with engagement in non-
political associations.  
The varying results suggest that in the case of non-political associations, the results captured 
the presence of socialization processes, information distribution or a social networking effect. 
However, the analysis has revealed that a self-selection mechanism also takes place when 
associations collect people interested in politics or have the necessary background.  
Besides the Tocquevillian and self-selection mechanisms, the changing relationship between 
engagement in religious associations, political associations, and extra-parliamentary 
participation suggests that a third mechanism is at play: these associations are not only the 
terrain of social networks, but also serve as mobilizing agents.  
This last suggestion, however, cannot be examined on a dataset designed for the general 
purposes of understanding political behavior or value systems, but has to be taken to the field 






In this dissertation, I have explored the meanings and expectations towards Hungarian civil 
society around the time of the Velvet Revolution, examining how these expectations met reality 
in a twenty-year time span.   
Civil society, for the sake of the empirical examination, is understood as a sphere of voluntary 
associations. The expectations I have identified and examined are twofold: First, the 
associational sphere should expand itself and the pool of citizens engaging in exercising 
their civil and political rights. Second, participation in voluntary associations should foster 
individual engagement in political participation and political activities described in terms 
of the language of civil and political rights.  
The definition of civil society and the expectations towards it are based on a systemic review 
of the Hungarian and English scholarly literature published between 1985 and 1995. Based on 
this review, in Chapter I.2, I have identified five main categories of the usage of the concept. 
1) Civil society as a social order identifies civil society as the Western society and focuses on 
the structural relations between the sub-structures of a whole society. 2) A dualistic model, 
which redefines the Hegelian distinction of the state and civil society. This approach 
understands civil society as a sphere including everything outside the state. 3)  A dualistic model 
under state socialism, which equates civil society mainly with the second society, the non-
formal structures of society. 4) Civil society as a mediating sphere, in which civil society is 
understood as a non-state, non-economic sphere of organizations (and movements), mediating 
between the state and the society and providing important functions of social integration. 5) 
Civil society as the opposition under socialism refers to the networks and organizations of the 
dissident groups prior to 1989.  
Although the five models define civil society differently, voluntary associations are always 
found in the core of their definition. Furthermore, they attribute an important role to 
associations in developing democratic skills and values or creating a pool for mobilization and 
information sharing. As an outcome, these groups of authors expect that with time people will 
increasingly realize their civil and political rights, especially rights connected to associations 
and political participation. I often refer to the increasing realization of rights as the process of 





Therefore, the main expectations are formulated in the language of human rights. This is also 
based on the literature, since the language of human rights undoubtedly penetrates the corpus. 
To formulate the expectations by applying the idea of fundamental rights makes possible that 
civil society is at the same time a communitarian, association-based idea, but the expected 
outcome of its activity is imagined as growing individual-level participation, bringing as much 
plurality into the political system as possible. Civil and political rights create a bridge between 
communities and individual level participation. Although the rights connected to civil society 
could be realized only in a community, or at best in cooperation with others, they are connected 
to the individuals. In principle, this contradiction guarantees the balance between the need for 
communities to exercise rights, and pushes people to communicate and cooperate with each 
other since, in principle, it should not be possible to realize interests by simply overruling 
others. This way, these rights also secure that the forming communities do not oppress 
individual freedom, or the freedom of those who chose to remain outside these communities.  
It would be simplistic to pretend that each category of the usage of civil society is the same in 
the end. In my view, however, their main difference is connected to the mechanisms by which 
associations come into the picture in the eighties as one of the main forces of democratization. 
The way authors perceive this process is strongly connected to their definition of civil society. 
For example, theories presenting civil society as a social order emphasize long-term historical 
processes creating the necessary conditions for associating. Because of that, these theories lead 
to pessimistic views regarding the chances of building a new democracy. Dualistic models 
propose that tensions in the social structure lead to the realization of interests, which leads to 
the development of associations based on these interests. This is an unconscious way of 
democratization, while the ‘mediating sphere’ and ‘opposition’ approaches emphasize the more 
classical, Tocquevillian effects of civil organizations reformulated by Adam Michnik’s new 
evolutionism. According to this approach, civil society organization serves as the main network 
for the diffusion of democratic values and skills necessary to operate under democratic 
conditions. The autonomous sphere of civil society mediates between the state and society by 
proposing democratic mechanisms and suggesting that people are able to influence the state’s 
operation.  
Evidently, these are, in the same way as my synthesis, normative concepts and ones which are 
seen as unfulfilled by the vast majority of the literature published in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Despite the often sharp criticism of the notion of civil society, when I looked into this literature, 
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I found hardly any empirical attempts at following the tendencies of civil society from the 
point of view of its impact on individual level participation or exercising rights. Only 
officially registered organizations are followed longitudinally, but not doing more than merely 
describing their numbers and main organizational characteristics, such as their age, income and 
main activities.   
This is because of the widely accepted view that the project of civil society has failed. As I 
argue, this simple judgment is partly due to the mixing up of civil society as a political strategy 
by the opposition on the one hand, and civil society as a concept used in social sciences, on the 
other. The boundaries are blurry for several reasons, but while the failure of the strategy means 
the abandonment of the strategy, which could be stated several years after the Velvet 
Revolution, the democratization processes unfolded by civil society take more time and 
should be examined based on longitudinal data.   
It is true, however, that the strategy of civil society was abandoned after the transition. 
Nevertheless, I argue that it is hardly the outcome of a conscious decision. Political actors 
abandoned the strategy because of their assumptions about the mechanisms that are supposed 
to lead to the development of associations. These assumptions lead to parallel strategies and 
the interplay between them leads to a blind spot, which might explain why the strategy of civil 
society was abandoned after the transition. My argument is that there are four distinct, implicit 
factors built into these ideas of democratization, and a fifth, external factor leading to the 
abandonment of the strategy of civil society:  
1. Using the notion of autonomy in two different ways but treating them as the same: 
While the notion of second society defines autonomy as avoiding state control and 
being left alone, other approaches define autonomy as autonomous action, aiming at 
political participation and the active exercise of freedom rights.  
2. Forgetting that opposition groups lacked embeddedness, and expecting the 
democratization of second society, which would mean fostering its participation, 
despite its different criteria of autonomy.  
3. The assumption that voluntary associations have to and will be based on common 
interests, which are based on a shared social status, therefore they are always bound 
to distinct social groups.   
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4. The necessary focus on legal institutions: The programs and reforms of the 
opposition focused on the establishment of the legal framework, which is necessary, 
but not sufficient for establishing and maintaining a new democracy.  
5. The fifth factor is the rapid and unexpected nature of the regime change. This caught 
the supporters of civil society unprepared, and the elections every four years pushed 
the political actors towards strategies effectively maximizing votes. This 
marginalized the idea of further democratization, since the principles of civil society 
including the idea of individual freedoms lacked popular support in contrast to values 
of consumption, economic rights or raising living standards (Ferge, 1994).  
The abandonment of the strategy of civil society and the perception that it failed to fulfill its 
role had a further consequence. In describing and explaining voluntary organizations, the theory 
of the non-profit sector became the dominant approach (see Glózer, 2008; Kuti, 1998). 
Although this seems a minor issue, I argue that it is hardly possible to understand processes 
of democratization based on non-profit theories and when voluntary organizations and 
democratization are in the focus, civil society is still a better concept to use.  
The reasoning behind my argument is that the two broadly defined groups of theories rely on 
different theoretical cores and have different assumptions and questions. Non-profit theory asks 
the questions why someone acts for the public good or why someone does voluntary, non-paid 
work. According to the non-profit theory, this could be explained on the grounds of rational 
choice, motivations or selective incentives. ‘Civil society’ theories in principle cannot deal with 
these questions since their inquiry focuses on how to introduce human rights into the 
relationship of the state and its citizens. The main assumption that implicitly guides the attempts 
at answering this question is that human rights inherently belong to the individual. Thus, 
participation in the public sphere and governing their own life are part of the nature of 
the citizen. Selective incentives in this approach are not required to foster participation, but 
they can be a tool to block participation, especially when they are coming from the state or the 
economy.  
Civil society examines problems to which non-profit research is blind. The models, non-profit 
economic theories propose, require democracy and market-oriented economy. Civil society 
theories target the development of democracy (and sometimes the market), which is the 
framework for non-profit theories. Probably this is the explanation of why Hungarian 
researchers adopted the non-profit framework in the early nineties. The problem of democracy 
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seemed to be solved, at least on the institutional level. As it is easily observed, the failures of 
democratization have recently redirected the attention of non-profit researchers to the notion of 
civil society.   
Undoubtedly, the data which non-profit researchers based in the Hungarian Statistical Office 
provide is an invaluable resource. This data is often used for the purposes of research on civil 
society. Problems arise from the divergent theoretical core, often seen as questions of data 
collection. These questions are treated as “solved” by paying a seemingly small price: the 
data offered by non-profit research is seen as information about an organized civil society 
which cannot reach informal actors of civil society. However, this approach does not only 
abandon informal actors but treats civil society organizations as non-profit, excluding parties 
and other formally political actors by default. As a further problem, this type of data alone 
cannot take the impact of associations into account. Thus, for my purposes it is better to a) use 
the concept of civil society (and voluntary associations for operationalizing empirical research) 
b) use individual-level data provided by nationally representative surveys.  
Because of the limits of the dissertation, the empirical examination focuses on the scope of 
realizing civil and political rights and the impact of associations on the practice of these 
rights. At first sight, examining the realization of rights is an easy task, since there are 
numerous indices available. However, when I tried to apply them to following the changes, I 
faced serious problems. It turned out that these indices are able to follow institutional changes 
only, such as changes in regulations or state policies, but they do not capture the extent people 
exercise their rights.  
Therefore, in Chapter II.1, I needed to develop a method which is able to capture the changes 
in exercising freedom of association, freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly and 
the right to take part in public life. This is an action-based approach of measuring human 
rights, since it takes the actions of citizens into account.  
After laying down the basics for such a methodology, I was able to examine the extent of 
exercising these rights. Along with the aim of examining whether exercising the four 
fundamental rights became more prevalent during the two decades after the Velvet Revolution, 
I identified how the institutional characteristics of the new system and its changes shaped these 
trends. Four aspects of institutional change were examined: the overall framework 
(Constitution, and fundamental laws about the given rights), policy changes concerning civil 
society, political opportunity structures (electoral cycles) and turmoil of the political system.  
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To the first question about the extent of exercising rights, the overall answer is not surprising. 
Although in some aspects the prevalence of participation or exercising rights increased, in most 
aspects they were stagnating at best. Associational participation stagnated or even decreased 
throughout the period, as measured by individual engagement (membership, belonging and 
volunteering) or by registering associations.  Participation in different kinds of events, 
qualifying as assemblies also stagnated. Trends of the realization of the right to take part in 
public issues do not have a clear direction. The realization of this right is measured by electoral 
participation, participation in popular votes, numbers of popular initiatives and contacting 
politicians. The only systematic change is that the prevalence of contacting politicians is related 
to electoral cycles, becoming more prevalent in electoral years. Private forms of freedom of 
expression (discussing politics) seem to grow in the 2000s, following a setback in the early 
nineties.   
Policy periods rarely have an identifiable effect on exercising rights. There are two 
exceptions: Firstly the case of tax designation, which is a form of expressing opinions, created 
by a certain regulation. Secondly, when the regulation about referenda and popular initiatives 
was clarified in 1997, this clarification gave an impetus to initiating these forms of direct 
democracy and consequently to exercise the right to take part in public affairs.  
Political opportunity structures have a more significant influence. Although it seems that the 
level of individual participation is not affected by electoral cycles, registering associations, the 
number of assemblies and, to in a smaller extent, the number of local referenda initiated is 
influenced by them: when opportunity structures are open, the number of these attempts 
is higher, while closing opportunity structures lower them.  
Finally, political turmoil undoubtedly has an impact on some forms of exercising freedom of 
expression in the private sphere (discussing politics). Political upheavals motivate people to 
talk about politics, however, expectations formed during times of social and political change 
might have a counter-effect, by discouraging interest in politics when expectations proved to 
be exaggerated. Political turmoil probably has an impact on practicing freedom of assembly, 
and on the right to take part in public affairs: the number of assemblies, referenda initiated and 
popular initiatives all show an unexpected growth after 2006. Although the number of 
assemblies returns to the level experienced before 2006, the attempts to initiate referenda seem 
to be growing further.  
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Thus, two main tendencies are identifiable: First, exercising freedom rights measured by 
individual forms of participation mostly remains stable throughout the period, while 
attempts on the “event” level (registering associations, number of assemblies, number of 
referenda initiated) seem to be influenced by political opportunity structures or political 
turmoil. Thus, it seems that the proportion of people ready to participate is similar throughout 
the period, which leads to strong structural causes, while openness of opportunity structures or 
unexpected events might increase the level of their organizational activity.  
In Chapter II.3, I examined the extent associational participation influenced political 
participation in Hungary between 1991 and 2008. The practice of rights, when translated into 
political action, might be better examined together than separated analytically. For this reason, 
in this chapter, I differentiated between extra-parliamentary (protests, boycotts, petitions 
and strikes) and electoral participation. The core expectations toward civil society around 
the transition are very similar to the mechanisms Tocquevillian and neo-Tocquevillian theories 
propose about the relationship between associational and political participation. Thus, 
associations serve as an incubator of a system of universal values and skills supporting 
democratic political participation; they are sites of information distribution and developing 
social networks.  
These mechanisms are presented as universal, emerging from the general characteristics of 
associations. However, empirical research points out that the relationship between associational 
and political participation is changing with time, by region or by types of associations.  Based 
on the available classifications and the examination of the characteristics of associations which 
might influence the impact of associations, I have identified four types: political, non-
political, interest and religious associations.   
To examine the relationship between engagement in associations and political participation in 
the Hungarian case, I have presented an empirical analysis of the three waves of European 
Values Study between 1991 and 2008. The results reveal that the relationship between 
associational and political participation differs for the two types of political participation. 
Associational participation has a more frequent and perhaps stronger relationship with 
extra-parliamentary associations than with electoral participation. At the end of the period, 
the relationship between associational and electoral participation vanishes entirely.  
The relationship of associational and extra-parliamentary participation is also changing through 
the period, however not consistently for the different types of associations. While this 
215 
 
relationship appears only from 1999 in the case of political associations, the existing 
relationship between belonging to other types of associations and extra-parliamentary 
participation vanishes by 1999 and re-appears in 2008 for engagement in non-political 
association only.  
The varying results suggest that in the case of non-political associations, the presence of 
socialization processes, information distribution or the social networking effect might be 
captured. However, the analysis reveals that a self-selection mechanism, whereby 
associations collect people interested in politics or have the necessary background to 
mobilize resources for participation might also be present.  
Besides the Tocquevillian and self-selection mechanisms, the changing relationship between 
engagement in religious associations, political associations, and extra-parliamentary 
participation suggests that a third mechanism is at play: these associations are not only the 
terrain of social networks but also serve as mobilizing agents.  
Finally, what are the answers to the questions I initially raised? What is the impact of civil 
society on democratization? The results suggest that the picture is far more complex than the 
often repeated claims about the weakness and failures of civil society imply. Firstly, belonging 
to voluntary associations has a correlation with exercising rights. As the theory suggests, 
this relationship should be causal, thus associations support the realization of rights or 
participation. Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to decide about the direction of casualty. 
Thus it might be possible that, as Hannah Arendt suggests, any kind of participation serves as 
a wake-up force for human dignity. But associations certainly have a role in this circle, in 
which action leads to increasing consciousness, and this consciousness leads to more action.  
This role might be twofold. First, the often-emphasized political socialization and mobilizing 
effects might be present. Mechanisms developing democratic and organizing skills, or building 
social networks require permanent engagement and hardly evolve in acts that require only 
momentary engagement, as participation in a protest. Therefore, it might be a plausible 
conclusion that associational engagement explains political participation.   
Secondly, associations might not only serve as a terrain for socialization and do not provide a 
possible pool of networking and mobilizing but act as mobilizing agents. Thus, under different 
circumstances, they mobilize different groups and might also foster different types of 
participation. This way, as expected, they are active participants of democratization processes.    
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However, it seems that the other parts of the expectations have failed. Although associations 
are able to contribute to the mobilization of certain social groups, they were unable to increase 
the proportion of people realizing their rights. At this point, however, I need to admit that 
the analysis was unable to explore the exact role of associations in this phenomenon. To 
examine the capacity of associations to include new members, a different research design would 
be needed. Data should be collected on the organizational level from associations, and in 
parallel, on the individual level from their members in a way that associations and the activities 
their membership is engaged in could be followed, fluctuation rates and the inclusion of new 
people could be tracked. This data is not available and certainly not for the examined period. 
This type of research is ahead of us.  
It is also important to point out that institutional processes were also unable to foster the 
realization of rights, with the much larger pool of resources and tools that the governments and 
state institutions controlled. Although these institutions certainly influence the extent people 
realize their rights, the strength of this influence is not clear. It is also not clear whether 
associations are only observing this process, or are somehow counter-balancing it, slowing 
down the eruptive influence of state (and economic) institutions. I believe that this is a question 
that is becoming more and more pressing.  
It is also clear that the two terrains, namely political and state institutions and civil society, are 
interrelated. Political turmoil and political opportunity structures have an impact on 
associational participation, while associations might contribute to the legitimacy of a given 
regime through mobilization. Sometimes associations serve more as “transmission belts” 
mobilizing loyal citizens, while on the other hand they might give a possibility to raise concerns. 
This, rather than a clear bottom-up or top-down direction, points to the interrelatedness of the 
two directions. 
Even more importantly, I must emphasize that the proportion of people gathering in associations 
or engaging in extra-parliamentary ways of expressing their opinions hardly changed 
throughout the period. Certainly, there are shifts in the membership of associations working in 
different fields, or probably the issues of strikes and protests are changing, but the proportion 
and characteristics of people is very similar throughout the twenty years.  Thus, the prevalence 
of such activities might be deeply embedded in the structural characteristics of Hungarian 
society. What matters greatly is not only its value structure, as for example the dominance of 
material values, or the refusal of tolerance and its closed character (Keller, 2010), but probably 
also its hierarchies on the micro and macro level, processes in the families and the methods 
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applied in education (D. Sik, 2014; A. Szabó, 2018; I. Szabó et al., 2010).  Therefore, it seems 
hard to escape the ‘paradox of democracy’ as it was foreseen by Ernest Gellner or Ralf 
Dahrendorf, or the power characteristics of this society developed by the long-term processes 
Jenő Szűcs described.  
And the scene is changing. First, with the various crises in the late 2000s, contentious politics 
strengthened in Hungary and worldwide. (Della Porta, 2015; Della Porta - Alice, 2014; Gerő - 
Kerényi, 2017; Van Til - Krasztev, 2013). Populist and authoritarian tendencies are on the rise. 
Based on the argument that the concept of civil society is always connected to the processes of 
democratic development, it is not a surprise that the concept has lately come into fashion again 
both in political sociology and in public discourse. With rising populism and authoritarian 
tendencies, the question is not how to amend the “system”, but how to secure freedoms and 
democratic institutions. Under the growing tensions, civil society has entered into the discourse 
in three different regards. The expectations formulated towards civil society that it will counter-
balance authoritarian tendencies have re-appeared in a manner similar to that around the 
Velvet Revolution. (Cizewska-Martynska, 2015) Second, as Carothers and Brechenmacher 
(2014) argue, there is a closing space for human rights and civil society organizations in many 
countries. This means changing regulations is unfavorable for independent civil society 
organizations and the closing political opportunity structures.  
Third, both the concept of civil society and civil society organizations have become part of the 
political discourse. Political actors like to point out “real” and “pseudo” or “fake” civil society 
organizations, to control the discourse on what and who is “civil”, thus, as Jeffrey Alexander 
(2006) points out, to define who belongs to the polity. They argue that fake civil organizations 
only serve ill interests, the other side of the political terrain, which tries to ruin the polity. 
Through these fake civils, they identify the actors who are against the nation and their 
supporters. As a consequence, civil society as a pool of actors and as an important element 
of the political discourse becomes a frontier of a sharpening political conflict.  
In this conflict, the enemies of the nation are mainly organizations critical of populist 
governments and organizations standing on the ground of human rights. Although the conflict 
takes place mainly in the discursive arena of politics, the Russian, Hungarian and Israeli anti-
NGO laws, labeling civil society organizations as foreign agents, point out that governments 
started to use more direct policy tools to exclude civil society organizations from the political 
arena, or to occupy their resources. Such a labeling practice might strike us as extreme but 
regulations with the intent of controlling the resources of civil society organizations and 
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applying restrictions about accepting foreign funding are in effect in more the 40 countries 
(Dupuy et al., 2016).  
Nevertheless, most of these countries were never considered established democracies. There 
are a few countries, however, such as Hungary, Poland and Israel, which belong to the pool of 
countries that are relatively rich (in a global comparison), consider themselves democracies, 
where  democratic institutions have been perceived as well established until recently, but who 
are taking a populist, or even authoritarian turn, including an anti-civil society stance (Filc, 
2018; Gerő et al., 2017; Herman et al., 2016).  
The research on discourses about civil society, the conflicts between populists and civil society 
organizations is the last and maybe most important direction this research could turn to. Thus, 
not only associations and participation, but conflicts also need to be examined to understand 
the role of civil society in building and maintaining a democracy and to understand, and more 
importantly, to explore the circumstances under which civil society and its friends are able to 









1) Categories, Subcategories and indicators of Freedom in the World’s ranking 





Is the head of government or other chief national authority 
elected through free and fair elections? 
Are the national legislative representatives elected through 
free and fair elections? 




Do the people have the right to organize in different political 
parties or other competitive political groupings of their 
choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these 
competing parties or groupings? 
 Are there a significant opposition vote and a realistic 
opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain 
power through elections? 
 Are the people’s political choices free from domination by 
the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious 
hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful 
group? 
Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have 
full political rights and electoral opportunities? 
Functioning of 
Government 
Do the freely elected head of government and national 
legislative representatives determine the policies of the 
government? 
Is the government free from pervasive corruption? 
Is the government accountable to the electorate between 







Are there free and independent media and other forms of 
cultural expression?  (Note: In cases where the media are 
state controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the 
survey gives the system credit.) 
Are religious institutions and communities free to practice 
their faith and express themselves in public and private? 
Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system 
free of extensive political indoctrination? 





 Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open 
public discussion? 
 Is there freedom for nongovernmental 
organizations?  (Note: This includes civic organizations, 
interest groups, foundations, etc.) 
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Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or 
equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are 
there free professional and other private organizations? 
Rule of Law Is there an independent judiciary? 
Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal 
matters?  Are police under direct civilian control? 
Is there protection from political terror, unjustified 
imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that 
support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and 
insurgencies? 
Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of 





Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, 
employment, or institution of higher education? 
 Do citizens have the right to own property and establish 
private businesses?  Is private business activity unduly 
influenced by government officials, the security forces, 
political parties/organizations, or organized crime? 
Are there personal social freedoms, including gender 
equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family? 





2) The validation of data used to examine the practice of political rights  
Building timelines is a challenge, especially when a single longitudinal research program, 
which covers the whole examined period, executes its data collection rounds frequently enough 
and comparable, is not available. In my case, there is only one research program which covers 
the examined period between 1990 and 2010 and which contains data about participation: the 
European Values Study program (EVS). Since it is conducted in every nine years, which is 
quite rare, I have to apply other datasets to examine trends of participation.  
The European Social Survey (ESS) is an ideal candidate to supplement the EVS since Hungary 
has participated in every round of the European Social Survey program. The ESS started in 
2002 and repeated in every two years, thus it covers the period of 2002-2010. Although the ESS 
measures political participation in its every round, only the first round has variables about 
associational engagement. As a control and further possibility of an inquiry, I used the data of 
the Hungarian Election Studies collected in 2003, 2008 and 2009247 and the “Citizenship” data 
of the International Social Survey Programme from 2004.   
Since associational and political participation, as well as engaging in other forms of exercising 
rights is influenced by socio-demographic variables, to compare the different datasets it is 
inevitable that I know whether the distribution of the collected data is similar to the Hungarian 
population’s distribution at least regarding some important variables. Therefore, in this 
Appendix, I examine whether these databases, compared to the National Census, conducted in 
every 10 years are reliable sources. I will examine the: 
- Three waves (1991, 1999, 2008) of European Values Study  
- The five waves of European Social Survey (ESS 2002-2010)  
- Three waves of the Hungarian Election Program (2003, 2008, 2009) 
- ISSP Citizenship 2004 
Validating data 
Participation is highly influenced by demographic features. To be sure that the data used gives 
reliable results, I examined the datasets whether they can be treated as representative to the 
Hungarian adult population by some of its characteristics. I chose four variables to examine: 
gender, level of education, age and the distribution of population among types of 
settlements.  
As a reference point, I use the National Census from 1990, 2001 and 2011. In the case of gender 
and educational level, the survey data and the census could be grouped in the same way. 
Respondents of the surveys by age are grouped almost in the same categories than the census. 
There is only one minor difference between them: the surveys I apply were conducted on the 
adult (18+) population248 except for the ESS. In the case of the ESS, such as in the analysis in 
                                                                
247 The dataset form 2008 and 2009 is partly a result of a panel-study: The sampling in 2009 was based on the 
respondents of the data collected in 2008. In 2008 3122 respondents answered the questionnaire, from which the 
researchers were able to find 1523 respondents. The sample in 2009 was supplemented with the inclusion of new 
respondents, thus the total sample included 2980 people. (Kmetty, 2013) Therefore despite its panel-characteristic, 
the data collected in 2009 was also intended to be nationally representative.  
248The ESS collects data from the 15+ population, but I deleted the respondents younger than 18 from the database 
to make it more comparable to the others.    
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chapter II.2, I left out the respondents under 18. From the published data on the census, the 
closest lowest age groups are the 15-19 and 20-24 years old cohort. For the analysis, I chose to 
include the 15-19-year-old group as well.  
The most difficult is to apply the same settlement categories to the different datasets, since some 
of the data ask about the different types of (ESS) settlements or the size (EVS) only.  
Gender 
The numbers provided by the censuses are generally very similar to those in the survey data.  
Their proportion remained the same through the 21 years: around 47% male and 53% female. 
The examined datasets have a similar proportion, with one exception: Two rounds of the ESS, 
in 2004 and 2006 experience a larger deviation from the censuses. The proportions of males are 
41.5 in 2004 and 42.3 in 2006, consequently, the percentages of females are 58.5 and 57.7.  
(table 40) 
Table 38. Gender by the National Census 1990-2011, percentage of 15+ population 
 1990 2001 2011 
male 47.2 46.8 46.8 
female 52.8 53.2 53.2 
Table 39. Distribution of respondents by gender, EVS, percentage of 18+ population 
 
EVS II EVS III EVS IV 
male 47.8 46.9 46.6 
female 52.2 53.1 53.4 
N 999 1000 1513 
Table 40. Distribution of respondents by gender, ESS, percentage of 18+ population 
 ESS 1  ESS 2 ESS 3 ESS 4 ESS 5 
male 47.4 41.4 42.3 46.2 45.7 
female 52.6 58.6 57.7 53.8 54.3 
N 1610 1431 1469 1503 1535 
Table 41. Distribution of respondents by gender, HES and ISSP 2004, percentage of 18+ 
population 
 HES 2003 ISSP 2004 HES 2008 HES 2009 
male 47.2 46.6 46.5 46.5 
female 52.8 53.4 53.5 53.5 
N 1507 1035 3120 2980 
Age 
The comparison of the distribution of age in the datasets and the national censuses shows larger 
differences than the distribution of gender. The EVS in 1990 under-represents the younger 
generation and over-represents the middle-aged group. The difference is around eight percent 
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in the first and five in the second case. In the younger group, it is more than the standard 
deviation would allow (+-1,6) with a 95% confidence interval, even if one take into 
consideration that the first age category of the census involves the 15-17 years old population. 
The ESS datasets are similar, throughout the 2000s: they underrepresent the younger generation 
(the lowest proportion is 33.9% in 2006, the highest is 37.6% in 2010) and somehow over the 
middle-aged and elderly group. The largest the difference between ESS and the national census 
regarding the middle-aged group is in 2002 (around six percent). In 2004, 2008 and 2010, both 
of the two older groups have a higher proportion only with one or two percentages.  HES and 
ISSP seems to be closer to the censuses, the difference between these and the censuses remains 
between one and three percent in each age group.  
Table 42. Age in three categories by the National Census, percentage of 15+ population 
 1990 2001 2011 
15-39 44.7 42.0 40.1 
40-59 31.5 33.5 32.4 
60+ 23.8 24.5 27.5 
Table 43. Distribution of respondents by age, 1991-2008, percentage of 18+ population 
 EVS II EVS III EVS IV 
18-39 37 40.1 39.6 
40-59 36.3 34.8 34.4 
60+ 26.6 25.1 26 
N 999 997 1513 
Table 44. Distribution of respondents by age, ESS, percentage of 18+ population 
 ESS 1  ESS 2 ESS 3 ESS 4 ESS 5 
18-39 35.7 36.5 33.9 36.6 37.6 
40-59 37.3 34.9 36.3 33.8 33.4 
60+ 27 28.6 29.8 29.6 29 
N 1610 1431 1469 1502 1535 
Table 45. Distribution of respondents by age, HES and ISSP 2004, percentage of 18+ 
population 
 HES 2003 ISSP 2004 HES 2008 HES 2009 
18-39 39.4 39.2 39.1 38.9 
40-59 35.7 35.1 33.9 34.2 
60+ 24.9 25.7 27 26.9 





Educational level is one of the most important predictors of any type of participation. Therefore, 
any significant deviation from the national data could seriously affect the measured extent of 
participation.  Since in the National Census I applied the percentage of the 15+ population to 
count the proportion of each educational level, one could expect somehow lower ratios of the 
higher two levels.  
There are two noteworthy deviations are experienced. First, in 1991 in the lowest level of 
education and in completed secondary education. In this case, the data collected by EVS in 
1991 underrepresents those, who did not finish primary education with almost seven percent, 
and over-represents those who finished secondary education with nine percent. Second, the 
second round of ESS overrepresents those, who completed the secondary and higher education.   
Table 46. Education by the National Census, percentage of the 15+ population 
 1990 2001 2011 
Uncompleted primary education 21.9 11.2 4.8 
Completed primary education 50.2 52.3 48.2 
Completed secondary education 18.7 25.4 30.7 
Higher education (At least BA/college degree) 8.3 10.4 16.1 
Table 47. Distribution of respondents by educational level, EVS, percentage of the 18+ 
population249 





Uncompleted primary education 15 14.7 4.9 
Completed primary education 48.8 50.3 46.9 
Completed secondary education 27.7 24.2 31.8 
Higher education (At least BA/college degree) 8.4 10.4 16.2 
N 986 987 1500 
Table 48. Distribution of respondents by educational level, ESS, percentage of 18+ 
population 
 ESS 1  ESS 2 ESS 3 ESS 4 ESS 5 
Uncompleted primary education 8.7 3.2 5.4 7 4 
Completed primary education 52.5 38,7 53.3 53.9 46.1 
Completed secondary education 24.6 37.8 27.8 26.8 34.8 
Higher education (At least BA/college 
degree) 14.2 20.2 13.4 12.3 15.1 
N 1556 1431 1467 1502 1533 
  
                                                                
249 Based on the age, the respondent completed education.  
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Table 49. Distribution of respondents by educational level, HES and ISSP 2004, 
percentage of the 18+ population 
 HES 2003 ISSP 2004 HES 2008 HES 2009 
Uncompleted primary education 10,2 9.3 6,4 6,4 
Completed primary education 52,2 52.5 48,5 48,2 
Completed secondary education 26,2 28 29,1 29,1 
Higher education (At least 
BA/college degree) 11,4 10.1 16 16,1 
N 1507 1035 3122 2969 
Type of settlement 
The type of settlements is the most difficult variable to compare. The national census applies 5 
categories: capital, county-centers, cities with county rights, towns and villages. The ESS and 
ISSP apply different categories, while HES aggregates the second and third categories. EVS 
measures the size of the cities. Despite these differences in the metrics, the overall picture is 
that the datasets fit the national censuses. The differences between the censuses and the surveys 
are usually small, only one or two percentages. The only exception is the second round of the 
ESS, where the number of people living in a big city was 62% which means that this wave 
almost did not reach anyone from the countryside (table 51). Fortunately, the regional 
distribution of the respondents is similar to the census, thus the large proportion of ‘big cities’ 
does not mean the overrepresentation of the capital. As a comparison, ISSP counts that 34.5 of 
the respondents lives in a large city, which is much closer to the national censuses results (35.2 
percent of the Hungarians live in Budapest or in county-centers) 
Table 50. Distribution of the 18+ population by the type of settlement by the National 
Census 1990-2011, percentage of the population 
 1990 2001 2011 
Budapest 19.4 17.4 17.4 
County-centers 17.8 17.8 17.7 
Cities with county rights 2.5 2.6 2.7 
Towns 30.6. 31.4 31.7 
Villages 29.6 30.7 30.5 
Table 51. Distribution of the 18+ population by the type of settlement, ESS and ISSP 
2004, percentage of the 18+ population  
 ESS 1 ISSP 2004 ESS 2 ESS 3 ESS 4 ESS 5 
City 21.9 34.6 62 21.7 15.1 25.5 
Suburb of a City 3 2.7 7.2 3.5 2.8 6.1 
Town 35 30.1 26 39.7 37.4 34.4 
Country village 38.7 31.6 3.5 33.3 43.2 32.6 
Farm or home in 
countryside 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.8 1.5 1.4 
N 1609 1035 1421 1469 1503 1535 
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Table 52. Distribution of the 18+ population by the type of settlement, EVS (percentage 
of the population) 
 EVS 1991 
EVS 
1999 EVS 2008 
Budapest 21.7 19.4 16.6 
Above 50.000 
inhabitants 9.6 16.7 19.4 
5-50000 inhabitants 39.8 32.5 32.5 
Below 5000 
inhabitants  28.7 31.4 31.5 
N 998 1000 1514 
Table 53. Distribution of the 18+ population by the type of settlement, HES and ISSP 
2003-2009, percentages  
 HES 2003 HES 2008 HES 2009 
Budapest 18.5 17.2 17.2 
County-centers 16.4 19.1 19.1 
Towns 29.3 30.5 30.9 
Villages 35.8 33.33 32.8 
N 1507 3122 2980 
Data validation suggests that most of the applied survey is good for examining trends of 
participation. The only dataset which shows multiple deviations from the census is the second 
round of the ESS. However, the highest educational level and the capital is not as 
overrepresented as the people living in larger cities. Since this dataset is only interesting 
regarding extra-parliamentary participation, I decided not to exclude it from the analysis. 
However, it must be noted that the data resulted from this particular dataset might overrepresent 
the people who engage in any type of participation.  
In a smaller extent, the EVS’s data, collected in 1991 deviates in some aspect from the census 
in 1990. Age and education differ from the results of the national census, younger generations 
are over-, while the group with the lowest educational level is under-represented. Those who 
completed secondary education are also over-represented. If I accept that younger generations 
and those who attend higher levels of education tend to participate more likely than others, both 
deviations might decrease the extent of the measured participation in 1991. However, I do not 
have other data from the early nineties, and deviations are not that large, which would suggest 





3) Associational participation by activity fields  
Table 54. Belonging and volunteering to a voluntary organization or group by activity 
fields (belonging), 1991-2008, EVS, percentage of the adult population* 
 1991 1999 2008 
  Belong Volunteer Belong Volunteer Belong Volunteer 
1.      welfare 
organization 2.1 1.5 1.9 2.7 0.9 0.5 
2.      religious 
organization 11.1 2.6 12.1 5.4 6.1 2.2 
3.      cultural 
activities 2.5 1.9 3.4 3 2.6 2.6 
4.      trade unions 31.7 4.6 7 1.3 3.7 0.7 
5.      political 
organization 2.4 1.2 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.4 
6.      local community 
action 1.4 1.5 1 1.3 1.4 0.8 
7.   third-world 
development/ human 
rights organization 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
8.      professional 
organization 
5.6 1.6 3.7 1.9 1.7 0.8 
9.      youth work 
organization 
1.8 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.1 
10.  sports and 
recreation 
organization 
4.2 1.7 3.8 2.6 4.9 2.7 
11.  women’s groups 1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.6 
12.  peace movement 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 
13.  voluntary health 
organization 
3.5 2 2 1.2 1.6 0.7 
14.  environmental, 
ecology and animal 
rights organization 
2.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.4 0.8 
15.  other groups 1.8 0.8 2.6 1.8 1.7 1.8 
total 50 16 29 15  21  11  
N 999  1000  1513  
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Table 55. Membership, participation, volunteering and donating money in voluntary 
organization or group by activity fields, 2002, ESS, percentage of the adult population* 
 Member Participated Belong (member+participate Volunteer Donate 
sports/outdoor activity club 4.70 5.30 7.9 2 0.9 
cultural /hobby activity 
organization 4.30 5.40 7.8 
2.5 0.7 
trade Unions 6.30 2.70 6.8 0.9 0.3 
business/professional/farmers 
organizations 3.50 3.20 4.6 
1.1 0.4 
consumer/automobile 
organizations 3.00 0.70 3.30 
0.1 0.3 
humanitarian organizations 0.70 0.70 1.2 0.8 1.3 
environmental/peace/animal 
organizations 0.40 0.90 1.2 
2 2.7 
religious/church organizations 6.00 4.70 8 0.4 0.4 
political Party 1.60 1.40 2.2 0.8 0.2 
science, Education, teacher 
organization 2.90 2.40 4.1 
1.3 0.3 
social club 5.20 4.10 7.5 0.9 0.5 
other voluntary organization 2.40 1.90 3.2 1.5 0.7 
total 26.50 19.00 32 9 6.3 





Table 56.  Membership in voluntary organizations or group by activity fields, 2003-2009 
HES, percentage of the adult population 
 HES 2003 HES 2008 HES 2009 
sports club 5.1 6.9 6.3 
cultural organization 3.8 2.9 3.5 
trade union 4.6 4.7 4.6 
professional organization 2.8 3.2 3 
political organization 1.8 1 2 
social movement, civil society 
organization 2.6 3 3.3 
religious, church organization 4.4 5.4 4.6 
welfare organization 1.7 1.6 1.8 
local group 1.6 1.7 2 
environmental organization 1 1.1 1.3 
kaláka, house building community n.a. n.a 1.1 
local event organizing n.a. n.a 3.3 
local sports event organizing n.a. n.a 3.4 
total 19 21.3 18.8 
N 1507 3122 2870 
 
Table 57. Membership in voluntary organizations or group by activity fields, 2004, ISSP 
Citizenship, percentage of the adult population 
 Field ISSP Citizenship, 2004, % 
political party 1,4 
trade union 10,1 
church, religious organization 29,1 
sports group 2,4 






4) The sources of protest event analysis: journal articles and datasets.   
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On page 116 the source of the data for voter turnout is not cited. The source of the data is the 
Voter Turnout Database published by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance.  
The corrected text should be phrased as:   
As a single indicator, I use voter turnout to evaluate this particular right based on the election 
held in 2010 or in the prior year.  
Although similarly to the situation experienced in the case of the other rights, the voter turnout 
was the highest in Sweden in 2010 (84.6%) the overall picture of the five countries is different. 
France, Estonia and Hungary had a similar, relatively low voter turnout, (60.4%, 61.9% and 
64.4%) while Italy was closer to the Swedish rate with its 78.1 percent voter turnout. (IDEA 
2018) 
Reference:  
IDEA (2018) Voter Turnout Database. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance. Stockholm. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout last accessed: 
10/12/2018 
 
 
 
